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ŰłŰšÙ Ù۰ۧ ۧÙÙ ÙŰȘÙÙ Ű§ÙŰźŰȘŰ§Ù Ù ŰčŰŻÙŰŻ ۧÙÙ۱ێۧŰȘ ۧÙŰȘۯ۱ÙŰšÙŰ© ۧÙŰȘÙ ŰȘ۷۱ÙŰȘ ŰŁŰŽŰșۧÙÙۧ ۧÙÙ Ű§ÙÙ Ùۧ۶ÙŰč ۧÙŰąŰȘÙŰ©:
We are privileged to be represented by Slim Othmani, our President at a webinar exploring the key political, social, economic, and demographic changes that have transformed the largest country in Africa and the Arab world over the past six decades.
The webinar is hosted by the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University and co-sponsored by the CMES Tunisia Office and is taking place this Thursday, June 30th at 12:00 pm Eastern, 5:00 PM Tunisian Time.
Speakers include :
Hugh Roberts, Edward Keller Professor of North African and Middle Eastern History, Tufts University
Zahia Smail Salhi, Professor of Modern Arabic Studies, University of Manchester
The webinar will be moderated by :
Adel Hamaizia, Visiting Fellow, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University
On behalf of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET) carried out a policy-oriented research on a New Policy Agenda for Africa (NPA) as part of the process of learning lessons from continental development experiences and as a key input to the 8th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD8) in August 2022. As part of this work, ACET organized case studies in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Zambia. This research has produced country-specific and cross-country findings and policy recommendations to help African countries transform while building resilient economies in the post-COVID-19 era. These recommendations will be discussed at TICAD8, co-organized by the Government of Japan (GOJ), the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), and African governments. This cross-country policy learning event will convene government policy makers, experts, representatives from the business community and civil society, and development partners from the six countries covered in the report to exchange views and draw lessons to enhance economic transformation and build resilience, centered around the findings of ACETâs and partnersâ research. The discussions during this event will provide an opportunity for collective learning, and improve the NPA report.
Join us on the 25th of February, 4:30 PM for the Policy Engagement Workshop to discuss the findings of the study on new policies to build a resilient economy in the post-Covid-19 era in Tunisia, with the participation of many Tunisian panelists, ACET For Africa representatives, and JICA representative in Tunis.
The workshop is expected to generate insights and policy recommendations around the following topics :
The workshop will be moderated by Prof. Aram Belhadj.
Guests include :
The Maghreb Economic Forum organized on January 28-30 in Djerba a training workshop to introduce Bounoud Platform which consists of a centralized, reliable and comprehensive open data outlet that maps, analyzes and assesses the conflict and the agreements related to socioeconomic development of the region of Tataouine with the participation of different civil society representatives from the region.
This workshop is part of âBounoudâ program that aims to strengthen civil societyâs oversight of socio-economic policies in Tataouine and enhance the understanding of the different beneficiaries of the context of the socioeconomic conflicts in the region and the various stakeholders and circumstances.
It included sessions on :
The platform is still under development (This is a draft version, and it may be inaccessible from time to time: Bounoud.tn
Background
In December 2019, the European Commission adopted its landmark European Green Deal. The goal is to reach climate neutrality by 2050, and to turn the transition into an economic and industrial opportunity for Europe. An agreement was also recently reached on the European climate law which turns the EUâs commitment to reduce its net Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) into a legal obligation under the âFit for 55â package unveiled on July 14th, 2021. In addition to GHG abatement goals, this package includes a proposal for its long-discussed carbon policy measure, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (EU CBAM), meant to avoid carbon leakage and encourage EU trading partners to accelerate their decarbonization strategies. Another important and explicit goal of the European Green Deal is to strengthen the EUâs global leadership. One of the ways it seeks to do this is by establishing environment, energy, and climate partnerships with the states of the EUâs southern neighborhood, including Maghreb countries. The EU can achieve this by pursuing key policy actions that could collectively be embedded under âGreen Deal diplomacyâ.
Welcoming Remarks
Antonio Villafranca, Director of Studies, ISPI
Panel Discussion
Amine Bennis, International Legal Counsel; Former Visiting Fellow, ECFR
Rim Berahab, Senior Economist, Policy Center for the New South
Ayman Cherkaoui, Coordinator and Head of Strategic Development, Mohammed VI Foundation for Environmental Protection
Larabi JaĂŻdi, Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South
Slim Othmani, President, Maghreb Economic Forum (MEF), Enterprise Action and Reflection Center (CARE)
Ilaria Urbani, Project Manager, MENA Region, RES4Africa Foundation
Introduction
Antonio Villafranca: Todayâs event is a part of a series of events organized in preparation of the 7th edition of the Rome MED conference which will take place from the 2nd to the 4th of December 2021 promoted by the ISPI and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
The Rome MED aims to rethink traditional approaches to the area complementing analyses of current challenges with new ideas and suggestions and to draft a new âpositive agendaâ, addressing shared challenges at both the regional and the international level.
Launched in 2015, MED has quickly become the global hub for highâlevel dialogues on the broader Mediterranean engaging prominent leaders of Mediterranean governments, business, civil society, media, and academia.
Rome MED builds upon four pillars: Shared Prosperity, Shared Security, Migration, and Civil Society and Culture. Debates on these topics are intended to complement analyses of current challenges with new ideas and suggestions to scale-up economic cooperation, overcome regional rivalries and conflicts, and ensure that adequate incentives for sustainable development are set in motion.
One of the key issues of Rome MED will be; environment, green transition, energy transition which is the core of todayâs webinar and in particular the link between EU Green Deal and the energy transition in Mena Region.
Uri Dadush: The âFit for 55â initiative announced on July 14 aims to ensure that the EU is on track to achieve 55% greenhouse gas emission cut by 2030 from the level of 1990 and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.
This represents a substantial acceleration of decarbonization from the previous target under the EU Green Deal over a couple of years ago. It is just a proposal by the commission still to be agreed in the European Parliament by the member States. The Fit for 55 initiative includes at 12 packages. These packages include; revising the emissions trading scheme of the European Union ( EU ETS ) which comprises:
To achieve the Paris Agreement, The United States and China would have to follow a similar path of that of the EU. In fact, every country in the world need to contribute in order to control the GHG and that includes the Maghreb countries.
The EU is the Maghrebâs most important economic partner and has very tight links to it going back to colonial times and way before.
The effects of the EUâs scheme will not work only through trade and investment among others, but also through the power of example.
Discussions
Amine Bennis: He has substantial experience of working on energy and infrastructure transactions and policy initiatives in the government and private sector. His geographic focus is the Mediterranean and Maghreb countries.
He started by recalling that his thoughts are inspired by a paper that he published earlier this year when he was visiting the European Council of Foreign Affairs[1].
One the explicit goals of the Green Deal is to strengthen the EUâs global leadership. And this by establishing environment, energy, and climate partnerships with countries of the EU southern neighborhoods and particularly those of the Maghreb region.
Therefore, he sees two main trends; the first one is the link between the EU Green Deal and economic development and migration. The EU GD can effectively offer solutions to create workforce opportunities in renewable energies which can contribute to economic development and mitigate migration flows.
The European development assistance for the development of the green energy sectors in Maghreb countries can provide a source of significant economic development and local employment. Not only European investors are involved, but also local developers, subcontractors, and workers.
The second main trend is the EU climate neutrality target and the hydrogen prospects from the Maghreb. Some EU States will need to import a large amount of green hydrogen to reach their carbon neutrality targets. Hydrogen can seasonally stored and transported cost-effectively over long distances using gas pipelines. The EU can actively pursue this potential for cooperation for green hydrogen with Maghreb countries a way to contribute to its 2050 carbon neutrality target.
In addition, there are various ways for the Europeans to use the GD to enhance cooperation with the Maghreb region and contribute to their reciprocal green transition. First by using financing sources or the EFSD + mechanism the European Fund for Sustainable Development-plus which is a new regulation and an integrated financial package that supplies financing capacity through grants, technical assistance, financial instruments, and budgetary guarantees.
So, the commission should incentivize companies willing to invest in renewables in the Maghreb by using this mechanism to bridge the funding gap of the energy transition.
In terms of policy dimensions, thereâs a need to increase technical and capacity building assistance to some key energy stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of renewable projects.
Targeting the EU GD would also be an opportunity to create jobs, strengthen the resilience of fragile in the region.
All this requires a significant policy dialogue and transactional funding in a path that addresses common strategic interests such as development, migration, poverty reduction and local and inclusive employment.
Ilaria Urbani: she works to support Africaâs energy transition mainly covering Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria.
Res4africa works to create a favorable condition for scaling renewable investment in Africa, bring on board some members and partners from all over the world and are on the forefront of the green energy revolution. Its commitment is to work in Africa, for Africa and with Africans.
It aims to translate the world into actions through strategic programs and strategic initiatives. One of them is the Res4med which aims to support the renewable energy transformation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, promote dialogue and partnership, conduct strategic analysis, and disseminate the knowledge in dedicated events.
The Maghreb is one of the regions they are focusing on. With its huge renewable potential, itâs evidence that it can still play a central role for the EU and support it to meet the growing demand of its growing population and fight against the climate change itâs suffering from.
Libya ad Algeria account the highest co2 emission resulting from oil and gas production, and with Egypt they account 12% of global oil and gas methane emission.
Maghreb countries can avoid up to 55% of methane emissions with no cost because the value of the captured methane will be greater than the cost of installing the abatement measures. So, itâs crucial from now on to accelerate the up-take in the RE investment.
For the rest of Africa, they started to investigate why only 0.5% of the world additional RE historic capacity occurred in the Med. The results of this study will be presented next year.
While analyzing the factors that affected the RE growth, they discovered that politics often interfere with regulatory progress and thereâs a lack of secondary legislation, slow amendment process, lack of bankability of PPAs, the difficulty to obtain souverain guarantee and in some cases also to secure financing from a local bank. Regarding the business environment, thereâs a general lack of transparency. The same thing with the tenders.
Following a survey done in 2016, which focused on Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan. Extended in 2021 to cover Libya, Algeria, and Lebanon, they discovered that overall risk level clearly shows the diversity of the region:
The public sector was also included in the survey in 2021. They discovered that the perceptions are not the same. The private sector stakeholders tend to see more risks than the public sector.
What can be done to boost the RE development in the region?
Four urgent solutions need to be implemented:
Rim Berahab: she works mainly on energy issues, but actually on a number of other development issues at the Policy center of the New South where sheâs a Senior Economist.
As an economist and a researcher from the Maghreb, she canât help but wonder about the implications of these ambitious packages like the EU GD on the region and particularly on Morocco. Thatâs why she decided to take a different outlook and bring attention to a specific mechanism introduced within the âFit55â unveiled last July with a special focus on the carbon border adjustment mechanism to highlight the areas of concern and issues that the CBAM is likely to raise for developing countries including those of the Maghreb.
The CBAM aims to apply the same carbon tax to the import of high emitting and highly trade exposed sector as is applied to domestic producers in the EU. So far, five categories of products are covered by this tax which are electricity, iron and steel aluminum cement and fertilizers.
Therefore, carbon border tax whether based on EU ETS or other systems will vary not by country of destination and product but also by country of origin and firm and this is a practice that would significantly deviate from the WTOâs most favored nation principle.
In her opinion and despite being a well-intentioned effort to encourage decarbonization outside EUâs border, the EU CBAM introduces enormous complexities that risk fatally undermining the already fragile foundation of the world trading system and will also be strongly resisted by the developing countries that perceive it as inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.
Slim Othmani: who gave a business perspective from his think tanks that deal mainly on these issues in the Maghreb by answering this question:
Slim assumes that both Maghreb countries and EU should have the same priorities which in fact are not. All what had been presented in this webinar further proves his claims as almost everything made around the energy transition are one-side, and evidently for the EU.
Even if the Maghreb governments agreed to follow the global recommendations and sign the different international agreements on climate change, this canât deny the fact we and the EU are not in the same boat. The Maghreb still has so many issues that Europe has already overcome. Issues that require good infrastructure, qualified human resources, know-how, and funding without compromise on the sovereignty of those countries. This means more political and diplomatic discussions in perspective with the EU.
The Desertec Project can be taken as an example. The political issues in Europe could jeopardize the development and the execution of such a transition plan in the region. The conflict between two European countries has aggravated an already unbalanced situation and has led to abandon this huge project which could supply Both North Africa and Europe with electricity.
Despite the importance of all these deals, mainly initiated by rich countries â and that require billions of dollars, our region still struggles to obtain enough water. This should be the Maghrebâs priority before spending billions of dollars to make Europe greener.
Larabi JaĂŻdi: Heâs an economist who focuses on international issues, social development, and Mediterranean studies and is a member of the royal commission on the new development model in Morocco. Heâs very active member whoâs looked overall at the development strategy of Morocco which of course has to include these climate issues as well.
He believes that the ambition to make Europe the first climate neutral continent by 2050 cannot achieved by Europe on its own. The transformation of the EU economy will also depend on its partnersâ effort including in its most immediate neighborhood such as the Maghreb.
The ambition of the EU GD in the Maghreb context is marked by the socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The debate is how to catch this opportunity to use this crisis towards a greener and a more circular model in Maghreb countries. Energy will be addressed as one of the pillars of this transition where interdependence between both shores of the Mediterranean demands coordination and collaborative solutions.
Regarding the Covid-19 recovery process, the Maghreb countries are in a context to turn this crisis into an opportunity for a green a circular transition which require noting short than of a major structural transformation of economic models, domestically and globally.
Due to the social, political, and economic heterogeneity in the region, itâs obvious that one size fits all solution is not suitable. The Maghreb countries are far from mainstreaming green and sustainable development principles in their economies despite the progress in Morocco and Tunisia.
The Maghreb countries need to include domain specific study to propose recommendations on how to accelerate the green economy in this particular context.
The success of the EU GD is intertwined with a green transition is the economy and Maghreb and more largely the southern Mediterranean countries. In this regard, is the energy package of the EU GD relevant to promote the future partnerships with these countries.
This package needs to complement the objective of securing the energy supply in EU with radical change in EUâs support to hydrocarbon production and marketing in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.
In this context also, the renewed partnership proposes a new ambitious innovative agenda for the Maghreb countries. This agenda incorporates new area of forms of corporation identified during the Covid-19 race crisis. It offers opportunities on strategic priorities for green and digital transition and is based on the conviction that sustainable prosperity and resilience can only be built on strong partnership.
The challenges that this renewed agenda may face is how to reinforce resilient economies in the Maghreb and how to build sustainable economies as itâs the question for almost all the Maghreb countries.
Ayman Cherkaoui: from the Mohamed IV Foundation for Environmental Protection. A foundation that has been working on these issues for many years.
The foundation activities focus on environmental awareness raising and capacity building. It has a series of activities that look at coastlines, air quality and evidently climate action.
The geographic scope of the foundation and its partners encompasses the entire Moroccan territory and beyond specifically Africa and Mediterranean Sea.
The interest of the foundation for climate action is not recent. The foundation was one of the first stakeholders in the Arab region and Africa to put in place greenhouse gas calculation tools based on a methodology from the EU but adapted and contextualized to Morocco.
As such, the foundation has more recently launched an effort in a facilitative manner in close partnership with leading stakeholders in the country including ministries and research institutes. This coalition of stakeholders will be working on how to further decarbonize the Moroccan economy.
One of its objectives is to update and adjust the greenhouse GHG emissions tool put in place a decade ago. Since ten a lot of progress has been made in the country. But at the same time there are areas of improvement whether it is in terms of the tool itself but also in terms of the actions that can be undertaken by the various partners, by the Moroccan economic stakeholders as a whole.
[1] https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-surge-how-the-european-green-deal-can-succeed-in-morocco-and-tunisia/
The period since the IDRC launched its research initiative, Understanding and Addressing Youth Experiences with Violence, Exclusion and Injustice in 2017âand more ominously still, since UNSCR 2250 was adopted in 2015âhas coincided with significant shrinking of civic space and erosion of democratic rights and freedoms across much of Africa. Freedom Houseâs Freedom in the World report1 in 2020 documented the 14th year of what it described as an Ìłalarming global decline in democratic governance and respect for human rightsâ, with sub-Saharan Africa (and West Africa in particular) leading the world in both positive and negative movement: of the 12 largest declines globally, seven were in sub- Saharan Africa, and of the seven largest improvements, six were in the region. Only seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa were now in Freedom Houseâs Freeâ categoryâthe lowest figure since 1991. Furthermore, only 9 percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa now lived in ÌłFreeâ countries, compared with 11 percent in 2018.
In addition, a large number of African countries had introduced curbs on NGOs, particularly those working in the human rights and governance sectors, and more were poised to follow:
In Africa, as in other regions of the world, restrictions that hamstring NGO activity form part of a broader strategy adopted by regimes to narrow democratic space and prevent challenges to the rule of strongmen and governing parties. .....Curbs on NGOs working in Africa, particularly those that focus on human rights and governance, are being imposed in the context of a global assault on democracy that often appears to be coordinated across borders.
Regimes have taken advantage of the pandemic lockdown to introduce further restrictions on freedom of association and on the ability of opposition groups to mobilize and/or campaign openly.
Concomitantly, the notion of coupling democracyâ with developmentâ âa linchpin of the liberal development discourse--was being challenged by authoritarian models which were demonstrating success in generating rapid and broad-based development and alleviating mass poverty (backed in the case of the most successful representative of the genre, China, by diplomacy and serious amounts of cash).
The main danger is that with creeping authoritarianism and shrinking civic space, youth would no longer have the space to advocate on their own behalf, at the same time
telegraphing the radical notion (already a principal lesson of the Jasmine Revolution) that Ìłdemocracyâ is no longer sufficient.
And yet paradoxicallyâeven while there is considerable evidence that youth have been losing faith in the state and political institutions and recoiling from politics- this period is also characterized by striking acts of youth political activism, interpreted by one critic as intended to Ìłrenegotiate the social contract with the stateâ,3 including:
 Zimbabwe protests that led to the military coup to remove Mugabe
Sudan protests that removed Al Bashir
South African Ìłtuitionâ protests
#EndSARS
#FixKenya, #FixGhana protests
There is evidence also of womenâs independent leadership (not just participation) in these protests, as well as (it is claimed) inter-class alliances (educated youth from the middle class joining with youth from the informal settlements). As importantly, the recent presidential elections in Zambia and the upset of the incumbent, widely attributed to youth mobilization, is a demonstration of the real power wielded by youth at the ballot box. Uganda is a classic example of this collision between self-perpetuating (and increasingly gerontocratic) regimes, and growing Youth militancy. Objective of the Webinar: In the research that took place under the IDRC funding initiative, ÌłResilienceâ emerges as the crucial attribute (or variable) that inoculates the youth against private and public sources of violence, as well systemic marginalization and exclusion. There is much less focus, by contrast, on how youth activism and mobilization may be summoned to transform oppressive social, economic and political conditions, or foster more democratic, accountable and inclusive governance In this webinar, we interrogate the shrinkage in civic space that has occurred across much of Africa and its implications for youth activism, development and inclusion; we also pinpoint three case studies where analysis of youth political activism was incorporated into the research, as the focal point for the broader discussion and lessons learned. The following questions will be considered (among others):
(a) How does (or can) youth activism advance inclusive, democratic and accountable Governance (experience of Tunisia)?
(b) What have we learned from efforts to enhance youth political inclusion (example: the campaign for youth seat quotas in the Zimbabwe parliament (YETT)? How do youth themselves define Ìłinclusionâ?
(c) What success has attended Youth political agency/electoral mobilization to challenge incumbency, such as the National Unity Party in Uganda (GAPS)?
(d) What about those countries that featured in the IDRC research (such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Tanzania, and even Senegal) where Freedom House also recorded significant declines in civic space and democratic freedoms?
(c) Finally, what have we learned from the various forms of youth political and policy engagement (in both formal and informal spaces)? What entry points and alliances are involved? What works and what does not (eg single issue protest/advocacy vs demands for systemic change and accountability) and how do we ensure that gender equity is taken on board, etc?
[The KPSRL Conference will deal with global dimensions of these questions, and how global resources (including aid and diplomacy) can be brought to bear to support youth causes and enhance inclusion]
The webinar will be moderated by Dr. Olawale Ismail, a leading Youth researcher at the African Leadership Centre in Nairobi and Kings College London, and co-author (with Funmi Olonisakin) most recently of âWhy do youth participate in violence in Africa? A review of evidenceâ, Conflict, Security & Development (June 2012). (Publication may be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2021.1933035). Dr Ismail also led a recent webinar on Youth-led Protest and the Renegotiation of the 'State' in Africa: initial mapping assessmentâ, ALC Research Seminars: No. 3: African Leadership Centre (ALC), Nairobi, 29th June 2021
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ۧÙÙ ÙŰȘŰŻÙ Ű§ÙۧÙŰȘŰ”Ű§ŰŻÙ Ű§ÙÙ Űșۧ۱ۚÙ
ۧÙÙ ÙŰȘŰŻÙ Ű§ÙۧÙŰȘŰ”Ű§ŰŻÙ Ű§ÙÙ ŰșŰ§Ű±ŰšÙ ÙÙ Ù Ű€ŰłŰłŰ© ŰšŰŰ« ŰșÙ۱ ŰÙÙÙ ÙŰ©Ű ŰȘۣ۳۳ŰȘ ŰłÙŰ© 2011 Ù Ù ŰŁŰŹÙ ŰȘŰčŰČÙŰČ Ű§ÙÙŰŰŻŰ© ۧÙÙ Űșۧ۱ۚÙŰ© ÙÙŰȘŰ Ű§ÙŰŁÙŰ§Ù ŰŁÙ Ű§Ù ŰźÙÙ Ù۱۔ ۧÙŰȘ۔ۧۯÙŰ© ÙۧۏŰȘÙ Ű§ŰčÙŰ© ŰŹŰŻÙŰŻŰ© ÙÙ Ű§ÙÙ ÙŰ·ÙŰ© Ù۶Ùۧ ŰčÙ Ű±ŰčۧÙŰ© ÙÙ ŰłŰ§ÙŰŻŰ© ŰŹÙÙ ŰŹŰŻÙŰŻ Ù Ù Ű§Ùێۚۧۚ ۧÙÙ ŰłŰ€ÙÙ ÙÙ ÙÙŰšÙۧ ÙŰȘÙÙŰł ÙۧÙŰŹŰČۧۊ۱ ÙۧÙÙ Űș۱ۚ ÙÙ Ù۱ÙŰȘۧÙÙۧ ÙŰŻÙŰčÙ ÙŰÙ Ű§ÙÙ ŰŽŰ§Ű±ÙŰ© ÙÙ Ű§ÙŰÙۧ۩ ۧÙŰčŰ§Ù Ű© ÙۧÙÙ ŰłŰ§ÙÙ Ű© ÙÙ Ù۶Űč ŰšŰ±Ű§Ù ŰŹ ŰȘÙۧ۳ۚ ۧÙÙ ÙŰ·ÙŰ© ۧÙÙ Űșۧ۱ۚÙŰ© ۧÙŰŹŰŻÙŰŻŰ©.
Contre toute attente, nous assistons en cette période de rentrée 2021 à des re-confinements drastiques dans de nombreux pays et ce, en dépit des premiÚres campagnes de vaccination.
Le Maghreb demeure la rĂ©gion la moins intĂ©grĂ©e du monde avec des flux dâĂ©changes inter-rĂ©gionaux estimĂ©s Ă moins de 5% du total des transactions commerciales.
Le prolongement de la pandĂ©mie reprĂ©sente une sĂ©rieuse menace pour les indicateurs macroĂ©conomiques : rĂ©cession Ă©conomique moyenne de 5% dans la zone en 2020 dâaprĂšs le FMI, fort taux de chĂŽmage et faible dispositif dâaides sociales, etc.
Cependant, la crise sanitaire est aussi un accĂ©lĂ©rateur de lâhistoire et peut ĂȘtre ainsi un levier de mobilisation rĂ©gionale. Face au mur dressĂ© depuis plus de 25 ans par les institutions, la pandĂ©mie invite les acteurs Ă©conomiques Ă faire un pas de cĂŽtĂ© pour se glisser dans un couloir dynamique dâĂ©changes et de partenariats. LâentrĂ©e en vigueur de la ZLECAF en janvier 2021 peut ĂȘtre un ressort supplĂ©mentaire pour impulser une stratĂ©gie commune maghrĂ©bine.
Les entreprises maghrébines, constituées à plus de 90% de PME/TPE, ont besoin de nouer des liens pragmatiques autour de projets innovants, inclusifs, et facilement déployables.
Le pas de cĂŽtĂ© se concrĂ©tise Ă travers ce rendez-vous trimestriel des entrepreneurs du Maghreb au service dâune nouvelle vision : Rendre possible une intĂ©gration rĂ©gionale basĂ©e sur approche business.
Ce second webinar nous invite à mettre en exergue le rÎle des patronats aux stratégies nationales et leur impact.
Le Maghreb représenterait une solution supplémentaire de sortie de crise à travers une nouvelle forme de coopération dans ce contexte économique difficile. Ainsi, intéressons-nous aux secteurs clés qui dynamiseraient le commerce intra-maghrébin et in fine, créeraient des emplois.
La situation actuelle du Maghreb peut se rĂ©sumer en une question : Pourquoi obtenons nous collectivement des rĂ©sultats quâindividuellement personne ne souhaite ?
Aperçu de l'événement
Tout au long de lâannĂ©e, CARE, ICEM et MEF ont organisĂ© des rencontres virtuelles en invitant des dirigeants et experts de la rĂ©gion pour prĂ©senter les retombĂ©es Ă©conomiques sur toute la rĂ©gion dâune synergie entre les pays du Maghreb.
Aujourdâhui, les entreprises du Maghreb ont besoin dâoxygĂšne et le Maghreb reprĂ©sente une opportunitĂ© considĂ©rable dans divers secteurs : lâautomobile, lâoffshoring, les start-up, lâĂ©nergie, les Ă©nergies renouvelables, lâeau, le traitement des dĂ©chets, la santĂ©, lâagriculture, lâagro- industrie, les tĂ©lĂ©coms, la culture, etc.
L'objectif de ce webinaire, exclusivement dédié à traiter de l'environnement des entreprises au Maghreb, est de donner la parole aux dirigeants et aux confédérations patronales pour que chacun puisse parler des réussites actuelles et des solutions réalistes pour une communauté d'affaires régionale toujours plus grande, agile et intégrée.
As the annual Why Think Tanks Matter Forum and the 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Report Launch â initially scheduled for January 28, 2021- will be virtual due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Maghreb Economic Forum is organizing a Webinar on how think tanks can make a difference in Tunisia, which will take place on January 29th, 2021 at 2 pm. Â
This event will highlight the critical work think tanks perform and how they have helped lives and livelihoods. It is now more important than ever to focus on their role in helping tackle the different issues emerging from the covid-19 pandemic.
The discussion will bring together Nizar Ben Salah Chief Research Officer â Maghreb Economic Forum, Hachem Alaya, founder of TEMA Think Tank, and Karim Ammar, Security Expert from IPASSS Think Tank.
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ÙŰŻÙ۱ ۧÙÙÙۧێ
Le contexte actuel et exceptionnel de la crise liée à la COVID19 ne doit pas nous faire oublier que les économies de la région étaient déjà sur une tendance baissiÚre au quatriÚme trimestre 2019.
Plus que jamais, les derniers rapports des institutions internationales prĂ©sentent les avantages qui pourraient ĂȘtre tirĂ©s dâune intĂ©gration Ă©conomique plus poussĂ©e au Maghreb avec un impact sur la croissance du PIB supĂ©rieur Ă 2%.
Avec un marchĂ© Ă©largi Ă plus de 100 millions de consommateurs et un cadre lĂ©gislatif favorable, les entreprises de la rĂ©gion sortiraient plus rapidement de la crise Ă©conomique et crĂ©eraient davantage dâemplois. La concurrence stimulerait les dĂ©partements R&D et les investissements Ă©trangers viendraient sâajouter aux mouvements de capitaux en direction et Ă partir des pays du Maghreb.
Or, le Maghreb dĂ©tient le triste record de la rĂ©gion la moins intĂ©grĂ©e du monde, avec des flux dâĂ©changes inter-rĂ©gionaux estimĂ©s Ă moins de 5% du total des transactions commerciales.
DâoĂč lâintĂ©rĂȘt de rĂ©unir une large communautĂ© rĂ©gionale des affaires pour mettre en lumiĂšre les retombĂ©es Ă©conomiques dâune synergie entre lâAlgĂ©rie, le Maroc et la Tunisie.
Les médias tunisiens, depuis l'intensification des attentas terroristes, se sont trouvé obligé de trouver la formule exacte dans la transmission de l'information.
Entre ĂȘtre claire et objectif et sans tomber dans la banalisation des nouvelles, l'Ă©quation a Ă©tĂ© assez souvent trĂšs difficile Ă mettre en place.
Le Maghreb Economic Forum (MEF) et Initiatives pour la Communauté Economique du Maghreb (ICEM), en partenariat avec le groupe AOB, ont le plaisir de vous inviter au Webinar : « Accélérons la transition énergétique pour un impact économique au Maghreb ».
Les trois agences nationales AMEE (Maroc), ANME (Tunisie) et APRUE(Algérie) présenteront leur stratégie dans un contexte marqué par la COVID19 et dont les attentes économiques et sociales sont trÚs grandes.
Le webinar traitera des opportunitĂ©s actuelles et futures des trois pays du Maghreb dans le cadre dâune coopĂ©ration rĂ©gionale en vue dâopĂ©rer une transition Ă©nergĂ©tique crĂ©atrice dâun Ă©cosystĂšme durable avec de la recherche, des emplois, de la rentabilitĂ© et une plus grande protection de lâenvironnement. Ensemble, les trois pays de la rĂ©gion peuvent parvenir Ă rĂ©soudre cette fragile Ă©quation et devenir la locomotive du continent africain.
En mai 2020, le Forum Ăconomique Mondial (WEF) avait publiĂ© lâindice mondiale sur les performances des systĂšmes Ă©nergĂ©tiques. Le Maroc, en lĂ©ger recul demeure le mieux placĂ© au niveau rĂ©gional puisquâil occupe la 51Ăšme place mondiale ; lâAlgĂ©rie sâest hissĂ©e au 83Ăšme rang (gagnant 6 places) tandis que la Tunisie enregistrait un net recul de 17 places pour se hisser Ă la 89Ăšme place.
Comment la crise de la COVID19 peut-elle accentuer la transition Ă©nergĂ©tique en devenant un vecteur de croissance et de crĂ©ation dâemplois ? Existe-t-il aussi une menace du financement de la transition Ă©nergĂ©tique dont la collaboration multipartite est trĂšs lente et coĂ»teuse Ă mettre en place ?
La rĂ©gion peut trĂšs bien sâappuyer sur son positionnement stratĂ©gique pour devenir un acteur mondial dans la production et lâexportation dâĂ©nergie solaire. Dâailleurs, en 2016, le Maroc affichait ses ambitions avec la plus grande centrale solaire du monde : le complexe Noor Ă Ouarzazate dâune superficie de 480 hectares (soit 600 terrains de foot). Le Royaume ambitionne de porter la part des Ă©nergies renouvelables dans le mix Ă©lectrique national Ă plus de 52 % en 2030.
En Tunisie, la premiĂšre centrale Ă©lectrique photovoltaĂŻque vient dâĂȘtre inaugurĂ©e Ă Tozeur (au sud) en Septembre 2019. Dâune superficie de 20 hectares, la centrale pourra rĂ©pondre Ă 14% de la consommation annuelle de la rĂ©gion.
Pour ces deux pays, le risque rĂ©side dans la combinaison des impacts Ă©conomiques du coronavirus et de la chute du prix des hydrocarbures qui peuvent freiner certaines dĂ©cisions importantes en faveur de la transition Ă©nergĂ©tique. Ghozlene Oubya, prĂ©sidente de la Chambre de Commerce et dâIndustrie Maroco-Tunisienne) a Ă©tabli un constat simple :
« les deux pays sont importateurs dâĂ©nergie et que cela pĂ©nalise leur balances commerciales et compĂ©titivitĂ© (âŠ). Il nous paraĂźt, ainsi, vital dâen sĂ©curiser lâapprovisionnement, de rĂ©duire nos dĂ©pendances aux Ă©nergies fossiles et de diversifier notre mix Ă©nergĂ©tique en investissant massivement dans les Ă©nergies renouvelables. »
En AlgĂ©rie, la baisse du prix des hydrocarbures accĂ©lĂšre quant Ă elle les ambitions nationales avec un cap donnĂ© pour 2030 dâune production de 22 000 MW. Le mĂ©ga projet dĂ©buterait avec la production de 4.000 MW dâĂ©lectricitĂ© pour un investissement supĂ©rieur Ă 3,5 mds de $. Le plus grand pays africain jouit en effet dâune durĂ©e dâensoleillement de 2 000 Ă 6 000 Wh/ soit lâun des plus importants gisements dâĂ©nergie solaire au monde.
Pour conclure, lĂ oĂč certains considĂšrent le contexte gĂ©opolitique rĂ©gional comme un ralentisseur de cette transition Ă©nergĂ©tique, nombreux sont ceux qui voient les crĂ©ations dâemplois et les Ă©conomies dâĂ©chelle comme des catalyseurs pour un Maghreb rayonnant par son Ă©nergie. Soyons au rendez vous ce Jeudi Ă 15h pour prendre part au dĂ©bat et ĂȘtre force d'initiative.
« COVID-19 : Maghreb ou jamais »
Défis et Opportunités économiques pour les pays du Maghreb
Parce que les peuples du Maghreb souffrent de ne pas vivre ensemble et que les entreprises dĂ©plorent lâabsence dâun marchĂ© commun.
Parce que lâinefficacitĂ© des systĂšmes financiers rĂ©gionaux fragilise le dĂ©veloppement des infrastructures. Parce que le Maghreb câest aussi et surtout un socle commun, solide et qui a du sens. Nous pensons que la crise du COVID19 est une opportunitĂ© inespĂ©rĂ©e de reprendre les rĂȘnes de notre destinĂ©e commune face aux Ă©goĂŻsmes nationaux. Ensemble, nous pouvons repenser le Maghreb, animĂ© dâune sincĂšre solidaritĂ©.
Un Maghreb façonnĂ© et voulu ensemble et non la simple copie de modĂšles existants et inadaptĂ©s ; un Maghreb oĂč nous bĂątissons et consolidons ce qui nous unit et nous rapproche tout en Ă©tant vigilant sur ce qui nous dĂ©sunit et nous Ă©loigne.
Cette adversitĂ© qui bride lâĂ©lan de notre jeunesse et dont lâonde de choc risque de se propager durant plusieurs dĂ©cennies sera coĂ»teuse en vies, en temps, en emplois et en ressources.
Nos individualités et nos moyens ne peuvent suffire à répondre aux défis toujours plus nombreux et plus violents malgré toute la bonne volonté de nos sociétés civiles et de nos politiques.
Câest dâun Maghreb solidaire et offensif que le MEF se propose de dĂ©battre lors de cette E-ConfĂ©rence intitulĂ©e COVID-19 : Maghreb ou jamais, avec quatre panelistes fins connaisseurs des questions MaghrĂ©bines :
Amine Bouhassane
Directeur des Ressources Humaines HEYME au Maroc ;
Président du think tank maghrébin ICEM (Initiatives pour la communauté économique du Maghreb.
Ferid Belhaj
Vice-prĂ©sident du Groupe de la Banque mondiale pour lâAfrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient.
Hakim El Karoui
Senior Fellow Ă lâinstitut Montaigne.
Directeur de la société de conseil stratégique, Volentia.
Karim El Aynaoui :
Président du Policy Center for the New South.
Doyen de la Faculté de Gouvernance, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
Vice-Président Exécutif de l'Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique.
La conférence se tiendra le Vendredi 1 er Mai 2020 à 21h30 (GMT/UTC +1) sur la plateforme zoom et sera modérée par :
Prof. Dr. Rachid Ouaissa
Professeur de politique du Proche et du Moyen Ă lâuniversitĂ© de Marburg.
Directeur du Think Tank MECAM (Merian Center for Advanced Studies in the Maghreb).
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Űč۱۶ ÙÙ ÙۧÙŰŽŰ© ۧÙÙ ŰłŰ§ŰŠÙ Ű§Ù۱ۊÙŰłÙŰ© (ۧÙŰȘŰŰŻÙۧŰȘ ÙۧÙۧŰŰȘÙۧۏۧŰȘ ÙۧÙÙ۶ۧÙۧ ۧÙÙ ÙŰŰ©) ۧÙŰȘÙ ŰŁŰ«Ű§Ű±Ùۧ ۧÙÙ ŰŹŰȘÙ Űč ۧÙÙ ŰÙÙ ÙÙ Ű§ÙÙ ŰŽŰ§Ù۱ۧŰȘ ۧÙ۳ۧۚÙŰ©.
Ù۶Űč Ù ŰźŰ±ŰŹŰ§ŰȘ ÙŰ°Ù Ű§ÙŰŹÙ۳۩ ۧÙŰȘÙۧŰčÙÙŰ© ÙÙ ŰŽÙÙ Ù ŰŹÙ ÙŰčŰ© Ù Ù Ű§ÙŰȘÙŰ”ÙۧŰȘ Ù۱ۯ ŰčÙÙ ŰȘ۳ۧۀÙۧŰȘ Ùۧ۳ŰȘÙ۳ۧ۱ۧŰȘ Ù ÙÙÙۧŰȘ ۧÙÙ ŰŹŰȘÙ Űč ۧÙÙ ŰÙÙ.
With our collaborators Zenith.me and The Candid Foundation, MEF gathered various leaders of start-ups, business consultants, NGOs focused on job market development, representatives from job matching platforms, and young Tunisian graduates to come together at the Delegation of the European Union to Tunisia for an experts workshop. This workshop was conducted to discuss and explore innovative approaches to integrating new technologies and social media into job matching platforms and job creation.
MEF gathered experts of different backgrounds ranging from psychiatry to security consultancy for this experts workshop on youth radicalization. The aim of this convening of experts was twofold. First, to discuss key theories on psychological, societal, and ideological drivers of radicalization in Tunisia. The second, was to pinpoint what unique gaps in research exist today on deradicalization and re-integrating returning fighters.
The 2018 MENA Think Tank Summit was organized by Centre des Etudes Méditerranées et Internationales, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program TTCSP, University of Pennsylvania. MEF Executive Director, Slim Bahrini was invited as a panelist for the round-table discussion, "New Road-map for MENA Economic Integration".
The #EuroMeSCo network is taking part in the 2018 #MENA #ThinkTank #Summit in Tunisia. Rep' of 70 think tanks debate strategies and best practices for transforming public policy and institutions in an era of digital and political disruptions. #MENATTS2018 pic.twitter.com/wzPddJ5JcS
â IEMed (@IEMed_) 4 octobre 2018
The Global Think Tank Summit event gathered a hundred executives from the most influential Think Tanks around the world to convene in Brussels. Bruegel and and the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania invited MEF to participate at the closed event under the theme "Think Tank: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters and Turbulent Timesâ.
The Maghreb Economic Forum, in partnership with Robert Bosch Stiftung, will be holding a ceremony and final conference bringing together various stakeholders in the 3ESHRA Project. At the conference, a qualitative report culminated from the construction of a Community of Practice for Gender Equality in Tunisia will be presented to the Tunisian Individual Freedoms and Equality Committee (COLIBE in French).
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This event, organized by the Maghreb Economic Forum, addresses the effectiveness of different approaches of Dis-engagement/Prevention.
This event comes after one year of advanced studies on tackling youth radicalization through inclusion. The Maghreb Economic Forum research team are addressing the extent to which Inclusion affects Youth De-radicalization in post-revolutionary Tunisia while assessing the effectiveness of different approaches of Disengagement and Prevention.