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Education in the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Within the Tunisian Youth

First of all, how should we define radicalization? Radicalization refers to a social and moral disruption process. This leads an individual to the adoption of a new vision of society, and new behaviors that, in the end, break the social pact. The European Union gives another definition according to which radicalization is the adoption process, by an individual, of a radical ideology in which violence is advocated in order to reach a specific objective.  
Mathilde Dard
October 24, 2022
14 minute read

Mauritania: Intra-Africa Trade in Value Added

The Mauritanian economy suffers a substantial lack of diversification, low productivity, and over-reliance on primary sectors. According to the world bank Mauritania: Country Economic Memorandum (2020), in 2017, mining and fishing products accounted for 98.1 percent of the country’s exports. The insufficiency of the economic diversification and the slow transformation of the economy have central implications when it comes to the vulnerability to external shocks such as exchange rate and commodity prices fluctuation. An example is the 2014 fall in the price of the commodity shock that led the 5.5 percent GDP growth in the period 2011-2014 to drop to 2.5 percent in the period 2015-2018. Moreover, the insufficient diversification of the economy results in the dependency on low value-added domestic activities, which in turn, is associated with limited job creation, low productivity, and sluggish growth.
Mohamedou Nasser Dine
May 26, 2022
2 minute read

Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰ§Ù‚ Ű§Ù„Ù‚Ű§Ù†ÙˆÙ†ÙŠ و Ű§Ù„Ù‚Ű¶Ű§ŰŠÙŠ Ù„ŰŻŰ±ŰĄ Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰ·Ű±Ù Ù„ŰŻÙ‰ Ű§Ù„ŰŽŰšŰ§Űš

ŰłŰ§Ù‡Ù… Ű§Ù†ŰȘێۧ۱ ŰžŰ§Ù‡Ű±Ű© Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰ·Ű±Ù Ű§Ù„Űčنيف وŰȘŰčŰŻŰŻ Ű§Ù„ŰčÙ…Ù„ÙŠŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ű„Ű±Ù‡Ű§ŰšÙŠŰ© Ű§Ù„ŰȘي هŰČŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰčŰ§Ù„Ù… في ۧ۶ŰčŰ§Ù Ű§Ù„Ű§ŰłŰȘÙ‚Ű±Ű§Ű± Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰčي وŰȘÙ‚ÙˆÙŠŰ¶ ŰŹÙ‡ÙˆŰŻ Ű§Ù„ŰłÙ„Ű§Ù……
Maghreb Economic Forum
July 24, 2019
1 minute read

June 4 @ 22:48

ÙŠÙ†ŰžÙ… Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù†ŰȘŰŻÙ‰ Ű§Ù„Ű§Ù‚ŰȘŰ”Ű§ŰŻÙŠ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰșŰ§Ű±ŰšÙŠ ŰšŰ„Ű­ŰŻÙ‰ نŰČل ŰȘŰ·Ű§ÙˆÙŠÙ† يوم 19 ŰŁÙˆŰȘ Ù†ŰŻÙˆŰ© للŰȘŰčŰ±ÙŠÙ ŰšÙ…Ù†Ű”Ù‘Ű© "ŰšÙ†ÙˆŰŻ" www.bounoud.tn وŰč۱۶ Ù…ŰźŰȘلف ŰźŰ”Ű§ŰŠŰ”Ù‡Ű§ ŰšŰ­Ű¶ÙˆŰ± Ù…Ù…Ű«Ù„ÙŠ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŻÙ†ÙŠ ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰłÙ„Ű· Ű§Ù„ŰŹÙ‡ÙˆÙŠŰ© ŰšÙˆÙ„Ű§ÙŠŰ© ŰȘŰ·Ű§ÙˆÙŠÙ† ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰčŰŻÙŠŰŻ من Ű§Ù„ŰźŰšŰ±Ű§ŰĄ Ű§Ù„Ù†Ű§ŰŽŰ·ÙŠÙ† في Ù…ŰŹŰ§Ù„ Ű§Ù„Ű·Ű§Ù‚Ű© ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ű«Ű±ÙˆŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ű·ŰšÙŠŰčÙŠŰ©.
وŰȘÙ…Ű«Ù„ Ù…Ù†Ű”Ű© ŰšÙ†ÙˆŰŻ Ù…Ù†Ű”Ű© مŰȘÙƒŰ§Ù…Ù„Ű© ŰȘم ŰȘŰ·ÙˆÙŠŰ±Ù‡Ű§ ŰšŰ”ÙŰ© ŰȘŰŽŰ§Ű±ÙƒÙŠŰ© مŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŻÙ†ÙŠ ŰšŰȘŰ·Ű§ÙˆÙŠÙ† وŰȘÙ‚ŰŻÙ‘Ù… Ù…Ű€ŰŽŰ±Ű§ŰȘ Ù…Ű­ÙŠÙ‘Ù†Ù‡ ÙˆŰŻÙ‚ÙŠÙ‚Ű© ÙˆÙ…ŰŻŰčÙ‘Ù…Ű© ŰšŰ§Ù„ÙˆŰ«Ű§ŰŠÙ‚ Ű­ÙˆÙ„ مŰȘۧۚŰčŰ© Ű„Ù†ŰŹŰ§ŰČ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù‚ Ű§Ù„ÙƒŰ§Ù…ÙˆŰ± 2020.


ŰłŰȘكون Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù†Ű”Ű© ۄ۷ۧ۱ۧ ŰŹŰ§Ù…Űčۧ Ù„Ù…ŰłŰ§ŰčŰŻŰ© Ù…ŰźŰȘلف Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰȘŰŻŰźÙ„ÙŠÙ† من ŰłÙ„Ű·Ű§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ·Ù†ÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰŹÙ‡ÙˆÙŠŰ© ÙˆÙ…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ù…ŰŻÙ†ÙŠ ÙˆŰ„ŰčÙ„Ű§Ù… ÙˆÙ…ÙˆŰ§Ű·Ù†ÙŠÙ† Űčلى مŰȘۧۚŰčŰ© ŰȘÙ†ÙÙŠŰ° ۧŰȘÙŰ§Ù‚ Ű§Ù„ÙƒŰ§Ù…ÙˆŰ± 2020 ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ù…ŰłŰ§Ù‡Ù…Ű© في ŰźÙ„Ù‚ ۄ۷ۧ۱ Ù…ŰšÙ†ÙŠ Űčلى Ű§Ù„ŰŽÙŰ§ÙÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ű«Ù‚Ű© Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰȘŰšŰ§ŰŻÙ„Ű©.


ÙƒÙ…Ű§ ŰłŰȘŰŽÙ…Ù„ ŰšÙŠŰ§Ù†Ű§ŰȘ Űčن ŰŽŰ±ÙƒŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù†ÙŰ· ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰșۧŰČ Ű§Ù„ŰźŰ§Ű”Ű© ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰŽŰ±ÙƒŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰčÙ…ÙˆÙ…ÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰšÙ†ÙˆÙƒ ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰšÙ„ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆŰŽŰ±ÙƒŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù†Ù‚Ù„ ÙˆÙ…ŰŽŰ§Ű±ÙƒŰȘÙ‡Ű§ في Ű§Ù„Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù‚ÙŠŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù…ÙˆÙ‚ŰčŰ© ŰšÙŠÙ† Ű§Ù„Ű­ÙƒÙˆÙ…Ű© ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ù†Ű§ŰŽŰ·ÙŠÙ†.
ŰȘÙ†ŰŻŰ±ŰŹ Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„Ù†ŰŻÙˆŰ© في ۄ۷ۧ۱ ŰšŰ±Ù†Ű§Ù…ŰŹ "ŰšÙ†ÙˆŰŻ" Ű§Ù„Ű°ÙŠ ÙŠÙ‡ŰŻÙ Ű§Ù„Ù‰ ŰŻŰčم Ű§Ù„ŰŻÙˆŰ± Ű§Ù„Ű±Ù‚Ű§ŰšÙŠ Ù„Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŻÙ†ÙŠ ŰšŰȘŰ·Ű§ÙˆÙŠÙ† Űčلى Ù…ŰźŰȘلف Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰ§ŰłŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ű§ŰŹŰȘÙ…Ű§ŰčÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ű§Ù‚ŰȘŰ”Ű§ŰŻÙŠŰ© ŰšŰ§Ù„Ù…Ù†Ű·Ù‚Ű©.


ÙƒÙ…Ű§ ŰłÙŠÙŠŰȘم Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰ·Ű±Ù‚ ŰźÙ„Ű§Ù„ Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„Ù†ŰŻÙˆŰ© Ű„Ù„Ù‰:

  • Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰčŰ±ÙŠÙ ŰšÙŰ±ÙŠÙ‚ Ű§Ù„Űčمل
  • Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰčŰ±ÙŠÙ ŰšÙ†ŰŽŰ§Ű·Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ÙŰ±ÙŠÙ‚ ŰźÙ„Ű§Ù„ Ű§Ù„ŰŁŰ±ŰšŰč ŰłÙ†ÙˆŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ÙŰ§Ű±Ű·Ű©
  • ŰȘÙ‚ŰŻÙŠÙ… Ű§Ù„ÙˆŰłŰ§ŰŠÙ„ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰčŰȘÙ…ŰŻŰ© Ù„Ű„Ù†ŰŹŰ§ŰČ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù†Ű”Ű©

ŰłŰšÙ‚ Ù‡Ű°Ű§ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù„ŰȘقى Ű§Ù„ŰźŰȘŰ§Ù…ÙŠ ŰčŰŻÙŠŰŻ Ű§Ù„ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰŻŰ±ÙŠŰšÙŠŰ© Ű§Ù„ŰȘي ŰȘŰ·Ű±Ù‚ŰȘ ŰŁŰŽŰșŰ§Ù„Ù‡Ű§ Ű§Ù„Ù‰ Ű§Ù„Ù…ÙˆŰ§Ű¶ÙŠŰč Ű§Ù„ŰąŰȘÙŠŰ©:

  • ŰȘكوين Ű­ÙˆÙ„ Ű„Ù†ŰȘۧۏ Ű§Ù„Ù†ÙŰ· ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰșۧŰČ ÙÙŠ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù†Ű·Ù‚Ű©
  • ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Ű­ÙˆÙ„ ۧŰčŰȘŰ”Ű§Ù… Ű§Ù„ÙƒŰ§Ù…ÙˆŰ± 2017: Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰ§Ù‚ ÙˆÙ…ŰźŰȘلف Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰȘŰŻŰźÙ„ÙŠÙ†
  • ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Ű­ÙˆÙ„ ŰźŰ”ÙˆŰ”ÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ۧŰȘÙŰ§Ù‚ Ű§Ù„ÙƒŰ§Ù…ÙˆŰ± 2017 – ۧŰȘÙŰ§Ù‚ Ű§Ù„ÙƒŰ§Ù…ÙˆŰ± 2020
  • ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Ű­ÙˆÙ„ Ù…Ù†Ù‡ŰŹÙŠŰ© ŰŹÙ…Űč Ű§Ù„ŰšÙŠŰ§Ù†Ű§ŰȘ Ű­ÙˆÙ„ ŰȘŰ·ŰšÙŠÙ‚ Ű§Ù„Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù‚
  • ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Ű­ÙˆÙ„ ÙƒÙŠÙÙŠŰ© Ű§Ù„Ù†ÙŰ§Ű° Ű„Ù„Ù‰ Ù…Ù†Ű”Ű© ŰšÙ†ÙˆŰŻ ÙˆŰ§ŰłŰȘŰčÙ…Ű§Ù„Ù‡Ű§

Maghreb Economic Forum

+21671190019

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

We are privileged to be represented by Slim Othmani, our President at a webinar exploring the key political, social, economic, and demographic changes that have transformed the largest country in Africa and the Arab world over the past six decades.

The webinar is hosted by the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University and co-sponsored by the CMES Tunisia Office and is taking place this Thursday, June 30th at 12:00 pm Eastern, 5:00 PM Tunisian Time.

Speakers include :

Hugh Roberts, Edward Keller Professor of North African and Middle Eastern History, Tufts University

Zahia Smail Salhi, Professor of Modern Arabic Studies, University of Manchester

The webinar will be moderated by :

Adel Hamaizia, Visiting Fellow, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University

Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

https://youtu.be/i-qpsgUVpBo

On behalf of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET) carried out a policy-oriented research on a New Policy Agenda for Africa (NPA) as part of the process of learning lessons from continental development experiences and as a key input to the 8th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD8) in August 2022. As part of this work, ACET organized case studies in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Zambia. This research has produced country-specific and cross-country findings and policy recommendations to help African countries transform while building resilient economies in the post-COVID-19 era. These recommendations will be discussed at TICAD8, co-organized by the Government of Japan (GOJ), the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), and African governments. This cross-country policy learning event will convene government policy makers, experts, representatives from the business community and civil society, and development partners from the six countries covered in the report to exchange views and draw lessons to enhance economic transformation and build resilience, centered around the findings of ACET’s and partners’ research. The discussions during this event will provide an opportunity for collective learning, and improve the NPA report.

ACET for Africa

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

https://youtu.be/ulSHcyPXVdE

Join us on the 25th of February, 4:30 PM for the Policy Engagement Workshop to discuss the findings of the study on new policies to build a resilient economy in the post-Covid-19 era in Tunisia, with the participation of many Tunisian panelists, ACET For Africa representatives, and JICA representative in Tunis.

The workshop is expected to generate insights and policy recommendations around the following topics :

  • The different development plans of the last two decades in Tunisia.
  • The economic growth in Tunisia and the sectoral policies.
  • Tunisia’s structural transformation.
  • The economic impact of Covid-19 in Tunisia.
  • Tunisia's main vulnerabilities.
  • The resilience of the Tunisian economy.
  • Fiscal reforms in Tunisia.
  • Post-Covid 19 economic opportunities.

The workshop will be moderated by Prof. Aram Belhadj.

Guests include :

  • Lobna Jribi, former Minister of Public services
  • Habib Karaouli, CEO CAP BANK
  • Safouane Ben Aissa, University Professor - KPMG
  • Bilel Sahnoun, CEO Tunis Stock Exchange BVMT
  • Maher Gassab, University professor
  • Ali Kooli, former Minister of Economy
  • Ridha Chkoundali, University Professor

Maghreb Economic Forum

+21671190019

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

The Maghreb Economic Forum organized on January 28-30 in Djerba a training workshop to introduce Bounoud Platform which consists of a centralized, reliable and comprehensive open data outlet that maps, analyzes and assesses the conflict and the agreements related to socioeconomic development of the region of Tataouine with the participation of different civil society representatives from the region.

https://youtu.be/W7-M9rVca6Q

This workshop is part of “Bounoud” program that aims to strengthen civil society’s oversight of socio-economic policies in Tataouine and enhance the understanding of the different beneficiaries of the context of the socioeconomic conflicts in the region and the various stakeholders and circumstances.

It included sessions on :

  • Identifying concepts related to social movements and their development, with a special focus on the Kamour uprising and agreement, and the importance of participatory platforms for following up on such agreements.
  • Investment and Development Fund in Tataouine
  • Employment in oil companies and companies operating in the desert
  • On Hold projects in Tataouine
  • Settling what was accomplished about the Kamour movement and development decisions outside the Kamour Agreement, June 15, 2017

The platform is still under development (This is a draft version, and it may be inaccessible from time to time: Bounoud.tn

Maghreb Economic Forum

+21671190019

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

https://youtu.be/36_VbAJkxgE

Background

In December 2019, the European Commission adopted its landmark European Green Deal. The goal is to reach climate neutrality by 2050, and to turn the transition into an economic and industrial opportunity for Europe. An agreement was also recently reached on the European climate law which turns the EU’s commitment to reduce its net Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) into a legal obligation under the “Fit for 55” package unveiled on July 14th, 2021. In addition to GHG abatement goals, this package includes a proposal for its long-discussed carbon policy measure, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (EU CBAM), meant to avoid carbon leakage and encourage EU trading partners to accelerate their decarbonization strategies. Another important and explicit goal of the European Green Deal is to strengthen the EU’s global leadership. One of the ways it seeks to do this is by establishing environment, energy, and climate partnerships with the states of the EU’s southern neighborhood, including Maghreb countries. The EU can achieve this by pursuing key policy actions that could collectively be embedded under ‘Green Deal diplomacy’.

Welcoming Remarks

Antonio Villafranca, Director of Studies, ISPI

Panel Discussion

Amine Bennis, International Legal Counsel; Former Visiting Fellow, ECFR

Rim Berahab, Senior Economist, Policy Center for the New South

Ayman Cherkaoui, Coordinator and Head of Strategic Development, Mohammed VI Foundation for Environmental Protection

Larabi JaĂŻdi, Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South

Slim Othmani, President, Maghreb Economic Forum (MEF), Enterprise Action and Reflection Center (CARE)

Ilaria Urbani, Project Manager, MENA Region, RES4Africa Foundation

Introduction

Antonio Villafranca: Today’s event is a part of a series of events organized in preparation of the 7th edition of the Rome MED conference which will take place from the 2nd to the 4th of December 2021 promoted by the ISPI and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

The Rome MED aims to rethink traditional approaches to the area complementing analyses of current challenges with new ideas and suggestions and to draft a new “positive agenda”, addressing shared challenges at both the regional and the international level.

Launched in 2015, MED has quickly become the global hub for high–level dialogues on the broader Mediterranean engaging prominent leaders of Mediterranean governments, business, civil society, media, and academia.

Rome MED builds upon four pillars: Shared Prosperity, Shared Security, Migration, and Civil Society and Culture. Debates on these topics are intended to complement analyses of current challenges with new ideas and suggestions to scale-up economic cooperation, overcome regional rivalries and conflicts, and ensure that adequate incentives for sustainable development are set in motion.

One of the key issues of Rome MED will be; environment, green transition, energy transition which is the core of today’s webinar and in particular the link between EU Green Deal and the energy transition in Mena Region.

Uri Dadush: The “Fit for 55” initiative announced on July 14 aims to ensure that the EU is on track to achieve 55% greenhouse gas emission cut by 2030 from the level of 1990 and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.

This represents a substantial acceleration of decarbonization from the previous target under the EU Green Deal over a couple of years ago. It is just a proposal by the commission still to be agreed in the European Parliament by the member States. The Fit for 55 initiative includes at 12 packages. These packages include; revising the emissions trading scheme of the European Union ( EU ETS ) which comprises:

  • A carbon border adjustment mechanism.
  • A revision of emissions regulations in EU States.
  • A revision taxation of energy.
  • A social climate fund.
  • Several special initiatives for many sectors such as road transport, aviation and maritime

To achieve the Paris Agreement, The United States and China would have to follow a similar path of that of the EU. In fact, every country in the world need to contribute in order to control the GHG and that includes the Maghreb countries.

The EU is the Maghreb’s most important economic partner and has very tight links to it going back to colonial times and way before.

The effects of the EU’s scheme will not work only through trade and investment among others, but also through the power of example.

Discussions

Amine Bennis: He has substantial experience of working on energy and infrastructure transactions and policy initiatives in the government and private sector. His geographic focus is the Mediterranean and Maghreb countries.

He started by recalling that his thoughts are inspired by a paper that he published earlier this year when he was visiting the European Council of Foreign Affairs[1].

One the explicit goals of the Green Deal is to strengthen the EU’s global leadership. And this by establishing environment, energy, and climate partnerships with countries of the EU southern neighborhoods and particularly those of the Maghreb region.

Therefore, he sees two main trends; the first one is the link between the EU Green Deal and economic development and migration. The EU GD can effectively offer solutions to create workforce opportunities in renewable energies which can contribute to economic development and mitigate migration flows.

The European development assistance for the development of the green energy sectors in Maghreb countries can provide a source of significant economic development and local employment. Not only European investors are involved, but also local developers, subcontractors, and workers.

The second main trend is the EU climate neutrality target and the hydrogen prospects from the Maghreb. Some EU States will need to import a large amount of green hydrogen to reach their carbon neutrality targets. Hydrogen can seasonally stored and transported cost-effectively over long distances using gas pipelines. The EU can actively pursue this potential for cooperation for green hydrogen with Maghreb countries a way to contribute to its 2050 carbon neutrality target.

In addition, there are various ways for the Europeans to use the GD to enhance cooperation with the Maghreb region and contribute to their reciprocal green transition. First by using financing sources or the EFSD + mechanism the European Fund for Sustainable Development-plus which is a new regulation and an integrated financial package that supplies financing capacity through grants, technical assistance, financial instruments, and budgetary guarantees.

So, the commission should incentivize companies willing to invest in renewables in the Maghreb by using this mechanism to bridge the funding gap of the energy transition.

In terms of policy dimensions, there’s a need to increase technical and capacity building assistance to some key energy stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of renewable projects.

Targeting the EU GD would also be an opportunity to create jobs, strengthen the resilience of fragile in the region.

All this requires a significant policy dialogue and transactional funding in a path that addresses common strategic interests such as development, migration, poverty reduction and local and inclusive employment.

Ilaria Urbani: she works to support Africa’s energy transition mainly covering Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria.

Res4africa works to create a favorable condition for scaling renewable investment in Africa, bring on board some members and partners from all over the world and are on the forefront of the green energy revolution. Its commitment is to work in Africa, for Africa and with Africans.

It aims to translate the world into actions through strategic programs and strategic initiatives. One of them is the Res4med which aims to support the renewable energy transformation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, promote dialogue and partnership, conduct strategic analysis, and disseminate the knowledge in dedicated events.

The Maghreb is one of the regions they are focusing on. With its huge renewable potential, it’s evidence that it can still play a central role for the EU and support it to meet the growing demand of its growing population and fight against the climate change it’s suffering from.

Libya ad Algeria account the highest co2 emission resulting from oil and gas production, and with Egypt they account 12% of global oil and gas methane emission.

Maghreb countries can avoid up to 55% of methane emissions with no cost because the value of the captured methane will be greater than the cost of installing the abatement measures. So, it’s crucial from now on to accelerate the up-take in the RE investment.

For the rest of Africa, they started to investigate why only 0.5% of the world additional RE historic capacity occurred in the Med. The results of this study will be presented next year.

While analyzing the factors that affected the RE growth, they discovered that politics often interfere with regulatory progress and there’s a lack of secondary legislation, slow amendment process, lack of bankability of PPAs, the difficulty to obtain souverain guarantee and in some cases also to secure financing from a local bank. Regarding the business environment, there’s a general lack of transparency. The same thing with the tenders.

Following a survey done in 2016, which focused on Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan. Extended in 2021 to cover Libya, Algeria, and Lebanon, they discovered that overall risk level clearly shows the diversity of the region:

  • Morocco is a low risk perceived
  • Tunisia had made an important improvement in certain areas, but others require more politics effort.
  • Algeria and Libya are still perceived as a high risk, attracting RE investment still requires significant additional effort.

The public sector was also included in the survey in 2021. They discovered that the perceptions are not the same. The private sector stakeholders tend to see more risks than the public sector.

What can be done to boost the RE development in the region?

Four urgent solutions need to be implemented:

  • Foster energy mix diversification
  • Promote structural changes
  • Improve policy and regulatory framework
  • Improve energy cooperation

Rim Berahab: she works mainly on energy issues, but actually on a number of other development issues at the Policy center of the New South where she’s a Senior Economist.

As an economist and a researcher from the Maghreb, she can’t help but wonder about the implications of these ambitious packages like the EU GD on the region and particularly on Morocco. That’s why she decided to take a different outlook and bring attention to a specific mechanism introduced within the “Fit55” unveiled last July with a special focus on the carbon border adjustment mechanism to highlight the areas of concern and issues that the CBAM is likely to raise for developing countries including those of the Maghreb.

The CBAM aims to apply the same carbon tax to the import of high emitting and highly trade exposed sector as is applied to domestic producers in the EU. So far, five categories of products are covered by this tax which are electricity, iron and steel aluminum cement and fertilizers.  

  • 1st point of concern: Morocco is not a big exporter of these goods except for fertilizers but given that Morocco and the EU share strong economic ties. Morocco is still highly emission intensive particularly for heavy industries meaning that it produces more GHG emissions per unit of value added more than the EU which puts Morocco at risks.
  • 2nd point of concern: The negative implications that the EU likely to have on the global trading system. It’s true that the CBAM can technically be presented as WTO compliance. However, assuming that other countries opt for such systems, the structure of each national scheme will vary as with the many assumptions needed to calculate the appropriate tax in each case.

Therefore, carbon border tax whether based on EU ETS or other systems will vary not by country of destination and product but also by country of origin and firm and this is a practice that would significantly deviate from the WTO’s most favored nation principle.

  • The 3rd point of concern is that the CBAM might also be seen as inconsistent with the Paris Agreement itself because the proposed mechanism would penalize the least developing countries where the implicit carbon tax is below the EU price or where carbon intensity is higher. That’s why the CBAM is viewed as illegitimate by many developing countries and others.

In her opinion and despite being a well-intentioned effort to encourage decarbonization outside EU’s border, the EU CBAM introduces enormous complexities that risk fatally undermining the already fragile foundation of the world trading system and will also be strongly resisted by the developing countries that perceive it as inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

Slim Othmani: who gave a business perspective from his think tanks that deal mainly on these issues in the Maghreb by answering this question:

  • How are the Maghreb countries progressing on their decarbonization plans?

Slim assumes that both Maghreb countries and EU should have the same priorities which in fact are not. All what had been presented in this webinar further proves his claims as almost everything made around the energy transition are one-side, and evidently for the EU.

Even if the Maghreb governments agreed to follow the global recommendations and sign the different international agreements on climate change, this can’t deny the fact we and the EU are not in the same boat. The Maghreb still has so many issues that Europe has already overcome. Issues that require good infrastructure, qualified human resources, know-how, and funding without compromise on the sovereignty of those countries. This means more political and diplomatic discussions in perspective with the EU.

The Desertec Project can be taken as an example. The political issues in Europe could jeopardize the development and the execution of such a transition plan in the region. The conflict between two European countries has aggravated an already unbalanced situation and has led to abandon this huge project which could supply Both North Africa and Europe with electricity.

Despite the importance of all these deals, mainly initiated by rich countries – and that require billions of dollars, our region still struggles to obtain enough water.  This should be the Maghreb’s priority before spending billions of dollars to make Europe greener.

Larabi JaĂŻdi: He’s an economist who focuses on international issues, social development, and Mediterranean studies and is a member of the royal commission on the new development model in Morocco. He’s very active member who’s looked overall at the development strategy of Morocco which of course has to include these climate issues as well. 

He believes that the ambition to make Europe the first climate neutral continent by 2050 cannot achieved by Europe on its own. The transformation of the EU economy will also depend on its partners’ effort including in its most immediate neighborhood such as the Maghreb.

The ambition of the EU GD in the Maghreb context is marked by the socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The debate is how to catch this opportunity to use this crisis towards a greener and a more circular model in Maghreb countries. Energy will be addressed as one of the pillars of this transition where interdependence between both shores of the Mediterranean demands coordination and collaborative solutions.

Regarding the Covid-19 recovery process, the Maghreb countries are in a context to turn this crisis into an opportunity for a green a circular transition which require noting short than of a major structural transformation of economic models, domestically and globally.

Due to the social, political, and economic heterogeneity in the region, it’s obvious that one size fits all solution is not suitable. The Maghreb countries are far from mainstreaming green and sustainable development principles in their economies despite the progress in Morocco and Tunisia.

The Maghreb countries need to include domain specific study to propose recommendations on how to accelerate the green economy in this particular context.

The success of the EU GD is intertwined with a green transition is the economy and Maghreb and more largely the southern Mediterranean countries. In this regard, is the energy package of the EU GD relevant to promote the future partnerships with these countries.

This package needs to complement the objective of securing the energy supply in EU with radical change in EU’s support to hydrocarbon production and marketing in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.

In this context also, the renewed partnership proposes a new ambitious innovative agenda for the Maghreb countries.  This agenda incorporates new area of forms of corporation identified during the Covid-19 race crisis. It offers opportunities on strategic priorities for green and digital transition and is based on the conviction that sustainable prosperity and resilience can only be built on strong partnership.

The challenges that this renewed agenda may face is how to reinforce resilient economies in the Maghreb and how to build sustainable economies as it’s the question for almost all the Maghreb countries.

Ayman Cherkaoui: from the Mohamed IV Foundation for Environmental Protection. A foundation that has been working on these issues for many years.

The foundation activities focus on environmental awareness raising and capacity building. It has a series of activities that look at coastlines, air quality and evidently climate action.

The geographic scope of the foundation and its partners encompasses the entire Moroccan territory and beyond specifically Africa and Mediterranean Sea.

The interest of the foundation for climate action is not recent. The foundation was one of the first stakeholders in the Arab region and Africa to put in place greenhouse gas calculation tools based on a methodology from the EU but adapted and contextualized to Morocco.

As such, the foundation has more recently launched an effort in a facilitative manner in close partnership with leading stakeholders in the country including ministries and research institutes. This coalition of stakeholders will be working on how to further decarbonize the Moroccan economy.

One of its objectives is to update and adjust the greenhouse GHG emissions tool put in place a decade ago. Since ten a lot of progress has been made in the country. But at the same time there are areas of improvement whether it is in terms of the tool itself but also in terms of the actions that can be undertaken by the various partners, by the Moroccan economic stakeholders as a whole.

[1] https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-surge-how-the-european-green-deal-can-succeed-in-morocco-and-tunisia/

MEF - IDRC

June 4 @ 22:48

https://youtu.be/JUVLX7PxUmk

The period since the IDRC launched its research initiative, Understanding and Addressing Youth Experiences with Violence, Exclusion and Injustice in 2017–and more ominously still, since UNSCR 2250 was adopted in 2015—has coincided with significant shrinking of civic space and erosion of democratic rights and freedoms across much of Africa. Freedom House‘s Freedom in the World report1 in 2020 documented the 14th year of what it described as an Ìłalarming global decline in democratic governance and respect for human rights‘, with sub-Saharan Africa (and West Africa in particular) leading the world in both positive and negative movement: of the 12 largest declines globally, seven were in sub- Saharan Africa, and of the seven largest improvements, six were in the region. Only seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa were now in Freedom House‘s Free‘ category—the lowest figure since 1991. Furthermore, only 9 percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa now lived in ÌłFree‘ countries, compared with 11 percent in 2018.

In addition, a large number of African countries had introduced curbs on NGOs, particularly those working in the human rights and governance sectors, and more were poised to follow:

In Africa, as in other regions of the world, restrictions that hamstring NGO activity form part of a broader strategy adopted by regimes to narrow democratic space and prevent challenges to the rule of strongmen and governing parties. .....Curbs on NGOs working in Africa, particularly those that focus on human rights and governance, are being imposed in the context of a global assault on democracy that often appears to be coordinated across borders.

Regimes have taken advantage of the pandemic lockdown to introduce further restrictions on freedom of association and on the ability of opposition groups to mobilize and/or campaign openly.

Concomitantly, the notion of coupling democracy‘ with development‘ –a linchpin of the liberal development discourse--was being challenged by authoritarian models which were demonstrating success in generating rapid and broad-based development and alleviating mass poverty (backed in the case of the most successful representative of the genre, China, by diplomacy and serious amounts of cash).

The main danger is that with creeping authoritarianism and shrinking civic space, youth would no longer have the space to advocate on their own behalf, at the same time

telegraphing the radical notion (already a principal lesson of the Jasmine Revolution) that Ìłdemocracy‘ is no longer sufficient.

And yet paradoxically—even while there is considerable evidence that youth have been losing faith in the state and political institutions and recoiling from politics- this period is also characterized by striking acts of youth political activism, interpreted by one critic as intended to Ìłrenegotiate the social contract with the state‘,3 including:

 Zimbabwe protests that led to the military coup to remove Mugabe

Sudan protests that removed Al Bashir

South African Ìłtuition‘ protests

#EndSARS

#FixKenya, #FixGhana protests

There is evidence also of women‘s independent leadership (not just participation) in these protests, as well as (it is claimed) inter-class alliances (educated youth from the middle class joining with youth from the informal settlements). As importantly, the recent presidential elections in Zambia and the upset of the incumbent, widely attributed to youth mobilization, is a demonstration of the real power wielded by youth at the ballot box. Uganda is a classic example of this collision between self-perpetuating (and increasingly gerontocratic) regimes, and growing Youth militancy. Objective of the Webinar: In the research that took place under the IDRC funding initiative, ÌłResilience‘ emerges as the crucial attribute (or variable) that inoculates the youth against private and public sources of violence, as well systemic marginalization and exclusion. There is much less focus, by contrast, on how youth activism and mobilization may be summoned to transform oppressive social, economic and political conditions, or foster more democratic, accountable and inclusive governance In this webinar, we interrogate the shrinkage in civic space that has occurred across much of Africa and its implications for youth activism, development and inclusion; we also pinpoint three case studies where analysis of youth political activism was incorporated into the research, as the focal point for the broader discussion and lessons learned. The following questions will be considered (among others):

(a) How does (or can) youth activism advance inclusive, democratic and accountable Governance (experience of Tunisia)?

(b) What have we learned from efforts to enhance youth political inclusion (example: the campaign for youth seat quotas in the Zimbabwe parliament (YETT)? How do youth themselves define Ìłinclusion‘?

(c) What success has attended Youth political agency/electoral mobilization to challenge incumbency, such as the National Unity Party in Uganda (GAPS)?

(d) What about those countries that featured in the IDRC research (such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Tanzania, and even Senegal) where Freedom House also recorded significant declines in civic space and democratic freedoms?

(c) Finally, what have we learned from the various forms of youth political and policy engagement (in both formal and informal spaces)? What entry points and alliances are involved? What works and what does not (eg single issue protest/advocacy vs demands for systemic change and accountability) and how do we ensure that gender equity is taken on board, etc?

[The KPSRL Conference will deal with global dimensions of these questions, and how global resources (including aid and diplomacy) can be brought to bear to support youth causes and enhance inclusion]

The webinar will be moderated by Dr. Olawale Ismail, a leading Youth researcher at the African Leadership Centre in Nairobi and Kings College London, and co-author (with Funmi Olonisakin) most recently of ―Why do youth participate in violence in Africa? A review of evidence‖, Conflict, Security & Development (June 2012). (Publication may be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2021.1933035). Dr Ismail also led a recent webinar on Youth-led Protest and the Renegotiation of the 'State' in Africa: initial mapping assessment‘, ALC Research Seminars: No. 3: African Leadership Centre (ALC), Nairobi, 29th June 2021

IDRC – CRDI

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

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Maghreb Economic Forum

+21671190019

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

https://youtu.be/iwlQ5TQv-Ns

Contre toute attente, nous assistons en cette période de rentrée 2021 à des re-confinements drastiques dans de nombreux pays et ce, en dépit des premiÚres campagnes de vaccination.
Le Maghreb demeure la rĂ©gion la moins intĂ©grĂ©e du monde avec des flux d’échanges inter-rĂ©gionaux estimĂ©s Ă  moins de 5% du total des transactions commerciales.

Le prolongement de la pandĂ©mie reprĂ©sente une sĂ©rieuse menace pour les indicateurs macroĂ©conomiques : rĂ©cession Ă©conomique moyenne de 5% dans la zone en 2020 d’aprĂšs le FMI, fort taux de chĂŽmage et faible dispositif d’aides sociales, etc.

Cependant, la crise sanitaire est aussi un accĂ©lĂ©rateur de l’histoire et peut ĂȘtre ainsi un levier de mobilisation rĂ©gionale. Face au mur dressĂ© depuis plus de 25 ans par les institutions, la pandĂ©mie invite les acteurs Ă©conomiques Ă  faire un pas de cĂŽtĂ© pour se glisser dans un couloir dynamique d’échanges et de partenariats. L’entrĂ©e en vigueur de la ZLECAF en janvier 2021 peut ĂȘtre un ressort supplĂ©mentaire pour impulser une stratĂ©gie commune maghrĂ©bine.

Les entreprises maghrébines, constituées à plus de 90% de PME/TPE, ont besoin de nouer des liens pragmatiques autour de projets innovants, inclusifs, et facilement déployables.

Le pas de cĂŽtĂ© se concrĂ©tise Ă  travers ce rendez-vous trimestriel des entrepreneurs du Maghreb au service d’une nouvelle vision : Rendre possible une intĂ©gration rĂ©gionale basĂ©e sur approche business.

Ce second webinar nous invite à mettre en exergue le rÎle des patronats aux stratégies nationales et leur impact.

Le Maghreb représenterait une solution supplémentaire de sortie de crise à travers une nouvelle forme de coopération dans ce contexte économique difficile. Ainsi, intéressons-nous aux secteurs clés qui dynamiseraient le commerce intra-maghrébin et in fine, créeraient des emplois.

La situation actuelle du Maghreb peut se rĂ©sumer en une question : Pourquoi obtenons nous collectivement des rĂ©sultats qu’individuellement personne ne souhaite ?

Aperçu de l'événement

Tout au long de l’annĂ©e, CARE, ICEM et MEF ont organisĂ© des rencontres virtuelles en invitant des dirigeants et experts de la rĂ©gion pour prĂ©senter les retombĂ©es Ă©conomiques sur toute la rĂ©gion d’une synergie entre les pays du Maghreb.
Aujourd’hui, les entreprises du Maghreb ont besoin d’oxygĂšne et le Maghreb reprĂ©sente une opportunitĂ© considĂ©rable dans divers secteurs : l’automobile, l’offshoring, les start-up, l’énergie, les Ă©nergies renouvelables, l’eau, le traitement des dĂ©chets, la santĂ©, l’agriculture, l’agro- industrie, les tĂ©lĂ©coms, la culture, etc.

L'objectif de ce webinaire, exclusivement dédié à traiter de l'environnement des entreprises au Maghreb, est de donner la parole aux dirigeants et aux confédérations patronales pour que chacun puisse parler des réussites actuelles et des solutions réalistes pour une communauté d'affaires régionale toujours plus grande, agile et intégrée.

June 4 @ 22:48


As the annual Why Think Tanks Matter Forum and the 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Report Launch – initially scheduled for January 28, 2021- will be virtual due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Maghreb Economic Forum is organizing a Webinar on how think tanks can make a difference in Tunisia, which will take place on January 29th, 2021 at 2 pm.  

https://youtu.be/1wzeZ2vSzB0

This event will highlight the critical work think tanks perform and how they have helped lives and livelihoods. It is now more important than ever to focus on their role in helping tackle the different issues emerging from the covid-19 pandemic.  

The discussion will bring together Nizar Ben Salah Chief Research Officer – Maghreb Economic Forum, Hachem Alaya, founder of TEMA Think Tank, and Karim Ammar, Security Expert from IPASSS Think Tank. 

Maghreb Economic Forum

+21671190019

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

https://youtu.be/5qwz4DyK0Jw

ÙŠŰłŰčى Ù…ŰŽŰ±ÙˆŰč â€œÙ…ŰŽŰ§ÙˆŰ±Ű§ŰȘ” Ű„Ù„Ù‰ ŰšÙ†Ű§ŰĄ ŰŁŰ±Ű¶ÙŠŰ© Ù„Ù†Ù‚Ű§ŰŽ  Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰ­ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ű§ŰŹŰȘÙ…Ű§ŰčÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ű§Ù‚ŰȘŰ”Ű§ŰŻÙŠŰ© مŰč Ù…ŰźŰȘلف Ű§Ù„ÙŰ§Űčلين في ÙˆÙ„Ű§ÙŠŰȘي Ù‚ÙŰ”Ű© وŰȘŰ·Ű§ÙˆÙŠÙ†ŰŒ ÙƒÙ…Ű§ يŰčمل Ű§Ù„ŰšŰ±Ù†Ű§Ù…ŰŹ Űčلى ŰȘŰ·ÙˆÙŠŰ± Ű­ÙˆÙƒÙ…Ű© Ű§Ù„Ù…ÙˆŰ§Ű±ŰŻ Ű§Ù„Ű·ŰšÙŠŰčÙŠŰ© في Ù‡Ű§ŰȘين Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù†Ű·Ù‚ŰȘين. Ű­ÙŠŰ« فŰȘŰ­ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŽŰ±ÙˆŰč  Ű§Ù„ŰšŰ§Űš ŰŁÙ…Ű§Ù… Ű§Ù„Ù…ÙˆŰ§Ű·Ù†ÙŠÙ† ÙˆÙ…Ù†ŰžÙ…Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŻÙ†ÙŠ ÙˆÙ…ŰźŰȘلف Ű§Ù„Ù†Ű§ŰŽŰ·ÙŠÙ† Ű„Ù„Ù‰ ŰŹŰ§Ù†Űš Ù…Ù…Ű«Ù„ÙŠÙ† Űčن ۧŰȘۭۧۯ Ű§Ù„ŰŽŰșل ÙˆÙ…Ű€ŰłŰłŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰŻÙˆÙ„Ű© Ű§Ù„ŰŹÙ‡ÙˆÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ù…Ű­Ù„ÙŠŰ© Ù„Ù„Ù…ŰŽŰ§Ű±ÙƒŰ© في Ù…ŰŹÙ…ÙˆŰčŰ© من Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŽŰ§ÙˆŰ±Ű§ŰȘ ŰšÙ‡ŰŻÙ ŰȘقييم Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰ§ŰłŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰȘÙ†Ù…ÙˆÙŠŰ© Ű§Ù„Ű­Ű§Ù„ÙŠŰ©  ÙˆÙ…Ù†Ű§Ù‚ŰŽŰ© Ű§Ù„ŰšŰŻŰ§ŰŠÙ„ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰȘۭۧ۩ ÙˆŰ°Ù„Ùƒ من ŰźÙ„Ű§Ù„ ŰȘÙ‚ŰŻÙŠÙ… ŰȘŰ”ÙˆŰ± ŰȘنموي Ù…ŰłŰȘŰŻŰ§Ù… في Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù†Ű§Ű·Ù‚.

ŰłÙˆÙ يŰȘم Űč۱۶ ÙˆÙ…Ù†Ű§Ù‚ŰŽŰ© Ù…ŰźŰ±ŰŹŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰšŰ±Ù†Ű§Ù…ŰŹ مŰč:

  • Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰŻ ŰźŰ§Ù„ŰŻ Ù‚ŰŻÙˆŰ± وŰČÙŠŰ± Ű§Ù„Ű·Ű§Ù‚Ű© Ű§Ù„ŰłŰ§ŰšÙ‚
  • Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰŻ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù†Ű”Ù ŰčŰ§ŰŽÙˆŰ± Ű±ŰŠÙŠŰł Ű§Ù„ÙˆÙŰŻ Ű§Ù„Ű­ÙƒÙˆÙ…ÙŠ Ű§Ù„Ù…ÙŰ§ÙˆŰ¶ في Ű§Ù„ÙƒŰ§Ù…ÙˆŰ±
  • Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰŻ Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰŻ Ű­Ű§Ù…ŰŻ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ű§Ű·Ű±ÙŠ Ù…Ù‡Ù†ŰŻŰł Ù…ŰźŰȘŰ” في Ű§Ù„Ű„Ù†ŰȘۧۏ Ű§Ù„ŰšŰȘŰ±ÙˆÙ„ÙŠ ÙˆÙ…ŰłŰȘێۧ۱ ŰłŰ§ŰšÙ‚ لوŰČÙŠŰ± Ű§Ù„Ű·Ű§Ù‚Ű©
  • Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰŻ Ű±ÙŠŰ§Ű¶ ŰšŰŽÙŠŰ± ۭۚۧ۫ ÙˆŰźŰšÙŠŰ± في Ű§Ù„ŰȘÙ†Ù…ÙŠŰ© 

ÙŠŰŻÙŠŰ± Ű§Ù„Ù†Ù‚Ű§ŰŽ

  • Ű§Ù„ŰłÙŠŰŻ ŰŽŰ±Ù Ű§Ù„ŰŻÙŠÙ† Ű§Ù„ÙŠŰčÙ‚ÙˆŰšÙŠ ŰźŰšÙŠŰ± في Ű­ÙˆÙƒÙ…Ű© Ű§Ù„Ű«Ű±ÙˆŰ§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ű·ŰšÙŠŰčÙŠŰ©


ŰȘŰłŰŹÙŠÙ„ Ű§Ù„Ű­Ű¶ÙˆŰ±

Maghreb Economic Forum

+21671190019

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ŰȘŰłŰŹÙŠÙ„ Ű§Ù„Ű­Ű¶ÙˆŰ±

June 4 @ 22:48

Le contexte actuel et exceptionnel de la crise liée à la COVID19 ne doit pas nous faire oublier que les économies de la région étaient déjà sur une tendance baissiÚre au quatriÚme trimestre 2019.
Plus que jamais, les derniers rapports des institutions internationales prĂ©sentent les avantages qui pourraient ĂȘtre tirĂ©s d’une intĂ©gration Ă©conomique plus poussĂ©e au Maghreb avec un impact sur la croissance du PIB supĂ©rieur Ă  2%.
Avec un marchĂ© Ă©largi Ă  plus de 100 millions de consommateurs et un cadre lĂ©gislatif favorable, les entreprises de la rĂ©gion sortiraient plus rapidement de la crise Ă©conomique et crĂ©eraient davantage d’emplois. La concurrence stimulerait les dĂ©partements R&D et les investissements Ă©trangers viendraient s’ajouter aux mouvements de capitaux en direction et Ă  partir des pays du Maghreb.
Or, le Maghreb dĂ©tient le triste record de la rĂ©gion la moins intĂ©grĂ©e du monde, avec des flux d’échanges inter-rĂ©gionaux estimĂ©s Ă  moins de 5% du total des transactions commerciales.
D’oĂč l’intĂ©rĂȘt de rĂ©unir une large communautĂ© rĂ©gionale des affaires pour mettre en lumiĂšre les retombĂ©es Ă©conomiques d’une synergie entre l’AlgĂ©rie, le Maroc et la Tunisie.

Meghreb Economic Forum

+21671190019

View Organizer Website

June 4 @ 22:48

Les médias tunisiens, depuis l'intensification des attentas terroristes, se sont trouvé obligé de trouver la formule exacte dans la transmission de l'information.
Entre ĂȘtre claire et objectif et sans tomber dans la banalisation des nouvelles, l'Ă©quation a Ă©tĂ© assez souvent trĂšs difficile Ă  mettre en place.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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June 4 @ 22:48

Le Maghreb Economic Forum (MEF) et Initiatives pour la Communauté Economique du Maghreb (ICEM), en partenariat avec le groupe AOB, ont le plaisir de vous inviter au Webinar : « Accélérons la transition énergétique pour un impact économique au Maghreb ».

Les trois agences nationales AMEE (Maroc), ANME (Tunisie) et APRUE(Algérie) présenteront leur stratégie dans un contexte marqué par la COVID19 et dont les attentes économiques et sociales sont trÚs grandes.

Le webinar traitera des opportunitĂ©s actuelles et futures des trois pays du Maghreb dans le cadre d’une coopĂ©ration rĂ©gionale en vue d’opĂ©rer une transition Ă©nergĂ©tique crĂ©atrice d’un Ă©cosystĂšme durable avec de la recherche, des emplois, de la rentabilitĂ© et une plus grande protection de l’environnement. Ensemble, les trois pays de la rĂ©gion peuvent parvenir Ă  rĂ©soudre cette fragile Ă©quation et devenir la locomotive du continent africain.

En mai 2020, le Forum Économique Mondial (WEF) avait publiĂ© l’indice mondiale sur les performances des systĂšmes Ă©nergĂ©tiques. Le Maroc, en lĂ©ger recul demeure le mieux placĂ© au niveau rĂ©gional puisqu’il occupe la 51Ăšme place mondiale ; l’AlgĂ©rie s’est hissĂ©e au 83Ăšme rang (gagnant 6 places) tandis que la Tunisie enregistrait un net recul de 17 places pour se hisser Ă  la 89Ăšme place.

Comment la crise de la COVID19 peut-elle accentuer la transition Ă©nergĂ©tique en devenant un vecteur de croissance et de crĂ©ation d’emplois ? Existe-t-il aussi une menace du financement de la transition Ă©nergĂ©tique dont la collaboration multipartite est trĂšs lente et coĂ»teuse Ă  mettre en place ?

La rĂ©gion peut trĂšs bien s’appuyer sur son positionnement stratĂ©gique pour devenir un acteur mondial dans la production et l’exportation d’énergie solaire. D’ailleurs, en 2016, le Maroc affichait ses ambitions avec la plus grande centrale solaire du monde : le complexe Noor Ă  Ouarzazate d’une superficie de 480 hectares (soit 600 terrains de foot). Le Royaume ambitionne de porter la part des Ă©nergies renouvelables dans le mix Ă©lectrique national Ă  plus de 52 % en 2030.

En Tunisie, la premiĂšre centrale Ă©lectrique photovoltaĂŻque vient d’ĂȘtre inaugurĂ©e Ă  Tozeur (au sud) en Septembre 2019. D’une superficie de 20 hectares, la centrale pourra rĂ©pondre Ă  14% de la consommation annuelle de la rĂ©gion.

Pour ces deux pays, le risque rĂ©side dans la combinaison des impacts Ă©conomiques du coronavirus et de la chute du prix des hydrocarbures qui peuvent freiner certaines dĂ©cisions importantes en faveur de la transition Ă©nergĂ©tique. Ghozlene Oubya, prĂ©sidente de la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie Maroco-Tunisienne) a Ă©tabli un constat simple :

« les deux pays sont importateurs d’énergie et que cela pĂ©nalise leur balances commerciales et compĂ©titivitĂ© (
). Il nous paraĂźt, ainsi, vital d’en sĂ©curiser l’approvisionnement, de rĂ©duire nos dĂ©pendances aux Ă©nergies fossiles et de diversifier notre mix Ă©nergĂ©tique en investissant massivement dans les Ă©nergies renouvelables. »

En AlgĂ©rie, la baisse du prix des hydrocarbures accĂ©lĂšre quant Ă  elle les ambitions nationales avec un cap donnĂ© pour 2030 d’une production de 22 000 MW. Le mĂ©ga projet dĂ©buterait avec la production de 4.000 MW d’électricitĂ© pour un investissement supĂ©rieur Ă  3,5 mds de $. Le plus grand pays africain jouit en effet d’une durĂ©e d’ensoleillement de 2 000 Ă  6 000 Wh/ soit l’un des plus importants gisements d’énergie solaire au monde.

Pour conclure, lĂ  oĂč certains considĂšrent le contexte gĂ©opolitique rĂ©gional comme un ralentisseur de cette transition Ă©nergĂ©tique, nombreux sont ceux qui voient les crĂ©ations d’emplois et les Ă©conomies d’échelle comme des catalyseurs pour un Maghreb rayonnant par son Ă©nergie. Soyons au rendez vous ce Jeudi Ă  15h pour prendre part au dĂ©bat et ĂȘtre force d'initiative.

 

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« COVID-19 : Maghreb ou jamais »

Défis et Opportunités économiques pour les pays du Maghreb

Parce que les peuples du Maghreb souffrent de ne pas vivre ensemble et que les entreprises dĂ©plorent l’absence d’un marchĂ© commun.

Parce que l’inefficacitĂ© des systĂšmes financiers rĂ©gionaux fragilise le dĂ©veloppement des infrastructures. Parce que le Maghreb c’est aussi et surtout un socle commun, solide et qui a du sens. Nous pensons que la crise du COVID19 est une opportunitĂ© inespĂ©rĂ©e de reprendre les rĂȘnes de notre destinĂ©e commune face aux Ă©goĂŻsmes nationaux. Ensemble, nous pouvons repenser le Maghreb, animĂ© d’une sincĂšre solidaritĂ©.

Un Maghreb façonnĂ© et voulu ensemble et non la simple copie de modĂšles existants et inadaptĂ©s ; un Maghreb oĂč nous bĂątissons et consolidons ce qui nous unit et nous rapproche tout en Ă©tant vigilant sur ce qui nous dĂ©sunit et nous Ă©loigne.

Cette adversitĂ© qui bride l’élan de notre jeunesse et dont l’onde de choc risque de se propager durant plusieurs dĂ©cennies sera coĂ»teuse en vies, en temps, en emplois et en ressources.

Nos individualités et nos moyens ne peuvent suffire à répondre aux défis toujours plus nombreux et plus violents malgré toute la bonne volonté de nos sociétés civiles et de nos politiques.

C’est d’un Maghreb solidaire et offensif que le MEF se propose de dĂ©battre lors de cette E-ConfĂ©rence intitulĂ©e COVID-19 : Maghreb ou jamais, avec quatre panelistes fins connaisseurs des questions MaghrĂ©bines :

Amine Bouhassane

Directeur des Ressources Humaines HEYME au Maroc ;

Président du think tank maghrébin ICEM (Initiatives pour la communauté économique du Maghreb.

 

Ferid Belhaj

Vice-prĂ©sident du Groupe de la Banque mondiale pour l’Afrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient.

 

Hakim El Karoui

Senior Fellow à l’institut Montaigne.

Directeur de la société de conseil stratégique, Volentia.

 

Karim El Aynaoui :

Président du Policy Center for the New South.

Doyen de la Faculté de Gouvernance, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.

Vice-Président Exécutif de l'Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique.

 

La confĂ©rence se tiendra le Vendredi 1 er Mai 2020 Ă  21h30 (GMT/UTC +1) sur la plateforme zoom et sera modĂ©rĂ©e par :

Prof. Dr. Rachid Ouaissa

Professeur de politique du Proche et du Moyen Ă  l’universitĂ© de Marburg.

Directeur du Think Tank MECAM (Merian Center for Advanced Studies in the Maghreb).

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June 4 @ 22:48

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June 4, 2023
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June 4 @ 22:48

ŰłŰȘŰ¶Ù…Ù‘ Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Ù…ŰłŰ€ÙˆÙ„ÙŠÙ† من Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰčŰȘÙ…ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰ§Ù„Űł Ű§Ù„Ű„Ù‚Ù„ÙŠÙ…ÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰšÙ„ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆÙ†ŰŽŰ·Ű§ŰĄ ÙˆÙ†Ù‚Ű§ŰšÙŠÙŠÙ† ÙˆÙ…Ù…Ű«Ù„ÙŠÙ† Űčن Ù…ÙƒÙˆÙ†Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŻÙ†ÙŠ.
وŰȘŰȘوŰČّŰč ŰŁŰŽŰșŰ§Ù„ Ű§Ù„ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Űčلى Ù…Ű­ÙˆŰ±ÙŠÙ’Ù†:

Űč۱۶ ÙˆÙ…Ù†Ű§Ù‚ŰŽŰ© Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰłŰ§ŰŠÙ„ Ű§Ù„Ű±ŰŠÙŠŰłÙŠŰ© (Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰ­ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ű§Ű­ŰȘÙŠŰ§ŰŹŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ù‚Ű¶Ű§ÙŠŰ§ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù„Ű­Ű©) Ű§Ù„ŰȘي ŰŁŰ«Ű§Ű±Ù‡Ű§ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…Ű­Ù„ÙŠ في Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŽŰ§ÙˆŰ±Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰłŰ§ŰšÙ‚Ű©.

ÙˆŰ¶Űč Ù…ŰźŰ±ŰŹŰ§ŰȘ Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„ŰŹÙ„ŰłŰ© Ű§Ù„ŰȘÙŰ§ŰčÙ„ÙŠŰ© في ŰŽÙƒÙ„ Ù…ŰŹÙ…ÙˆŰčŰ© من Ű§Ù„ŰȘÙˆŰ”ÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙƒŰ±ŰŻ Űčلى ŰȘŰłŰ§Ű€Ù„Ű§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§ŰłŰȘÙŰłŰ§Ű±Ű§ŰȘ Ù…ÙƒÙˆÙ†Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…Ű­Ù„ÙŠ.

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June 4, 2023
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June 4 @ 22:48

ŰłŰȘŰ¶Ù…Ù‘ Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Ù…ŰłŰ€ÙˆÙ„ÙŠÙ† من Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰčŰȘÙ…ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰ§Ù„Űł Ű§Ù„Ű„Ù‚Ù„ÙŠÙ…ÙŠŰ© ÙˆŰ§Ù„ŰšÙ„ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆÙ†ŰŽŰ·Ű§ŰĄ ÙˆÙ†Ù‚Ű§ŰšÙŠÙŠÙ† ÙˆÙ…Ù…Ű«Ù„ÙŠÙ† Űčن Ù…ÙƒÙˆÙ†Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŻÙ†ÙŠ. وŰȘŰȘوŰČّŰč ŰŁŰŽŰșŰ§Ù„ Ű§Ù„ÙˆŰ±ŰŽŰ© Űčلى Ù…Ű­ÙˆŰ±ÙŠÙ’Ù†:

Űč۱۶ ÙˆÙ…Ù†Ű§Ù‚ŰŽŰ© Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰłŰ§ŰŠÙ„ Ű§Ù„Ű±ŰŠÙŠŰłÙŠŰ© (Ű§Ù„ŰȘŰ­ŰŻÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ű§Ű­ŰȘÙŠŰ§ŰŹŰ§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§Ù„Ù‚Ű¶Ű§ÙŠŰ§ Ű§Ù„Ù…Ù„Ű­Ű©) Ű§Ù„ŰȘي ŰŁŰ«Ű§Ű±Ù‡Ű§ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…Ű­Ù„ÙŠ في Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŽŰ§ÙˆŰ±Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„ŰłŰ§ŰšÙ‚Ű©.

ÙˆŰ¶Űč Ù…ŰźŰ±ŰŹŰ§ŰȘ Ù‡Ű°Ù‡ Ű§Ù„ŰŹÙ„ŰłŰ© Ű§Ù„ŰȘÙŰ§ŰčÙ„ÙŠŰ© في ŰŽÙƒÙ„ Ù…ŰŹÙ…ÙˆŰčŰ© من Ű§Ù„ŰȘÙˆŰ”ÙŠŰ§ŰȘ ÙƒŰ±ŰŻ Űčلى ŰȘŰłŰ§Ű€Ù„Ű§ŰȘ ÙˆŰ§ŰłŰȘÙŰłŰ§Ű±Ű§ŰȘ Ù…ÙƒÙˆÙ†Ű§ŰȘ Ű§Ù„Ù…ŰŹŰȘمŰč Ű§Ù„Ù…Ű­Ù„ÙŠ.

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June 4 @ 22:48

With our collaborators Zenith.me and The Candid Foundation, MEF gathered various leaders of start-ups, business consultants, NGOs focused on job market development, representatives from job matching platforms, and young Tunisian graduates to come together at the Delegation of the European Union to Tunisia for an experts workshop. This workshop was conducted to discuss and explore innovative approaches to integrating new technologies and social media into job matching platforms and job creation.

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June 4 @ 22:48

MEF gathered experts of different backgrounds ranging from psychiatry to security consultancy for this experts workshop on youth radicalization.  The aim of this convening of experts was twofold. First, to discuss key theories on psychological, societal, and ideological drivers of radicalization in Tunisia. The second, was to pinpoint what unique gaps in research exist today on deradicalization and re-integrating returning fighters.

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June 4 @ 22:48

The 2018 MENA Think Tank Summit was organized by Centre des Etudes Méditerranées et Internationales, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program TTCSP, University of Pennsylvania. MEF Executive Director, Slim Bahrini was invited as a panelist for the round-table discussion, "New Road-map for MENA Economic Integration".

 

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June 4 @ 22:48

The Global Think Tank Summit event gathered a hundred executives from the most influential Think Tanks around the world to convene in Brussels. Bruegel and and the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania invited MEF to participate at the closed event under the theme "Think Tank: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters and Turbulent Times”.

 

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The Maghreb Economic Forum, in partnership with Robert Bosch Stiftung, will be holding a ceremony and final conference bringing together various stakeholders in the 3ESHRA Project. At the conference, a qualitative report culminated from the construction of a Community of Practice for Gender Equality in Tunisia will be presented to the Tunisian Individual Freedoms and Equality Committee (COLIBE in French).

 

 

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This event, organized by the Maghreb Economic Forum, addresses the effectiveness of different approaches of Dis-engagement/Prevention.

This event comes after one year of advanced studies on tackling youth radicalization through inclusion. The Maghreb Economic Forum research team are addressing the extent to which Inclusion affects Youth De-radicalization in post-revolutionary Tunisia while assessing the effectiveness of different approaches of Disengagement and Prevention.

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