

TACKLING YOUTH RADICALIZATION THROUGH INCLUSION IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY TUNISIA



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Author

Nabil Barkati

Co-author

Nizar Ben Salah

Contributors

Imen Al-Nighaoui

Roland Gillah

Chourouk Amouri

Harrison Leon

Cover illustration

Hanen Ben Yahia



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In this study, we aim to:

- 1** Examine and understand youth perception of inclusion, and assess the link between exclusion and youth radicalization in Tunisia. Hence recommend policies, programs and practices to prevent violent extremism and deradicalize marginalized female and male youth in Tunisia.
- 2** Analyze and evaluate existing strategies of violent extremism prevention and deradicalization in the Maghreb Region, to identify which strategies and measures could be successfully adapted in Tunisia to build youth resilience.
- 3** Develop new approaches of preventing the radicalization of marginalized youth in Tunisia and enabling effective rehabilitation of former youth extremists.

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Foreword

Ramata Molo Thioune

Senior Program Specialist
Democratic and Inclusive Governance
International Development Research Centre

Preface

The project undertaken by MEF with support of IDRC is an attempt to gain a better understanding of key factors that drive youth impetus to join violent extremist groups. It is based on direct interaction with a group of Tunisian youth using interviews and focus groups and examines whether radicalized youth have financial difficulties (unemployment, economic exclusion), issues of social support and social recognition (identity crisis, social exclusion), or are culturally marginalized (cultural exclusion).

This document comes to provide the keys to understanding and exploring the radicalization phenomenon which plagues our countries. Intensified by the notion of global village, the loss of identity, the repeated economic crises and their corollary unemployment, the galloping world demography, the clash of civilizations but also that of religions, the growing inequalities, this radicalization finds its source both within our countries and internationally. So many elements that contribute to identity withdrawal and very probably to the rise of violent extremism.

Research work, mainly by the World Bank, shows that youth dissatisfaction or disillusionment that drove the Arab Spring was more linked to the decline in the quality of life and inequality of wealth among middle class and wealthier groups. Repressive governments in the Middle East relied on a social contract, known as the “authoritarian bargain,” by giving their citizens free public services in exchange for support. However, the political control of the economy hampered the creation of jobs in the private sector while restricting growth in the public sector, leading to a breakdown of this social contract, resulting in exclusion of large groups of people from wealth and power. These were the grievances that spurred the revolutions and violence of the Arab Spring and are often echoed by violent extremists as their motivations.

On this basis, this report considers Inclusion as an approach to remedy certain root causes of radicalization which can be used to prevent violent extremism or/and deradicalize extremists. The report analyses the perception of inclusion based on 6 key factors: 1) Education, 2) Employment, 3) Civic Engagement, 4) Political Participation, 5) Religion, and 6) Social acceptance

The research work, based on the perception of Tunisian youth that participated in the study, shows that fighting violent extremism and promoting de-radicalisation is directly linked to improving perception of these 6 factors and ensuring better inclusiveness of youth in social, economic, and political lives. The inclusion of youth should ensure their full and active participation in decision making and transforming current policies to be more in line with their future aspirations and the rapidly changing world around them.

Beyond the inclusion of youth in all aspects of life, fighting violent extremism and radicalisation, requires strong government action at national and regional level.

These actions can be translated into concrete measures to improve social norms, public policies and the regulatory framework in the Maghreb region to strengthen preventive processes and provide the right space for youth to grow and prosper through a more inclusive and equitable economic and political system.

Kamel Lazaar

President - Maghreb Economic Forum

About MEF

The Maghreb Economic Forum (MEF) is a Think-and-Do Tank founded in 2011 on the premise of supporting economic and social development in the five Maghreb countries. Our founders are North African business entrepreneurs, activists, and academics devoted to Maghreb integration. We believe that an informed citizenry which holds public and private institutions accountable is the key to building inclusive societies and sustainable economies. Our mission is thus to convene, connect, and catalyze diverse actors to foster dialogues on social and economic issues in the Maghreb.

About IDRC

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) funds research in developing countries to promote growth, reduce poverty, and drive large-scale positive change. IDRC was established by an act of Canada's parliament in 1970 with a mandate "to initiate, encourage, support, and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical, and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions." IDRC has a head office in Ottawa, Canada while there are regional offices in Egypt, Uruguay, Kenya, and India.

About the authors

Nabil Barkati is the chief programs officer at the Maghreb Economic Forum working on the research study “Tackling Youth Radicalization in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia Through Inclusion”. He has worked in several initiatives related to mitigating and preventing Violent Extremism in Tunisia since 2012. For instance, he worked on advocating alternative messaging as a tool to prevent and counter Violent Extremism. He, also, has been part of an initiative that promotes youth leadership to reinforce community resilience to radicalization. Additionally, Nabil worked on a project that worked on measuring youth susceptibility to violent extremism in vulnerable areas in Tunisia in order to reinforce youth resilience to radicalization and extremism.

Nizar Ben Salah is the chief research officer at the Maghreb Economic Forum, he manages the development of projects flow, research methodologies and the support of the different national and local stakeholders. He has worked on several youth empowerment and positive youth development projects in North Africa with organizations such as The International Institute of Debate, and UNESCO. Nizar has been supporting national and international organizations in designing, implementing, and evaluating projects and initiatives related to youth capacity development.

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Finally, we would like to thank everyone who contributed to the research by supporting, encouraging, and assisting the team with a special note to Wathek Ltifi, Chourouk Amouri, Harrison Leon and Hamida Jridi.

Nabil Barkati

MEF

Nizar Ben Salah

MEF

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Terminology and language used

Much of the language used to describe violent extremism is highly politicized and vague in meaning. Though many of these terms do not capture every aspect of those who perpetrate violence, this study uses a few key words to address the motivations of violent actions. In this case, terrorism is defined as the deployment of violence to intimidate the public. In general, violent extremism is the form of political violence legitimated by extreme ideological views and beliefs. As used in this book, “violent extremism” stands for one of its specific aspects: Jihadi violence, which is not particular to one nation or ethnic group and uses fundamentalist interpretations of Islam in its ideology as justification for the use of violence¹.

Radicalization:

It is the adoption of beliefs that legitimate the adoption of extreme means in the achievement of certain goals. While the accepted view is that the wave of violence currently sweeping the Muslim world is a combination of ideological (specifically religiously based) violence with political aims, this research does not proceed on the assumption that fundamentalist Islam is a necessary precursor of violent behavior or its recruitment. Instead, it acts only as a risk factor. However, involvement does not only mean perpetrating acts of terrorism, but can also include buying weapons, raising money, and recruiting other members.

De-radicalization:

A change in beliefs and mindsets that motivate extremist violence, specifically the belief that divine law must be imposed on others to save the world from corruption². This term is an umbrella term that describes why an individual changes their behavior and their beliefs.

¹ Pillar, Paul R., “Jihadi Terrorism: A Global Assessment of the Threat,” in *Jihadi terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge*, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 7-7.

² Horgan, John. “Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism,” in *Jihadi terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge*, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 186-173.

Disengagement:

Ending involvement with a violent extremist group. It entails a distinct behavior change, choosing to stop committing acts of political and ideological violence³. This term was selected because it is an understudied phenomenon in the Tunisian context and still allows the team to examine radicalization process and the exit process of violent extremism.

Insurgency:

A campaign of violence that specifically targets police and security forces in an attempt at rebellion. This term was added because the violence launched by violent extremist groups within Tunisia's borders is best characterized as an insurgency aiming to erode the government's influence in these areas.

³Horgan, John. "Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism," in *Jihadi terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge*, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011) 186-173

Executive summary

Tunisia has become a disproportionate source of jihadist recruits. Official numbers entails that approximately 3,000 Tunisians have joined the ISIS ranks in Syria, Iraq, and Libya to date, while ruling elites are being confronted with the challenges of home-grown terrorism.

This project develops innovative approaches for radicalization prevention and de-radicalization by analyzing the relationship between experiences of exclusion and female and male youth's susceptibility to extremism. The research focuses on the underprivileged regions of Tunis, Tataouine and Kasserine, holding focus groups with male and female youth and anonymized in-depth interviews with current and former members of the jihadist milieu. Research results provide evidence for decision-makers that inclusion is a key factor for reengaging millennials whose feelings of injustice are being exploited by anti-system extremists.

Building on the deep-rooted spirit of emancipation in Tunisia, the research also identifies adequate participatory inclusive approaches in strategies for radicalization prevention and de-radicalization.

A deep understanding of local context is largely missing from research on why individuals join and leave violent extremist groups. Although a global phenomenon, the roots of violent extremism are local. Tunisia's history of violent extremism is intertwined with relative deprivation: the sense of injustice arising from not attaining the quality of life expected. Although many Tunisian violent extremists are well-educated and come from middle-class backgrounds, they often hail from under-resourced regions. This lack of inclusion may be a driver of joining and exiting violent extremism.

This study aims to establish the centrality of inclusion within de-radicalization and prevention programs that respond to violent extremism in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Having identified discrepancies between academic research on radicalization and its translation into policy, the research project aims to influence how public policies of prevention and de-radicalization are framed.

The first chapter of the study lays down the methodology and the research questions, including the methodological path and the qualitative data analysis. The research methodology is based on a mixed method approach leaning more towards qualitative analysis to identify, measure and assess the perception of inclusion among Tunisian youth, radicalized and disengaged individuals. In this chapter, we describe the data collection and analysis process and the limitations of the methodology in reaching the research objectives.

In the second chapter, the research depicts a historical background of the Tunisian context before and after the revolution, portraying the characteristics of the educational system, employment, civic and political dynamics, and the evolution of religious teaching in Tunisia. Moreover, in this chapter, we outline the beginnings of violent extremist movements before and after the revolution through listing the different extremist jihadi groups and the rise of the extremist ideology in recent years, going through the root causes of radicalization and youth motives to support and join these groups.

The first part of the third chapter defines inclusion through literature from national and international interpretations. Focusing on breaking down the definition into multiple indicators to better conduct a thorough research and assess change in perceptions among youth, radicalized and disengaged individuals. The thorough exploration concludes that in Tunisia, a person is considered included if they are well educated, have a gainful job, religiously accepted, politically represented in the capital, civically active in their communities, and are not socially ostracized.

Additionally, reviewing the existing literature on Socio-economic vulnerability, political demobilization, educational difficulties, and politics in Tunisia, allowed building a comprehensive understanding of the topic as well as a cross-disciplinary analytical framework to better tackle the research question.

In the pursuit to study the link between youth exclusion and youth susceptibility to radical ideology in Tunisia, researchers investigated the perception of inclusion among youth in marginalized region, radicalized individuals and disengaged men and women.

Compelling differences in perceiving inclusion raised among the research subjects despite the similarities in specific details. Considering the psychological and cognitive sensitivities, the research deepened its investigation accordingly using a mix methodology with an inclination towards qualitative analysis.

The different perceptions and life stories inform on the importance of inclusion as an approach to prevent radicalization and a catalyst to encourage disengagement from violent extremist groups.

In the fourth chapter, the study tackles the adaptation of inclusive de-radicalization and prevention programs in post-revolutionary Tunisia and expose the Tunisian experience with combatting violent extremism. Compared to the different approaches implemented in Algeria and Morocco, the study insists on contextualizing any effort to prevent radicalization and/or deradicalize extremists. These efforts are advised to this research recommendations.

The study instructs preventing violent extremism programs and de-radicalization strategies to follow the research findings regarding the importance of specific perceptions in the effectiveness of their implementation.

Substantiate youth perceptions of education, religion and gainful employment is a key to successfully implement programs to prevent violent extremism whereas focusing on social acceptance of youth, the concept of religious teaching and providing gainful employment is the key to encourage and feed the process of disengagement among radicalized youth.

Introduction

This work is an attempt to isolate the key factor(s) that drive young Tunisian women and men to join violent extremist groups. Focusing on exclusion, it examines whether radicalized youth have financial difficulties (unemployment, economic exclusion), issues of social support and social recognition (identity crisis, social exclusion), or are culturally marginalized (cultural exclusion). Exclusion refers to an extensive definition that includes:

- Cultural and Ideological exclusion (Ex: religion, ideological affiliation)
- Psycho- sociological exclusion (Ex : precarious existence, disaffiliation)
- Socio-economic exclusion (Ex : deprivation, employment)
- Political exclusion (Ex : oppression, conflicts)

As the only country in the MENA region to have quite successfully taken a democratic path, Tunisia holds much promise. Notwithstanding continuous political and economic challenges, Tunisia succeeded in holding several free and transparent elections and ratified a constitution in 2014 seen by many observers as the most advanced legal text in the region. However, the country still faces several challenges most notably violent extremism. Since the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011, Tunisia has been struggling with a high number of terrorist attacks. On the 18th of March 2015, three gunmen attacked a group of tourists at the Bardo National Museum in the capital Tunis. Three months later, a lone gunman attacked a group of British tourists at a beach resort in the city of Sousse. On the 24th of November 2016, a dozen presidential guards were killed on a bus by a suicide bomber in downtown Tunis. All these deadly attacks were followed by sporadic terrorist attacks especially in the south, near the borders with Libya. In addition, a significant number of foreign fighters joining the Islamic State in Syria, Libya and Iraq were Tunisians.

According to the data released by The Soufan Group in 2015, Tunisians constituted the single largest group of foreign fighters in Libya and Syria, with around 6000 fighters (Soufan Group, 2015). A number of these fighters have already returned home, some of whom are not even known to the authorities.

The convergent trends of increasing violent extremism and reinforcing democratization since the fall of Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali is quite a puzzle. Scholars suggest that we should expect to see violent extremism declining while the country moves forward to more consolidated democracy (MacDonald and Waggoner, 2018; Krueger, 2007). Alan Krueger argues that extremists and terrorists emerge from countries where political and civil liberties are limited (Krueger, 2007: p 74). Puddington brings to light that 90% of terrorist attacks in 2013 took place in either “not free” or “partly free” countries (Puddington, 2015). However, the Tunisian case is quite different. Although Tunisia is classified as a free country by the Freedom House, the number of Tunisians joining radical groups either in Tunisia or foreign groups raises concerns. This study will address this issue and attempts to answer a few questions: What are the violent extremist groups that Tunisians have already joined, in Tunisia and abroad? What are the root causes of violent extremism? What kind of strategies has the Tunisian government adopted to counter violent extremism? Former national security advisor Akrouf, says that in each case Tunisia has put in place a “tailor-made approach”, involving rehabilitation, reintegration, travel restrictions, and de-radicalization in prison. But European officials say that accurate information is difficult to obtain; some experts believe three times as many fighters may have returned, with many of them evading detection by the authorities.

Indeed, Tunisians who join jihadist groups can be prosecuted for “terrorist crimes” or put under administrative surveillance under the 2015 Law on Combating Terrorism and Money Laundering. But there is little evidence that the government has taken major systematic approach to de-radicalization.

Tunisia is struggling to catch new ways on how to prevent the disillusionment of the country’s landscape after the 2011 revolution from breeding future terrorist fighters. The importance of research into countering violent extremism (CVE) has gained traction in recent years as increasing evidence demonstrates that hard line approaches to counter-terrorism can exacerbate the threat. Traditional CVE strategies that focus on increasing security measures often further alienate and disenfranchise young people who feel they are “under the watch” of the state.

This disillusionment has direct policy implications. The growing distrust of politics led to the low turnout of young people during the 2014 legislative elections. Where political parties are unable to engage with youth, violent extremist groups take the opportunity to exploit youth grievances and frustrations. The main rationale behind this project is the urgent need for a holistic perspective on preventing youth radicalization and de-radicalization for policy recommendations. Having identified discrepancies between academic research on radicalization and its translation into policy, the research project will aim to influence how public policies of prevention and de-radicalization are framed. Additionally, the project will aim to convince national decision-makers to involve marginalized groups of male and female youth in the design of social policies. As such, the project will aim to deny the homegrown drivers of violent extremism and work towards a strategic programming for former violent extremists to improve social cohesion in Tunisia.

The country's lack of an integrated, cross-government strategy is particularly apparent in this area but the most important obstacles to fight radicalization in Tunisia is the social and economic marginalization that persist, and the lack of social and economic opportunities lead to a sense of frustration and injustice among the population and especially youth.

Chapter I

METHODOLOGY.

To answer the problematics of the study, we apply a qualitative multimethod research approach for data collection. Although the terms “multimethod” and “mixed method” are often confused or used interchangeably in the related literature, nevertheless, it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between both terms. According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research, p 11), multiple method research could be defined as “research in which more than one method or more than one world-view is used”. From this broad definition, they derive three core categories of multiple method research: (a) multimethod research, (b) mixed method research, and (c) mixed model research.

However, mixed method and mixed model research are regrouped under the term mixed methods, as they both comprise either a simultaneous or sequential use of both quantitative and qualitative data collection procedures and techniques. In contrast, multimethod research consists of using two different methods (e.g., Ethnography, Case study, etc..) or data collection procedures from the same methodological tradition (Qualitative or Quantitative.).

The adoption of a qualitative multimethod research approach ensures that our research questions are not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood. Furthermore, it is consistent with the inductive theoretical drive inherent to our study, conducted on a discovery working mode due to multiple reasons and constraints, such as:

- The complexity of research questions.
- Scarcity of research literature on youth perceptions in Tunisia.
- The absence of a single overarching guiding theory on youth radicalization.

1. Research design

From a broad array of designs to qualitative research, we select to module our study on a multiple case-studies design. Case study method enables a researcher to closely examine the data within a specific context. In most cases, a case study method selects a small geographical area or a very limited number of individuals as the subjects of study. Case studies, in their true essence, investigate and explore contemporary real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships. Yin (The Case Study Method, 1983:23) defines the case study research method “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”.

According to Yin (Case Study Research ,2003), a case study design is considered appropriate when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (c) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context. Following these considerations, the case study design is considered appropriate for our study given that: (a) the focus of the study is to discover root causes and routes of youth radicalization in Tunisia; (b) measuring the influence of multiple inclusion dynamics on youth radicalization in Tunisia; (c) youth radicalization in Tunisia is considered as a phenomenon specific to urban-peripheral contexts.

On the other hand, multiple case-studies are included to enhance the explanatory power and generalizability of the data collection and interpretation process. It will enable a replication of findings and an exploration of differences between and within cases. Based on comparisons, the boundaries between the phenomenon and micro-contexts will be assigned, macro-dynamics will be recognized, and

the influence of each specific inclusion variable will be defined.

All research is based on some underlying philosophical assumptions about what constitutes valid research and which research methods are appropriate for the construction of knowledge in each study. Therefore, a proper conduction and evaluation of any research requires a clarification of these assumptions.

Following Stake (The art of case study research, 1995) and Yin (Case Study Research, 2003), we will base our approach to case study on a constructivist paradigm. Constructivists claim that truth is relative and that it is dependent on one's perspective, social trajectory, and positionality in each socio-historical conjecture. This paradigm "recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning but doesn't reject outright some notion of objectivity. Pluralism, not relativism, is stressed with focus on the circular dynamic tension of subject and object" (Miller & Crabtree, *Doing Qualitative Research*, 1999, p.10). Constructivism is built upon the premise of a social construction of reality (Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, 1995).

The rationale for basing our approach to the case study on this paradigm is grounded in the recognition of a necessary close collaboration between the researcher and the participant, enabling participants to elaborate on their perceptions in interactive settings, and to construct their trajectories in a narrative form (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Through these interactions and narrations, the participants can describe their views and experiences, which enables the researcher to grasp a thick description of the participants' actions, motivations, and perceptions of reality.

2. Research methodology

The research methodology is based on a mix method approach (qualitative and quantitative analysis) to answer the research questions, reach its objectives, and develop a comprehensive understanding of the role of inclusion perception in the radicalization and de-radicalization processes.

2.1. Research question

Based on three assumptions, the research statement asserts that inclusive approaches reinforce youth de-radicalization in post-revolutionary Tunisia. The study answers two research questions:

1. To what extent inclusion affects Tunisian youth de-radicalization?
2. Do the existing Inclusive de-radicalization programs fit into post-revolutionary Tunisia?




Figure 1: the research methodology

2.2. Methodological path

The research aims to follow the changes of the perception of inclusion throughout the process of radicalization and disengagement. The change of the perceptions is believed to assert the importance of inclusion and more specifically the importance of certain inclusion indicators in preventing violent extremism and disengagement.




Figure 2: The research methodological path

3. Data collection

To put the research into its context, data was collected in the years 2018 and 2019 meaning the research is based on data, information and analysis undertaken from 2018 to the beginning of 2020. However, the research team considers that the research outputs remain valid since no considerable developments or changes were made in the field of preventing violent extremism and de-radicalization programming in Tunisia and the Maghreb Region.

The data is collected through reaching out to Tunisian youth, radicalized individuals, returnees, and local and national stakeholders. During the data collection process, the research team abide by the study's ethics and security protocols.

The language used during the data collection is the "Tunisian dialect". This choice of language was made for the sake of preserving the data content. Moreover, it would help create a better understanding of the post-revolutionary Tunisian context.

As stated, the research overlay the process of de-radicalization and the change of inclusion perception among Tunisian youth. In this study we focus on portraying three perceptions of inclusion among 3 different groups of research subjects.

The research data is collected through 3 phases using different data collection tools according to the methodological path and framework.

3.1. First Phase: Literature Review

The purpose of a literature review is to establish the importance of the topic at hand and to provide a background information about it. Furthermore, it allows researchers to effectively place themselves in a

scholarly conversation.

With the data collected, the research team aims at creating a comprehensive paper analyzing books, academic and journalistic articles, research papers, policy briefs and accessible governmental data to establish a primary understanding of the topic.

In addition, the purpose of the literature review is to depict the Tunisian context through understanding the background of each indicator of the inclusion definition. The data comprises historical, societal, and anthropological facets.

The literature review covers:

- Defining Radicalization.
- Root causes of supporting violent extremism groups.
- Root causes of joining violent extremism groups.
- Defining de-radicalization.
- Root causes of de-radicalization / disengagement.
- Defining inclusion.
- Understanding the Tunisian context
- Understanding the link between prevention / de-radicalization and inclusion.
- De-radicalization and prevention programs in Tunisia.
- De-radicalization and prevention programs in Algeria and Morocco.

The literature review concludes the baseline definition of inclusion based on international and national interpretations while describing the process of radicalization and de-radicalization.

3.2. Second phase: Focus groups

In order to define and contextualize the perception of inclusion in Tunisia post revolution, primary data from focus groups with youth from the research population intend to test the literature review-based definition of inclusion.

3.2.1. Population

Kasserine: Ezzouhour neighborhood

Kasserine, a small town in midwestern Tunisia, is also spelled Al-Qasrayn. The town is an important market, road and railway hub, and the center of an irrigated agricultural area.

Kasserine's economic activities are based on the cultivation of olives and esparto grass and the manufacture of paper pulp. It is also known for the nearby Chaambi National Park, home of the country's endangered mountain and a hideout for several extremist groups.

Kasserine is a one of the first Tunisian regions where the uprising of 2011 started. The protests in 2011 were a result of decades of marginalization and socioeconomic exclusion.

The research is conducted in the neighborhood of Ezzouhour in the city center of Kasserine, with a population of 19 21 individuals and a high unemployment rate of 32.45 compared to 17.8 at national level and an illiteracy rate of 28.39 which is considered significant in comparison with a national illiteracy rate of 19.27.

Tataouine: Ghomrassen

The Tataouine Governorate is Tunisia's southernmost governorate, and the only one that shares borders with both Algeria and Libya. It is also the biggest, with a total area of 38,889 km². It was virtually tied for second least populated with a population of 149,453.

The governorate of Tataouine is home to Tunisia's greatest natural resource fields, including Borma, Adem, Chourouk, and Nawara, which will shortly begin gas production and is believed to be the country's largest gas field. Despite its wealth of natural resources, the governorate has poor development indicators: unemployment is over 32 percent, about double the national average of 15 percent, and the governorate's economy is stagnant.

One of the cities of Tataouine, Ghomrassen is the third most populated city with a population of 15957 and a high unemployment rate of 21.05 in comparison with a national rate of 17.8. We find, 20.28% of females in Ghomrassen are illiterate compared to 9.07 of males. Ghomrassen in total has an illiteracy rate of 15.77 .

Tunis: Sidi Hassine

Sidi Hassine is a town and neighborhood in the Tunis Governorate. As of 2014 it had a population of 109.672

Sidi Hassine takes approximately third of capital Tunis's land area. It was once an agricultural area, but it has been overrun by anarchic houses.

Sidi Hassine, which is bordered to the west by the Sebkhia and to the east by the Borj Chekir landfill, suffers from a proliferation of anarchic housing and multiple wastewater management shortcomings.

With an unemployment rate estimated to 16.47 and illiteracy rate of 15.61, the commune of Sidi Hassine is at a stalemate due to its lack of human capital and financial resources, as well as the lack of an effective executive apparatus. In the preparation of regional development projects, particularly waste recovery, it continues to rely on the central government.

3.2.2. Research subjects

In this data collection phase, the research subjects are youth from the regions of Ezzouhour neighborhood in Kasserine, Ghomrassen in Tataouine and Sidi Hassine in Tunis with 3 specific criteria mentioned below:

- Age: Youth between 18 to 35 years old.
- Life experience: Youth who are originally from the targeted population and who experienced living in a considered-to-be included region of Tunisia (generally the coastal side of the country)
- Exposure: Participant must have been exposed to Jihadi and violent extremism groups propaganda either in person or through any online outlet.

⁴Institut National de la Statistique : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014

⁵Institut National de la Statistique : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014

3.2.3. Group discussion

A focus group is a limited gathering of people that are demographically grouped to assess a current social or political phenomenon. Through this group interview, the participants are asked about their perceptions regarding their feeling of inclusion based on the 6 indicators concluded by the literature review. The focus group is an interactive process where the participants are free to express their point of views, in addition to interacting with other group members.

Through this research tool, the research team's goal is to collect data about the perception and understanding of exclusion and inclusion within the youth community in the different research populations.

Participants in these focus groups are divided into two categories; the first consists of man and women between the age 26 and 35, while the second consists of young man and women between the age 18 and 25. For each category 3 focus groups are conducted:

1. One female only focus group
2. One male only focus group
3. One mix gender focus group

Since the research focuses on youth perception of inclusion in post-revolution Tunisia, the first category of 26 to 35 years old represents individuals who- as youth- lived in Tunisia before and after 2011, while the second category represents youth who grew up in Tunisia post revolution. The subjects in both categories, must have experienced both inclusion and exclusion within their lifetime. Participants are originally from City Ezzouhour in Kasserine, Ghomrassen in Tataouine and Sidi Hassine in Tunis (considered as excluded regions of Tunisia) and lived an experience in a considerate-to-be included regions such as the costal line of the country (either studied or worked in an included environment).

The focus groups are semi-structured; therefore, open to follow up questions to help the research team uncover the different aspects of the

subjects' experiences. Through these focus groups, the research team tested the perception of inclusion indicators among Tunisian youth.

3.3. Third Phase: In-depth interviews

In-depth interviewing is a qualitative research method that comprises conducting individual in-depth interviews with a small sample of respondents to learn about their perspectives on a certain topic, program, or issue. In our case, these interviews were conducted with different categories. In a form of an open discussion to write participants life-stories, researchers focused on the inclusion's indicators through follow up questions in order to depict the interviewees perception.

3.3.1. Research subjects

The in-depth interviews were conducted with two different research subjects.

- 1.** Radicalized individuals
- 2.** Disengaged individuals

No specific criteria were set to select the participants except their involvement with violent extremism either as supporter, participant, or ex-member of a violent extremist group.

Radicalized individuals

The first category is Tunisian youth who are radicalized. By radicalized we mean individuals who believe in the legitimacy to the use of extreme means in the achievement of certain goals, in our case the belief in the legitimacy of violence to achieve religious reign and install a political regime based on religion (Sharia law).

Interviewees are people who adopt an extreme belief system - including a willingness to employ, advocate, or facilitate violence - to achieve societal/political revolution through the success of the Sharia law.

We discover a dynamic of individuals breaking away from their local context at the heart of the radicalization process that leads to violence (family,

friends, colleagues, etc.) as well as a trend toward radicalization that could lead to bloodshed.

As a result, violent radicalization is defined as:

- Adoption of an ideology whose logic becomes a true framework for a person's life, activity, and meaning.
- The belief in using violent tactics to get one's point across
- The mash-up of ideas with violence

The research team collected 6 life-stories from 6 radicalized individuals.

Interviewee	Gender	Age	Origin	Number of Sessions
Individual 1	Female	26	Bizerte	2
Individual 2	Male	29	Kasserine	6
Individual 3	Male	33	Tunis	5
Individual 4	Female	33	Tunis	3
Individual 5	Male	34	Bizerte	3
Individual 6	Male	35	Medenine	2

Table 1: Details about the radicalized interviewees

Disengaged individuals

The second category consists of Tunisian disengaged youth. While de-radicalization is defined as the change in beliefs and mindsets that motivate extremist violence, specifically the belief that divine law must be imposed on others to save the world from corruption. This term is an umbrella term that describes why an individual changes their behavior and their beliefs.

Disengagement is ending the involvement with a violent extremist group. It entails a distinct behavior change, choosing to stop committing acts of political and ideological violence. This term was selected because it is an understudied phenomenon in the Tunisian context and still allows the team to examine radicalization process and the exit process of violent extremism distinguishing behavioral from cognitive in the process of de-radicalization.

The research secured 5 disengaged Tunisian individuals' life-stories. Although only three of them are in person, the two others are conducted through online meetings knowing that these two are still based in foreign conflict zones more specifically in Libya and Syria.

Interviewee	Gender	Age	Origin	Number of sessions
Individual 1	Female	24	Sfax	2
Individual 2	Female	26	Medenine	2
Individual 3	Male	29	Kairouan	3
Individual 4	Female	32	Tunis	2
Individual 5	Male	36	Tunis	4

Table 2: Details about the disengaged interviewees

3.3.2. In-depth interviews

In this study, the research team, first, conducted in-depth interviews with Tunisian radicalized individuals that are supporting, advocating, and/or actively participating in national and/or foreign violent extremist groups activities,

In total, the research team interviewed 6 radicalized individuals 4 of them in person and 2 via online meetings. While in some cases the in-depth interviews took 2 interview sessions, other took up to 6 sessions. Interview sessions lasted between 20 to 70 minutes.

Second, researchers run in-depth interviews with disengaged individuals, either used to support, advocate and/or have been part of violent extremist groups in Tunisia or abroad.

In total the study comprises 5 disengaged Tunisians aged between 24 and 26 years old and researchers conducted in-depth interviews that lasted between 2 to 4 sessions.

Relying on the expertise and the capacity of the researchers, for both categories, the discussion guide contains 4 questions to be discussed

according to the interviewees flow of thoughts. However, the first in-depth interview session is restricted to ask the interviewee “How he/she feels?” The idea behind is to take all the necessary time to first gain the interviewee’s trust and to keep a dynamic discussion with follow up questions in interaction with the subject’s answers.

While in the next sessions, research have the freedom to reorder the following question depending on the respondent’s train of thoughts.

- How is/was work
- What he/she studied
- How she/he sees her/himself in the next 5 years
- How she/he sees Tunisia in 5 years

During the discussion, researchers’ follow-up questions included suggested probes—follow-up questions designed to explore specific aspects of an issue, in our case, explore the indicators of the inclusion definition. In addition, issues may arise during the interview that could not have been anticipated, and interviewers can ask additional questions to find out more about relevant issues.

4. Data analysis

The purpose of the analysis is to compare the perception of inclusion among disengaged/de-radicalized individuals to the perception among non-radicalized and Radicalized Tunisian youth. This analysis will lead the research team to identify the key indicators that trigger the radicalization and de-radicalization process.

4.1. Focus groups

In defining youth perception of inclusion based on the literature review definition, the research team adapted the 5S method to the research context and applied it on the data collected from the focus groups.

The 5S method consist of employing 5 actions to the data with a continuous iteration in order to narrow down the findings:

- 1st S:** Seiri / Sort
- 2nd S:** Seiton / Set in order
- 3rd S:** Seiso / Shine
- 4th S:** Seiketsu / Standardize
- 5th S:** Shitsuke / Sustain




Figure 3: The process of data analysis using the 5S method.

The analysis is based on coding the "cognition" and "behavior" of the research's subjects. The "cognitive" aspect is about coding the answers, whereas the "behavioral" is mainly coding the participants' interaction and response to the questions. After sorting the answers according to the frequency of the code, as well as, studying the intensity of their interaction and response to the questions, the out-turn of each sorting was labelled to an indicator. This process was iterated until a result was reached. At a final stage, the indicators were ranked from "important" to "less important", and therefore, the "inclusion" definition was created.

4.2. In-depth interviews

The transcript of each in-depth interview serves as the foundation for analyzing life tales. All of the stories are then organized into three levels (Demazière and Dubar, 1997): the level of functions (episodes of the story called sequences), the level of actions (elements of the story that stage Annotated "actants" (An), that is to say "characters", who act, intervene, play a role in the trajectory) and the level of the narration (arguments and propositions noted (Pn) intended to convince the interviewee, to defend a point of view, to inventory the universe of possibilities).

Depending on the level the tale pertains to, each part is highlighted and commented accordingly. However, the same element might have several meanings.

The numerous parts from the tale are given in tables after the interviews have been completely sequenced. The data tables were used to sort the interviewee answers according to the 6 indicators defining Inclusion.

A comparative analysis between the life stories had been made to assess and validate the perception of inclusion among radicalized and disengaged individuals that the research is focusing on.

5. Data collection and analysis limitations

The results of this study rigorously reflect the reality of the research subjects. They can also reflect the reality of other young people from the same populations. They provide indicators that can serve as a basis for measuring the impact of future interventions in the prevention of radicalization.

However, given the size of the sample relative to the young population in Tunisia, it will be very difficult to make an extrapolation for the whole country. It should still be remembered that this study concerns only the research subjects.

5.1. Data Access

In the quest to interview radicalized individuals as well as disengaged Tunisian youth, the research team had to rely on personal connections and a long process of following leads and negotiating with organizations and/or individuals to access radicalized and disengaged Tunisians.

As expected, access to such research subjects was the most challenging aspect of the study. Due to security issues, the absolute secrecy of organized violent extremist groups and to lack of available data, the research ambition to interview a representative number of individuals, compared to the number of Tunisian jihadists, became unachievable.

Most leads to contact the research subjects and the interviews of radicalized individuals and returnees were interrupted either for security reasons or for lack of trust and in some cases, mainly with foreign fighters abroad, it was interrupted due to accessibility shortcomings.

5.2. In-depth interviews discussions

When we study a subject as delicate and sensitive as the question of radicalization, there are no shortage of difficulties. One of the big difficulties was the reluctance of the interviewees to speak of their life experience. In the majority of cases, these individuals were expecting a criminal-investigation-like questions, believing they are dealing with agents of justice, adopt sometimes a posture of defense and denial of belonging to any jihadist organization. All these difficulties have been overcome thanks to the explanations provided on the scientific and confidential nature of the study.

Chapter II

**RADICALIZATION, INCLUSION,
AND THE TUNISIAN CONTEXT.**

1. Historical interpretation of the Tunisian Context

In Tunisia, the revolution has revealed the depth of the gap between the educational system and the country's economic reality in terms of the inability of the labor market to absorb graduates, and socially, in terms of the inability to socially integrate the younger generation's victims of marginalization, and politically, in the sense of denying young people participation in public affairs through various organizations and state institutions, especially democratically elected officials.

It is enough to recall that young Tunisians who have joined the hotbeds of tension in Syria, for example, conquer the highest proportions compared to other different nationalities, moreover a significant number of terrorist attacks in Europe were carried out by Tunisians.

Understanding this phenomenon and revealing its circumstances and causes in all its historical, cultural, intellectual, political, and social dimensions remains an urgent goal.

When studying youth's issues and its cross-cutting topics such as education, employment, civic engagement, the participation in the political life, the importance of social inclusion, the relationship with religion as faith, we can draw a bigger picture of the Tunisian context and its effect on the social contract in general.

1.1. Education

When deciding to study civilizations and nations in various aspects of life, as well as in cultural, artistic, and intellectual aspects, researchers find in the educational system and its content, an honest reference, a revealing mirror of today's reality, and a truthful prophecy about the coming decades, generation after generation.

Whenever education is widespread throughout the country among all layers of society, progress and prosperity will be attained.

Today, education is linked to several important issues related to modern societies, especially in countries that are still seeking growth.

1.1.1. Muhammad Charfi: “The Reformer Minister” who had been charged with infidelity by Islamists

Mohamed Charfi, a professor of civil law and one of the symbols of the leftist Afaak movement (Perspectives Tunisiennes) in the sixties and head of the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, took over the Ministry of Education on April 11, 1989, a year and a half after the “medical” coup of Ben Ali.

Charfi had a reformist vision for the school, based on its reconciliation with the state and the principles of democracy and human rights. He considered that education in Tunisia had become a reactionary trend, in contrast to the state’s modernist trend, and that the Tunisian school did not educate children citizenship but rather on ideals and references that contradict it.

Charfi had put the review of school programs as the first priority. He decided to prepare and print new schoolbooks in few months and withdraw the two previously-used books of Islamic education for the fifth and sixth grades because he found in them serious implications like:

- The right of a husband to beat his wife.
- The Khilafah is the only legitimate political system in Islam.
- The punishment for abandoning prayers.
- A black list of thinkers whose reading is forbidden,

He replace them with a book by Mukhtar El Salami, the Mufti of the Republic at that time, on “Ijtihad in Islam”.

Charfi announced this in a press conference in September of 1989 and explained his vision of the school and the seriousness of what he found in the two withdrawn books.

The protest campaign was launched:

- Official Islam against the decisions of the Minister of Education,
- The reaction of the Al-Nahdha movement was strong.
- A statement signed by Abdel-Fattah Mourou, entitled “No to mocking Islam,” was issued accusing Charfi of perpetuating the “Bourguiba’s Project against Islam and the Arabic language” and of “attacking the sanctities and feelings of the nation.”
- Protests with the slogan “There is no god but Allah, and Charfi is the enemy of God.”
- Al-Nahdha considered Charfi a symbol of what it called “the policy of draining the sources,”
- Violent street protests.
- Protests and strikes in institutes and universities, led by Islamic students, have continued for more than a year.

1.1.2. Laws 1991 and 2002: Between a legislative translation of the modernizing approach to education and submission to the dictates of loan funds

Muhammad Charfi oversaw the drafting of a new legal framework that replaced the 1958 law, Basic Law No. 65 of 1991 relating to the educational system.

The first chapter of the law sets thirteen goals for the educational system, including:

- Raising awareness among young people about the Tunisian national identity.
- Developing a civic sense and a sense of civilized belonging at the national, Maghreb, Arab and Islamic levels.
- Strengthening openness to modernity and human civilization.
- Raising young people to be loyal to Tunisia.
- Preparing for a life in which there is no room for any form of discrimination based on gender, social origin, color, or religion.
- Enabling learners to master the Arabic language and at least a foreign language in a way that enables them to have direct access to the production of scientific thoughts and qualifies them to keep pace with its development and contribute to it.

As the 1991 law enshrined:

- The concept of middle education, which includes in addition to primary education (six years) three years in preparatory schools. (This has been developed since the eighties).
- Reinforced compulsory basic education between the ages of six and sixteen,
- Adopting Arabic in teaching all human, scientific and technical subjects in primary and middle schools.

Charfi remained in the ministry until 1994, in order to complete his reform by issuing new textbooks and the necessary application laws.

Although the 1991 law was less than ten years old, the directive law No. 80-2002 that copied it maintained the same philosophy and principles.

This law was drafted under the supervision of the Minister of Education at the time, Mansour Rouissi, who also adopted the left political ideology, but, unlike Mohamed Charafi, he joined the Ben Ali regime from 1987 until the revolution.

The 2002 law came to keep pace with developments and "international standards" in the field of education, for example adopting the "competencies approach" and focusing on periodic and regular evaluation of all components of school education.

However, Rouissi reforms also included:

- Changing the formula calculating the baccalaureate rate, allowing a much higher success rate. As a result, the numbers of students in higher education rose without employment prospects.
- Practically and effectively canceled sixth and ninth grades national exams.
- Maintain the formality of the two exams and limit them to an opportunity to elect the candidates to be directed to the elite institutions.
- Abandon technical schools' programs.

The 2002 law still, despite some minor amendments, regulates education in Tunisia.

The failure of the social elevator represented by the public school and the lack of prospects ahead of a large proportion of the graduates were among the most important reasons that led to the 2010-2011 revolution.

Moreover, after the revolution, successive governments were unable to complete a comprehensive education reform.

1.2. Employment

After the 1992 Law on educational reform and at the beginning of the third millennium, the Tunisian school produces annually, tens of thousands of degree holders, in 2017/2018 school year alone, 50307 students graduated from Tunisian universities. Those who drop out of school and has been trying to join the job market, find it incompatible, so they strengthen the reserve army of the unemployed and marginalized. Therefore, linked to the educational system, thorny issues of youth employment and the labor market are raised, and legitimate questions are asked about employment ratio in Tunisia.

By 2011, citizens in different arab countries have taken to the streets to protest their economic, social, and political marginalization. The major demands of the protestors, according to poll data, were connected to political reform but also, critically, to socioeconomic rights. These are exacerbated by rising unemployment rates and a lack of job stability.

Lack of access to quality jobs, particularly among young people, has played a critical role not only in igniting the wave of revolts, but also in concentrating attention on the arab youth and the major difficulties they face. Indeed, the youth unemployment rate in North Africa as a whole was 24%⁷ in 2009 and has since risen to 29.3% in 2016⁸

⁶ Ministry of higher education: *L'Enseignement Supérieur & la Recherche Scientifique En Chiffres (Secteur Public & Secteur Privé) 2013/2014 – 20 18/2019*

⁷ http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescent/s/p06_roudi.pdf

⁸ https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-report/s/weso/2016/WCMS_513739/lang-en/index.htm

Tunisia is no exception in this region, with an unemployment rate of 17.8% which is equivalent to 623,000 people without access to the labor market.

According to the numbers of the National Institute of Statistics (INS), the share of the population aged 15 to 29 has remained high and stable, around 28 to 29%, between 1960 and 2010. A downward trend change has occurred from 2010. In 2017, this share fell to 23%. This change in trend heralds the beginning of a lower pressure on the labor market, but this is a process that will take time and will not be continuous. We should even expect a slight return to the transitory rise in the years to come. Indeed, the share of 0–15-year-olds in the total population had already experienced a slight but significant increase: it went from 23 to 24% between 2010 and 2017, a recovery caused by a slim increase in fertility.

Furthermore, the youth unemployment rate (15–24) has risen from 30% in 2010 to 42% in 2011, and it is now 36%. The problem looks to be even more concerning given that highly educated persons are having the most difficulty finding work.

With higher graduates' unemployment, the skill mismatch between job vacancies and applicants' qualifications is a major challenge. It has been observed that there are 145,000 job vacancies in Tunisia which appear to be unfilled due to a skills gap between labor market and available candidates; but even without taking that number into account, there are still around 480,000 unemployed citizen. This implies that existing companies cannot absorb this surplus of labor on their own and that the creation of new companies is therefore essential. However, starting a business requires the highest level of financial and management skills as much as technological and marketing experience. Although youth have technical skills, they do not necessarily know how to start a business, a controversy that is by no means unique to Tunisia. In addition, the traditionally dominant role of the state as the main employer has hindered for many years the establishment of an open competitive private sector. Prior to the events of 2011, the private sector relied heavily on government patronage which hampered the growth of private investment and

⁹ National Institute of Statistics <http://dataportal.ins.tn/en/>

¹⁰ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/economic-outlook-april-2018>

independent entrepreneurship at the expense of small businesses and young entrepreneurs. As a result, the private sector is weak, and the development of entrepreneurship has also been hampered by the lack of an adequate legal and regulatory framework, particularly excessive bureaucratic requirements, and procedures.

In the other hand, there are more low-skilled male workers or self-employed workers in informal jobs. Informal jobs are mainly made up of very small, unstructured enterprises that do not keep accounts, and pay little or no taxes. In sum, in the informal sector, employers do not comply with the main legal requirements relating to workers' rights, job security and social coverage. Productivity and pay are low. Precarious informal jobs also exist in the formal sector. Data from the «National social security fund» shows that more than half of workers, especially young people, do not have a written contract and do not benefit from sufficient social coverage – not affiliated to the «National social security fund» (CNSS) or not even registered. In Tunisia, the size of the informal sector remains large and is even tending to increase. It is well established that the growth of the informal sector results from the gap between the cost of access to the formal sector and the guarantee of formal jobs and the cost of informality. The cost of the formality depends mainly on the requirements and complexity of the regulations, and on the efficiency and integrity of the public administration responsible for enforcing these regulations. The cost of informality results from the exclusion of the benefits of formality (credit, technology, right to public services, etc.) and penalties for non-compliance with the law. In a country where the authority of the State is weak and its steering capacity is reduced, the risk of sanctions is limited, even often zero, and the cost of formality tends to outweigh that of informality.

1.3. Civic Engagement

1.3.1. During the colonial period: Struggle momentum: journalists, sociologists, unionists, and politicians

The first building blocks

French colonization had been settled down due to the corruption and the rising of foreign bank debt, and according to the Bardo Treaty and the Marsa Agreement of May 12, 1881, it resulted in creating a significant popular resistance of varying effectiveness from one side to the other, but it quickly became weak. Perhaps the most important reasons for this are:

- The imbalance of military forces.
- Tribal conflicts and traditional social structure.
- Hostile traditions between the countryside and the city.
- The cut off communication between the authority and the people (the uprising of Ali Bin Ghadhahem in 1864 still feels recent at that time)

In the face of the failure of the military option, the elites in the cities turned to the option of peaceful resistance within the framework of protection:

- In 1888, «Al-Hadhra» newspaper was established, and it was the first building block of influential public opinion in the Tunisian country.
- In 1896 the «Khalduniya organization» was established.
- In 1904. «Al-Sawab» newspaper was published, a weekly scientific, political, and literary newspaper that lasted from April 1, 1904, to 1938.
- 1905 The «Association of Old Students of the Sadiqiyah School» was formed.
- In the same year, the establishment of the «Tunisian Club» was signed.
- 1907, the young Tunisian youth movement was launched, and it:
 - Considers itself a continuation of the reform movement announced, prior to protection, by Khairreddine Pasha, Ahmed Ibn Abi Al-Dhiaf and Mohamed Bayrem Al-Tounssi.
 - It is also considered the first building block of a national political action.

During this period prior to the first world war (1914-1918), several new cultural activities continued to emerge, along with multiple publications that contributed greatly to the development of a political awareness among readers and played an important role in the initiation of a cultural life.

Perhaps the most important event was the beginning of the consolidation of theatre in Tunisian artistic and cultural spaces, with the emergence of Tunisian theatre groups, as well as the hosting in Egypt of groups of masters like the Soliman Caradahi Choir, who stayed in Tunisia for a few years, as well as the Salama Hegazi Choir.

Clubs and youth associations have also begun to emerge, especially sports teams in various fields, most importantly in football.

In 1906, the first sports association created was the "Football Club of Tunisia", which soon changed its name to "Racing Tunisia". In November 1907, the first official competition (tournament) was organized with only five teams: "Tunisian Football Racing Club", the "Football Club" and the "Sports Club", along with two other teams: the Carnot Institute and the Sadiq Institute.

The Glorious Thirties

After the end of the first world war, following the changes in national and international environments, there was a development in the conduct of elites, a diversity of activities, an expansion of radiation and maturity of national awareness.

In the glorious 1930s, Tunisian society experienced a new dynamic, driven by the fresh spirit and the wind of creativity and innovation. The growth of the cultural movement, the proliferation of collective work, such as the emergence of the scouts movement, the flourishing and the diversity of newspapers and the embracement of a new literary movement, which was seen in the poetry of Abu-Kacem Al-shabby, who not so just a unique phenomenon but rather the leader of the innovators, like Ali Al-Du'aji, in the Art of novels. Also, music had found in Al-Rashidya the best place to flourish.

As for the great reformer and thinker, Taher al-Haddad, he had a pioneering contribution in founding the «General confederation of Tunisian workers», accompanied by Muhammad Ali al-Hami and Belkacem al-Ayari. On the issue of women, a wide path was opened for Tunisian women and Tunisian society that led finally to the emergence of the «Personal status code».

In the mid-1920s, Tunisian sports associations such as “Espérance Sportive de Tunis”, the “Club Africain” the “Club Sportif de Sfax” and the “Etoile Sportive du Sahel” emerged. And behind the establishment of these associations was an elite of patriotic youth who aimed to establish these associations to frame Tunisian youth and rehabilitate them on the physical, psychological, and civic levels.

The Tunisian Constitutional Party and the «Tunisian communist party» were founded during (1919-1920) and then the «General confederation of Tunisian workers» had been risen in 1924-1925. The new «Constitutional free party» then came in 1934.

Rising from the ashes of dark centuries, Tunisian society has demonstrated a new consciousness, vitality, a freedom-seeking spirit, and a strong patriotism, and has set for itself an increasingly militant cultural, social, and political course.

The decade of resolution: 1945-1955

And after the end of the Second World War (1939-1945), and following the change of the national and international circumstances:

- The weakness of old Europe to the power of the rising USA.
- The emergence of a socialist camp supportive of oppressed people and anti-colonialist
- The emergence of the international community with new values (human rights) and support for the right of peoples of self-determination.

Post 1955: In the Shadow of the National State : Muting voices

The country's independence process was carried out by the «Constitutional free party», which led the national militant movement. Therefore, accounted solely for all the decisions and measures, and in summary, the matter led to:

- State party building and state party restructuring.
- Disagreements broke out from the very beginning of negotiations with the French authorities in November 1953 and the tripartite commissions to disarm the resistance.
- The dispute started between Ben Youssef and Bourguiba.
- The assassination by the armed elements and groups loyal to the position of the leader Salah Ben Youssef.
- The 1962 coup attempt (group of Lazhar Al-Sharaiti).
- Repressing the press: restricting independent newspapers, censoring a number of issued publications. The transfer of Ben Yahmed's "Afrique Action" newspaper from Tunisia to France, where it continued to be published under the title: Jeune Afrique.
- Dissolution of the Tunisian Communist Party.
- Dissolving the Tunisian Union (USTT) since 1956 and continuing to restrict its secretary general Hassan El Saadawi from his freedom in until he died in a detention center by a heart attack in 1963.
- The beginning of disputes within the General Union of Tunisian Students about accepting the intervention of the ruling party in the affairs of the organization.

1.3.2. After the revolution: The waterfall

The 2011 revolution ended the era of censorship and repression of all types and activities of civic engagement. And as soon as the Decree No. 2011-88 dated September 24, 2011, related to the organization of associations was issued, the number of NGOs exploded significantly. At the end of 2017, more than 18,000 non-governmental organization were counted, most of which were established after the revolution.

In the words of Kamal Jendoubi, former minister to the Prime Minister in charge of relations with constitutional bodies and civil society:

“It is emerging and diverse, and most of it is made up of small associations and has deficiencies in skills and human resources. It also suffers from several obstacles, such as the absence of mechanisms for controlling funding, especially from foreign agencies, in addition to weak public funding and the absence of its own tax system.”

When studying civil society in Tunisia post revolution, one can record a number of observations, perhaps the most important of which are:

- The end of the resurrection wave after three or four years.
- A significant number of smaller organizations have not been able to impose their presence on the scene, and they are little active due to the lack of capabilities... They have a formal presence or have become completely absent.
- The most prominent civil society organizations that, before the revolution, had a presence, effectiveness, radiance, and leadership in confronting the tyranny system, spreading the values of freedom and democracy, and contributing to the dissemination of an alternative culture, their activities shrank and lost their status and their luster faded to varying degrees, such as:
 - o The Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights,
 - o The Tunisian Organization Against Torture,
 - o The General Union of Tunisian Students,
 - o The Democratic women,
 - o The Tunisian Federation of Cine Clubs
 - o The Tunisian Federation of Amateur Cinematographers,
 - o The Free Writers Organization.
- The civil society net recorded the emergence of a group of modern organizations that are distinguished by a clear vision, accuracy of programs with the availability of funds and human resources thanks to partnerships with international organizations and cooperation projects with international institutions or embassies such as:
 - o Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights,
 - o Al Bawsla,
 - o IWatch.

- The emergence of well-established international organizations that have opened branches in the country, such as:
 - o The World Organization Against Torture,
 - o The International Center for Transitional Justice,
 - o Reporters Without Borders,
 - o Lawyers Without Borders,

There is an important group of organizations funded by Arab and Islamic countries and their affiliated institutions, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Turkey... They began to appear massively immediately after the revolution and played a decisive role in the elections for the Constituent Assembly on October 23, 2011. What distinguishes these associations:

- They are mostly charities.
- There is great ambiguity surrounding the ways and methods of financing these associations,

National public opinion followed with great astonishment the agreement of funds from a Gulf institution to a Tunisian “charitable” association, signed at the presidential palace and in the presence of the President of the Republic, Mr. Mohamed Moncef Marzouki.

There are many voices that consider that these associations are directly or indirectly involved in directing young people to hotbeds of tension (Syria in particular and then Libya) and terrorist groups active in Tunisia.

1.4. Political Participation

Before the Revolution, political life was under the control of one party and one man, where it is impossible to talk truly about the voluntary and broad participation of young people in political life in general and in decision-making positions in particular.

But after the revolution, the margin of freedoms imposed first by the people and subsequently approved and codified by the 2014 Constitution opened the way for a new political life based on freedoms, the rule of law and institutions.

Globalization affected people's life choices, thus youth all over the world are being more reluctant to public life. Tunisia surprised the region with the 2008 protests in the Tunisian mining area and again in 2011 with the Jasmine revolution.

Youth played a major role in overthrowing the former regime, few weeks after the revolution, the debate about human rights, democracy and liberties became political and the older generation prioritized organizing elections rather than establishing a plan for the democratic transition.

The first elections left the Tunisian youth with disappointment, and this was witnessed during the next elections through a very limited youth participation in voting. Although, youth deserted polls, they started running for offices in national and most importantly local levels such as municipal council seats.

During the 2019 elections, the candidate Kais Saied gathered the youth around him for an unexpected journey. During his campaign, youth created multiple online spaces to promote their candidate Kais Saied to replace the traditional media platforms. This was considered as a punishment from youth to the existing political sphere.

The results of the presidential elections, in which a single candidate won the majority of the votes of the youth participating in the elections, compared to the rest of the candidates, raised a huge number of questions about the reasons for the youth's support for Kais Saied, and the hopes they placed on him. What can be learnt from this experience for the benefit of youth participation in general? How does this experience help to understand the actual needs of young people that encourage them to participate in public life?

This reluctance is confirmed in the 2019 United Nations Development Program report entitled “Youth and electoral participation in Tunisia: Bilateral turnout and aversion.” The report stated that:

The reluctance seems to be explained before the 2011 revolution, given the nature of the political system in place at the time, which restricted political freedoms. However, the post-revolution period did not bring anything new. The percentage of youth participation in the «Constituent assembly» elections did not exceed the ten percent threshold, which is a very weak number compared to the liberal spirit that the revolution added to political freedoms.

The participation of young people in the presidential elections was not limited to the support of Kais Saied in the electoral campaign but was also represented in his massive election by the general young electorate.

It is important to note that Kais Saied succeeded in attracting various youth groups, as it seems that he succeeded in presenting a discourse that fits their requirements. The image of an educated academic professor who speaks fluent Arabic and is capable of legal analysis par excellence, encouraged young people with higher degrees to elect him. They consider that the existing political class is controlled by uneducated people who do not believe in scientific production.

The young people who elected Kais Saied are youth who have

suffered from the scourge of successive disappointments coming from the lack of interest by the political class in their social and economic demands. The UNDP study claims that 70 percent of Kais Saied voters are people who do not have a fixed income. It seems that this youth group considers social and economic benefits to be more important than other benefits, including those related to rights and freedoms.

Meanwhile, President Kais Saied emerged as a figure who was not known to have any suspicions of corruption. Rather, he is known for his abstinence from positions, clinging to fighting corruption, clinging to fighting nepotism, and determined to enforce the law on everyone, and he has always repeated: "The law must be like death that does not exclude nobody". On several occasions, Kais Saied made fiery statements targeting the current political class, accusing them of involvement in corruption and "tampering with the Tunisians' livelihood." Thus, it can be concluded that the youth have searched for an honest candidate who is entrusted with the state, and who does not employ state agencies to serve his personal interests.

1.5. Social acceptance

Social acceptance is an aspect of social behavior defined as the degree to which an individual is actively brought into social interactions by others, in individual and/or group relationships. Barriers to Social acceptance may be prejudice, stigma.

Right after the independence, the Tunisian constitution and the establishment of a Tunisian independent political system united the nation around one unique Tunisian identity that, in some sorts obliterate the diversity of cultures, community characteristics and cultural tribalism dated back to the installments of north African tribes in the region.

The historical background of tribal conflicts and traditional social structure and the hostile traditions between the countryside and the city in Tunisia led to a strong social stigma that is associated with historical interpretations and deep-rooted social behavior.

Sociologist Erving Goffman draws on autobiographies and case studies to analyze a stigmatized person's feelings about himself and his relationships with ordinary people. Goffman focuses on the fact that stigma is not a fixed and inherent attribute of a person, but an experience of meaning and difference. It sheds light on how stigmatized people deal with their deprived identity, which means that stigmatization disqualifies them from full social acceptance by an audience that is "normal".

A social stigma is the extreme disapproval of a person because of social characteristics that separate them from other members of society. It is the deviation or disapproval of a person because it does not fit into the necessary social norms of a particular society. A social stigma can be so profound that it can overwhelm positive social feedback about how the same individual adheres to other social norms.

The degree to which an individual is actively drawn into social interactions by others, in individual and/or group relationships, is referred to as social acceptance. Prejudice and stigma can be barriers to social acceptance. Children, teens, and adults are all affected by social acceptance.

Peer pressure causes children and teens to undertake a variety of activities in order to be accepted by their peers. Peer pressure can influence how they style their hair and what clothes they wear. It also influences what people are prepared to do to be accepted by others whose companionship they value, such as smoking, drinking, cursing, and much more.

In Tunisia, the social exclusion and the dire social conditions experienced by the Tunisian youth make them search for an alternative that provides them with symbolic icon that the state has failed to achieve, which raises their position in the social hierarchy. It includes unemployment, the fear from the future, the feelings of anxiety and tension they are experiencing, and the deprivation of the world of consumption. The salafist movement did not arise out of a nothing. Rather, it is the result of important structural transformations and a historical pattern governed by the inefficient policies of a state that failed to implement a development model compatible with

¹¹ Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the management of a spoiled identity*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

the requirements of youth and compatible with their cultural specificities. It is the result of security policies such as the S17 listing. The high percentage of university youth who are involved in the salafi movement is evidence that the educational institution is no longer the space that educates young people on moderation.

1.6. Religion

Follower of what is happening in the Arab world in general, and specifically, in Tunisia, would easily notice the presence of religion in the political life at a high proportion. This can be seen in daily life and in the results of elections in various representative entities.

Tunisia is the most secularized country in the Arab world, according to the ties between politics and religion established by Bourguiba upon the country's independence in 1956. As a result of political and societal reforms advocating societal emancipation and establishing the primacy of the State over religion, Bourguiba effectively imposed secularization, a process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the authority of religious institutions and "symbols".

Right after the Tunisian independence and the establishment of the new modern state, Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian president at that time, played the role of an "enlightened despot," as Muhammad Charfi described it. Bourguiba, while trying to modernize the new Tunisia, brought new interpretations of Islam according to his own view of modernity.

The permanent instrumentalization of religion allowed Bourguiba to strengthen the structure of the state around his person and secure unchallenged power until the "coup d'état" that overthrew him in 1987, after which the instrumentalization of religion and the personalization of the state was to continue with greater vigor. Bourguiba will be remembered as the founder of the modern Tunisian state and the father of significant changes that altered the country's customs and regulations.

Influenced by western culture, characterized by French anticlericalism, and filled with positivist ideas, the "Supreme Fighter"(Bourghiba) launched the construction of the Tunisian state by implementing institutional and legislative changes unparalleled in the Arab world. With the introduction of the «Personal status code» (August 13, 1956), he quickly challenged behaviors he regarded antiquated, and imposed contemporary principles that he recognized were western but thought universal. The new legislation, which revolutionized the "family institution", prohibited polygamy (article 18) and marital coercion (article 3), substituted judicial divorce for unilateral repudiation of women (article 30), and established a minimum marriage age (article 17), among many other measures that stood out and deviated significantly from traditional muslim jurisprudence. Bourguiba's reforms intended to combat retroactive mentalities, remove the conventional constraints of the family, and encourage women's liberation. They also intended to promote universal and free education for an increasing number of young people, as well as to ensure accessibility.

The modernization of Tunisian society has also been illustrated by the secularization of the judicial apparatus, with the liquidation of religious courts. Secularization, that aimed to cut back the influence and prerogatives of men of religion, additionally disadvantaged them of an outsized part of their money resources with the suppression of mortmain merchandise handed over to profane state institutions.

While implementing modernizing policies, its reforms were questioning the practices of Islam while not ever denouncing or rejecting the dogmatic statement.

Within the repressing Arab systems, youth, stricken by injustice and corruption, suffered from economic inequalities ensuing from regional disparities and ethnic and social group divisions, religion appeared as a bulwark against the abuses of leaders in loss of legitimacy, whereas political house was locked, economic prospects distant or non-existent, the "musjid" became the sole space for socialization and, non-secular discourse was the only accepted ideology.

It is also certain that most Tunisian political groups, have avoided engaging in an open clash with Islam and declare, from their various ideological positions, that religion is an essential part of the national identity. As Mr. Mahmoud Ben Romdhan, a university professor of economics, a human rights activist and one of the leaders of the renewal movement said: "The cultural and political battle currently revolves around reading Islam, not abandoning it." The communist workers party, declared in 1987 that Tunisians has no interest in the clashes between the Islamists and Bourguiba's supporters.

However, the growth of political-religious ties had to adjust to societal changes as well as regional and worldwide upheavals. This adaption began under Bourguiba and was maintained under Ben Ali. It has continued since the January 14, 2011, revolution with the fall of the previous government, which opened the door for a political discussion on the status and function of religion in a country that, despite the mandated secularization, remains fiercely conservative and passionately committed to Islam. Following the experience of Ennahdha, the Islamist party in power between 2011 and 2014, the current political transition appears to favor liberal and anti-Islamist forces committed to the defense and maintenance of a certain secularization; in fact, societal polarization has never been so intense, as the country's Islamization continues at a rapid pace.

The main reason leading to the involvement of young Tunisians in Salafist movements is social exclusion, the prevalence of uncertainty, the failure of the Tunisian schools, and the salafi movement as a social elevator. The strategies of salafi movements in attracting youth groups: the mobilization strategy, the strategy of recruitment in periods of political and security instability, and suddenly appearing on the scene in periods of tension and chaos, and the strategy of selection in dealing with religious texts by focusing on verses and «hadiths» promoting war and Jihad, which serves its visions, so it appears to the young man that what the movement adopts is the core of religion and its essence. These verses of jihad and fighting ended up showing the strategy of demolition and re-establishment, by deepening the rupture between the young man and his living reality in periods of crisis.

Since the revolution, there has been a growing interest from the Salafist movement in the political issues, which prompted it to contribute more to discussing political issues and to express an opinion on them. But perhaps what hindered the transformation of some factions of the jihadist Salafist movement into political parties is the lack of a legitimate basis for partisan work and their lack of conviction in other salafi views in this field. Therefore, the salafi-jihadi movement chose to operate within the unstructured public space because it would provide it with the required flexibility in managing its interests without entailing any legal, moral, or political obligations.

Therefore, there was a tendency within the Salafi-jihadi movement to make a great effort to communicate with its incubating social environment through its service, advocacy, and media projects.

Then came the turmoil that was reflected when we saw the successive clashes with the government around the US embassy on September 14 2012, and then turned into open armed confrontations after the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi; This organization was accused of the two murders. The turmoil was also reflected in the periodic confrontations in Chaambi Mountains and in the border areas with Algeria.

Addressing violence within the extremist religious trends requires complex procedures between injunctive legal and communicative dialogue, filling voids, and spreading a positive religious culture. This also calls for distinguishing between what the state's security, educational and development institutions can do, and what civil society structures must do in terms of communication, dialogue, rationalization, bridging gaps and developing their framing capabilities among young people, and their capabilities in attributing and supporting these efforts to encourage the integration of Salafi youth within the society.

2. Violent extremism in Tunisia

2.1. Violent extremism pre-revolution in Tunisia

2.1.1. The revolutionaries during the 70s

The underlying foundations of Sunni Salafi-jihadi movements return to the last years of the 1970s. It started explicitly in Egypt, when jihadist groups were shaped for the purpose of overthrowing the political systems in the Arab world. A well-known booklet named "The Absent Obligation" filled in as a guide for these developments.

Its Egyptian creator, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, says in his leaflet that Muslims "hold fast to numerous strict commitments, however they have missed a fundamental commitment, which is jihad." Faraj required the need of battling the "close to adversary" - which means the decision systems in countries with Muslim majority over battling outer foes, or the "far off foe." The jihadists of that time addressed an overthrow style as opposed to an all-encompassing development. They assassinated the Egyptian president Mohamed Anwar Sadat in 1981.

2.1.2. The Afghan Project, 80s

At the point when Egypt's jihadists, after the death of Sadat, started to escape the country due to the security crackdown against them, Afghanistan was the most secure asylum, which started to become a "jihadist field." The United States and the Arab Gulf states supported the movement of Muslim young people to battle against the Soviet Union and the socialist government in Kabul.

2.1.3. Al Qaida, 90s

The evolution of al-Qaeda was different from what Abdullah Yusuf Azzam wanted, also known as the «Father of global jihad» who was killed in a car bomb in 1989. No one has yet claimed responsibility for his assassination. And the idea of global jihad began to form a major heading of Al Qaeda's activity. After the victory over the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the jihadists began to return to their homelands.

Some tried to transfer "victory over a superpower" to their countries, so tourism was targeted in Egypt, Libya also witnessed confrontations, and the bombings reached Saudi Arabia, and many cells were seized in Jordan.

Algeria has witnessed a decade of bloody violence, although the reason is related to preventing the Islamists from assuming power after they won the elections in the country in the early 1990s. However, the returnees from Afghanistan - who did not participate in the elections in the first place - had started to form armed groups from the start.

Others who returned from Afghanistan wanted to repeat the experience elsewhere, so they took part in the fighting in Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.

The jihadist-coup ideas coming from Egypt were mated with the salafi ideas coming from the Gulf states and Afghanistan. The new outcome was salafi jihadism.

This was later translated by an alliance between the Egyptian, the current leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and his former leader, the Saudi millionaire who supported and funded the Afghan jihad, Osama Ben Laden. In 1998, he announced the establishment of the International Islamic Front for Fighting the Jews and the Crusaders. The so-called "global jihad" of al-Qaeda began. In the same year, jihadists bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Three years later, the jihadists bombed the American Cole on the coast of Yemen.

2.1.4. Post 9/11

On the morning of the eleventh of September, four civilian aircraft, piloted by jihadists, attacked major buildings in New York and Washington, DC, in the United States of America.

The attack killed about three thousand people. And led to the war in Afghanistan, and the prosecution of suspects. Al-Qaeda jihadists began with a new method by recruiting and training young men and sending them to their countries to carry out bombings, as happened in Bali-Indonesia (2002), Casablanca (2003), Madrid (2004), and London and Amman (2005).

Saudi Arabia also witnessed confrontations with jihadists between 2003-2007. But the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 played a major role in the emergence of a new generation of militants led by the Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed in a US air strike in 2006. Al Qaeda in Iraq and Mesopotamia provided a more radical model of "jihadist" movements. Recordings of massacres spread online, as did suicide attacks and kidnappings.

Since 2008, al-Qaeda began forging new alliances, and the organization's branches spread in more than one place. In Iraq, Al Qaeda became known as the "Islamic State in Iraq."

In Yemen, the country's jihadists have united with their Saudi counterparts under the umbrella of "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula".

In Algeria, its jihadists pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda, under the name of "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," and expanded their activities to the Sahel countries, south of the Sahara.

Also, the Somali "al-Shabab al-Mujahideen" movement joined al-Qaeda later, after the organization's leader, Osama Ben Laden, was killed in a special American operation in 2011.

2.1.5. The Arab Spring and the history behind

The killing of Ben Laden posed a challenge to Al Qaeda and the jihadist movements, but the biggest challenge was the Arab Spring.

The protest movements in the Arab world, which overthrew powerful regimes in the region such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, marginalized the jihadist ideology.

However, the escalation of violence in more than one place in the Arab world, especially in Syria, restored the impetus to these movements. Syria turned into a magnet for jihadists from all over the world, and armed jihadist movements multiplied.

Differences emerged between these movements, especially between the Al-Nusra Front, which is linked to Al Qaeda, and the "Islamic State" organization, which controlled a large area between Iraq and Syria.

This organization, which has changed its name several times, and its roots back to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, occupied Mosul in June 2014.

This expansion, the declaration of a caliphate in the areas controlled by the organization, and pictures of the beheadings of journalists, prompted the announcement of air strikes on it by the United States of America and allied countries.

When talking about violent extremism in Tunisia, we mainly talk about jihadist salafi groups. Since the 80s, the strategy of this group, mainly focused on the establishment of "Khilafa" and got its inspiration from the well-known book, used as reference, "Management of Savagery or Administration of Savagery".

In his book, Abu Baker Naji, provided a manual or guide for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups on how to establish an Islamic caliphate. The book was published online in 2004 and was shared massively among extremist groups.

The first armed operations directed against the Tunisian state to destabilize it date back to the eighties of the last century. This comes after the emergence of several jihadist factions in Egypt in the late 1970s calling for the overthrow of existing regimes in arab countries in favor of "theocratic" regimes. This upsurge in the jihadi factions coincided with the emergence of the book "The Absent Obligations" by its author, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, in which he blames muslims for abandoning a basic obligation of their religion, which is jihad and invites them to start fighting the near enemy, which are the regimes in muslim-majority countries before devoting themselves to fighting the distant enemy of non-muslims.

The «Islamic trend movement» in Tunisia (Ennahda Movement) was one of the movements that was inspired by this thought to adopt the thesis of "armed radical change and revolutionary coup" and challenge the existing regime with various operations that affected the headquarters of the ruling party and some of its political symbols to the point of organizing a coup after the security and military institutions were penetrated in the year 1987.

In October of the same year, a group calling itself "Islamic Jihad" launched an attack on a post office and a police station and claimed responsibility for the bombings that hit two hotels in Sousse and Monastir. As a result of these events, the regime arrested the leaders of this organization, headed by the former member of the Islamic trend, Habib al-Dhawi, and the group's mufti, Muhammad al-Azraq, was executed after he was handed over from Saudi Arabia, where he sought refuge.

The eighties came to an end with the emergence of an organization that called itself "Precursors of Redemption" led by the former member of the «Islamic trend movement», Habib Lassoued, who was likely to have been eliminated in a security campaign in the early 1990s.

During the eighties, the groups were persecuted in Tunisia and the government led several operations arresting leaders and supporters. This led the fanatics to flee the country and join the war in Afghanistan where

several «fatwas» for jihad were issued, perhaps the most important of which is the fatwa of the Jordanian-Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, which states that jihad is an "Individual Obligation – fardh ain" on any muslim, if any muslim lands are occupied.

In fulfillment of these fatwas and to escape from the oppression of the regime, a number of young men and leaders pursued inside Tunisia went to Afghanistan, some of them belong to the «Islamic trend movement» and others to the «Tunisian islamic front» with a salafist ideology, most of its members and founders joined Peshawar, Pakistan (the crossing point to Afghanistan), perhaps the most prominent of them is Muhammad Ali Harrath and Abdullah Al-Hajji, who was imprisoned in Guantánamo Bay after the overthrow of the Taliban.

Tunisia was among the countries targeted by terrorist attacks on two occasions to destabilize the regime and hit the national economy by targeting tourism. The attack on the synagogue in Djerba in 2002, which left 19 dead and 30 wounded, most of them foreign tourists. The attack was carried out by a Tunisian jihadist named Nizar Nawar, who had been training at an al-Qaeda camp in the Pakistani city of Karachi and the events of Sliman in 2007 that took place between the Tunisian security forces and the “Soldiers of Assad Ibn Al Furat” battalion led by Al-Assad Sassi, who fought in both Bosnia and Afghanistan. These events claimed the lives of 15 militants and subsequently arrested hundreds of those accused of belonging to the Salafi jihadist ideology.

2.2. Post-revolution, the rise of Violent extremism

The uncertain times post revolution created countless opportunities for terrorist organizations. Large-scale recruitment operations were publicly authorized under the veil of freedom of speech. Extremist influencers such as Kamel Zarrouk (Ansar al-Sharia leader who was touring the country preaching for Jihad), or Seif Ediine Ben Hassine (Abu Iadh) who held the infamous meeting of salafists in Kairouan gathering around 5000

supporters, both of whom emphasized “feelings of injustice shared by large spans of the population – particularly those from marginalized regions and poor urban peripheries that most often encounter state brutality, corruption and social exclusion” .

2.2.1. Extremist groups in Tunisia

Existing data shows that there are a number of violent extremist groups operating in Tunisia. In addition to the task of planning and executing terror attacks, these groups also work on recruiting Tunisians for foreign conflicts, more particularly in Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Among these groups, ISIS has the most powerful ability to recruit Tunisians for its local and international operations. This is done thanks to ISIS large network, as it cooperates with local groups operating in Tunisia, including Ansar al- Sharia, Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade and Mujahidin of Kairouan.

Ansar al- Sharia

Ansar al- Sharia (AST) is a violent islamist group that works to implement Sharia law as the country’s prime source of laws. In order to achieve this, Ansar al- Sharia has recourse to proselytizing through religious education and the provision of social services. In order to increase its platform for more violent jihad, the AST sought to enforce strict laws, largely based on the duty to command moral acts, and looks forward to carrying out more jihad by executing violent terror attacks. According to a number of reports, leaders of the AST pledged their allegiance to ISIS in 2014. Since then, the AST has become the largest ISIS affiliate in Tunisia. The number of Tunisians joining ISIS in Libya and Syria was so high that AST lamented that the conflicts in the Middle East have “emptied Tunisia of its young generations”. ISIS propaganda has remarkably relied on Tunisians who participated in a significant number of ISIS’ terror attacks.

According to some reports, it seems that the cooperation between AST and ISIS started in 2014, when AST deputy “Emir” Kamel Zarrouk joined ISIS in Syria (Long War Journal, 2014). Since then, a strong relationship between ISIS and AST has been established. In 2015, ISIS released a video in which a

Tunisian militant, known as Abu Yahia al-Tounessi threatened all Tunisians of war and blood, unless they join ISIS and claim allegiance to its leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi (Reuters, 2015). ISIS also released another video in 2015, in which a group of militants called “Tripoli Province” threatened the Tunisian government of further attacks (Counter Extremism Project, 2015).

It would be remiss not to mention that AST had previously cooperated with al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, along with other extremist groups including the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq. In 2014, the leader of the AST, Abu Iyad al-Tounessi released a statement to call for unity between all the jihadi groups and set aside any potential ideological disagreements (Long War Journal, 2014).

Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade

Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade is a militant group that claimed responsibility for a large number of attacks against the Tunisian army and security forces. It pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014. Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade is known to the Tunisian authorities as experienced fighters of the Islamist rebellion in northern Mali as well as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Since the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, Okba Ibn Nafaa has been continuously attacking the Tunisian army and other security forces, especially in the checkpoints near the Libyan and Algerian borders. Several attacks were conducted by Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, including the 2015 attack on Tunisia’s Hotel Imperial Marhaba that ended up with around 37 casualties, and the 2014 attack on the Tunisian military forces near the Algerian borders. In September 2014, the Tunisian authorities disclosed Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade’s plan to attack the parliament during the 2014 parliamentary elections. The group’s leader, known as Lokmane Abou Sakhr, was killed by the Tunisian forces in 2015, after being accused of the attack on Bardo Museum that killed around 21 people including tourists and security forces.

Mujahidin of Kairouan

Mujahidin of Kairouan is a violent extremist group that pledged allegiance to ISIS in May 2015. The group was identified by the authorities when ISIS

english magazine Dabiq released an issue on the activities of the group in Tunisia, along with a picture of Kairouan mosque on the cover (Al- Arabia, 2015; Tunisia Live, 2015).

Tunisian Combat Group

The Tunisian Combat Group is classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department of State. The group was founded by Abu Iyad al-Tunisi and other commanders in al-Qaeda in 2000. This group was primarily founded as a bridge to unite Tunisians coming back home from Afghanistan to work against the Tunisian government. Since its establishment, the Tunisian Combat Group claimed responsibility for a number of violent attacks. For instance, the TCG provided foreign passports to al-Qaeda combatants who killed anti-Taliban leader Ahmad Shah Massoud in September 2001 (New York Times, 2001). In April 2001, militants from both the TCG and al-Qaeda were arrested in Rome for planning an attack against the US embassy. This incident impelled many embassies and consulates across Europe to close their doors for two days as a precaution against any potential terrorist attack.

Ansar al-Dine.

Ansar al-Dine is an affiliated group with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It operates mainly in Northern Mali and Southern Algeria. According to the latest data, Tunisians make almost 600 combatants among the group's members.

2.2.2. Joining extremist Groups in conflict zones.

Recruitment Strategies

In order to recruit new members, operatives or supporters, violent extremist groups use a number of tools and techniques. While some recruitment tools are quite costless, others require substantial funding and investment, including the use of a network of other groups or individuals or the maintenance of some infrastructure. In the Tunisian context, and according to the authorities' reports, recruitment often takes place in

religious institutions such as the mosques. Recruitment may also occur online or through particular social contacts as these techniques provide an easy and costless access to lower socioeconomic areas and even to prisons. Recruitment in Tunisia may also occur in areas where violent extremist groups already enjoy some territorial control, such as the Tunisian-Algerian borders.

Direct Recruitment

Direct recruitment occurs when a direct personal contact between the recruiter and the individual takes place. Through direct recruitment, recruiters generally select particular geographical areas where it is quite easy to find sympathizers or supporters of a particular violent group. The selection of these new members is not random. It is made according to the group's needs, ranging from militants to professionals such as doctors and engineers. Active recruitment requires substantive funding. The extremist violent group assigns one or a number of individuals to select and recruit new members. In order to effectively fulfil such a task, these individuals need a source of funding to sustain their living expenses and provide the necessary environment for the recruitment. This ranges from setting up meeting places, providing fake documents, booking flights tickets and training. All these expenses and others are generally met by the recruiter. Other forms of funding may come from donations from followers and sympathizers of the extremist group.

Indirect Recruitment

Indirect recruitment takes place when new individuals are recruited through indirect means, such as media campaigns and online communication tools. The use of social media as a tool to recruit new members in the extremist violent groups is common in Tunisia. According to the authorities' reports, these groups heavily rely on social media channels and internet to introduce their ideology, disseminate their propaganda and work on new recruitments. This strategy allows these groups to spread their ideas at a low cost and identify potential new members who are psychologically and even financially ready to join these groups.

While social media channels are the easiest and the largest windows for indirect recruitment of new individuals, violent extremist groups in Tunisia have largely used traditional strategies including printing leaflets, holding meetings and broadcasting programs targeting young people who are willing to join these groups. One good example of this is the ISIS-monthly magazine, *Dabiq*, available since 2014 and inspired by Al-Qaeda's magazines. In Tunisia, recruitment using traditional strategies was quite easy especially in 2012 and 2013. Violent extremist groups had an easy access to young Tunisians through leaflets and public meetings. However, since 2014, traditional recruitment has gradually become more complex as tightened security measures have significantly increased. Accordingly, indirect recruitment was limited to online communication tools.

Although access to the internet, including the creation of websites and the use of social media channels such as Facebook and YouTube, is almost free, violent extremist groups, especially ISIS, create high-quality content as it employs a number of media experts and high-tech equipment. In view of the quality of the content and the frequency of distribution, these violent groups use a large number of moderators and bloggers who are experts in the field.

2.2.3. Fighting as a violent extremist

Tunisians have an extensive history participating in violent extremist groups abroad and within Tunisia. In Afghanistan in the 1980s they played a small role, contributing only about 400 mujahideen. Likewise, during the Iraq War they constituted only about 5% of foreign fighters in al-Qaida in Iraq. However, in this time they built substantial linkages between violent extremist groups and local recruiters and financiers that facilitated a large exodus after the 2011 revolution¹².

The Tunisians Tarek Maaroufi and Seifallah Ben Hassine founded the Tunisian Combatant Group in 2000 to send Tunisians overseas to Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Europe, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Imprisoned in 2003, Ben Hassine was released after the fall of

¹² Haim Malka and Margo Balboni. "Tunisian Fighters: In History and Today." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June 2016.

Ben Ali and founded Ansar al-Shariā³. Ansar al-Sharia started heavily recruiting a move that was tolerated at the time by the ruling Ennahda government despite their public intellectual and political spats. Tunisians flocked to Syria, many at first to join opposition groups but later joining al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State. Likewise, due to proximity and historical connections a large number joined the Islamic State in Libya. Traveling to Syria and Libya was easily facilitated due to a lack of airport controls in Tunis and visas in Libya and Turkey (the main entryway to Syria).

Within Tunisia, by 2013 Ennahda had cracked down on Ansar al-Sharia and in return they openly denounced the Tunisian government and its leaders. In 2012 they were behind an attack on the U.S. Embassy after a film that debased the Prophet Mohammed. As the flow of Tunisians to foreign violent extremist groups slowed, local violent extremist groups began waging a protracted insurgency against the Tunisian state. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb established itself on the Algerian border in Kasserine and renamed itself Katiba Oqba ibn Nafa'a (KUIN). Since it mainly targets police and security forces, it is an insurgency rather than a country-wide terrorist campaign. In 2014, part of KUIN splintered off and joined the Islamic State, renaming itself Jund al-Khilafah Tunisia. With less concern for civilian casualties, violence increased both in regions along the Algerian border and in more heavily populated areas⁴.

In 2015, they orchestrated three major terrorist attacks in 2015 in the Bardo Museum, Sousse beach, and a Presidential Guard bus. In 2016, the Islamic State in Libya even launched an attack across the border on Ben Guerdane and captured the city, though they were quickly pushed out. While the Tunisian security forces have stepped up their raids and coordination abilities, both Jund al-Khilafah Tunisia and KUIN have about 175 to 185 fighters. Additionally, a number travel through the Libyan border, suggesting returning fighters will be a boost to their operations.

¹³ Malka and Balboni. *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Matt Herbert. "The Insurgency in Tunisia's Western Borderlands." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. June 28, 2018.

¹⁵ "How the Islamic State Rose, Fell, and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb." *International Crisis Group. Middle East and North Africa Report No178*, 24 July 2017.

Though a small force, KUIN is more closely associated with al-Qaeda's operations across North Africa, particularly in Algeria. It has been easily able to replace lost fighters and work with local populations for basic needs, though it does not have a wide base of support. It is exactly this insurgency's continued infiltration that makes addressing the root causes of radicalization so important.

2.2.4. Root Causes of Youth Radicalization

Motivations to support and/or join violent extremist groups are divided into 2 categories: psychological and Societal drivers.

Psychological drivers such as the feeling of insignificance due to traumatic experiences, social isolation, Conventional depictions of masculinity and femininity, the desire for self-destruction represents factors that influence individual personal process of radicalization. These drivers deepen the frailty of someone's personality and create a void that can be easily filled by extremist ideas and beliefs.

As an important psychological driver, feeling of insignificance due to traumatic experiences, and by traumatic we mean experiences such as emotional displacement (losing love or a key romantic relationship) as well as sexual abuse which can lead a person to make decisions in a temporary emotional state that may support violent action, or as Niconchuk terms it, "heroic limbo." Acts of violence are by consequence, in this context, a way for individuals to overcome their trauma-inflicted feelings of insignificance. These feelings are countered by a strong desire for glory and significance where one seeks to become greater than one is.

On the other hand, societal drivers derive more from a society common history and a cumulation of tensions experienced by the community. These drivers can be summarized in Identity threats and identity crisis, a predisposition to violence before recruitment, network influence, loss of faith in and active abuse by existing structures of justice, corruption, political collapse of the State, sense of injustice and loss of hope,

Religion-based discrimination and repression by the State, a limited educational system.

In Tunisia and according to the study subjects of the research, the most significant driver is sense of injustice and loss of hope which is defined as the contrast between the high expectations of people after the Arab spring meeting unresponsive state institutions which drives individuals to feel marginalized and powerless. They lose hope and become convinced that problems in Tunisia are hopeless and that they would never improve with




Figure 4: Root causes of radicalization

unemployment, indifference, and an increasing low self-esteem still existent.

The figure above explains to a certain extent, that the root causes of radicalization are mainly personal and complex. No algorithm or a pattern exists in studying the vulnerability of youth to radicalization.

Chapter III

PERCEPTION OF INCLUSION.

1. Inclusion in literature

The connection between inclusion and violent extremism is an increasingly studied phenomenon, primarily by economists at the World Bank. The prevailing view holds that a lack of economic inclusion is the underlying driver for the experiences of injustice that drive young men and women towards violent extremist groups or ideology. These experiences of injustice will be discussed further, but there is far less consensus as to what level of “inclusion” prevents political violence.

In a social and economic context, inclusion is when people of a specific area can get the education, decent jobs, housing, and healthcare to live comfortably and participate in society as valued members of their community. Amartya Sen describes inclusion as “characterized by a society’s widely shared social experience and active participation, by a broad equality of opportunities and life chances for individuals, and by the achievement of a basic level of well-being for all citizens¹⁶”. According to Robert Putnam, communities that are civically engaged build “social capital,” the way in which a society builds norms and associations that enhance individual productivity. In his landmark essay, he charts the decline of social capital in the American context by tracing indicators such as religious affiliation, voting, union membership, educational associations, volunteering. In a new democracy, this social capital can be essential to encouraging civic engagement in areas previously unaccustomed to participating in the democratic process¹⁷.

Exclusion is tied to violence because it produces frustrations that spur violence. The frustration of highly educated individuals is known as “relative deprivation,” since these individuals are educated to a high-school or university level but hold serious grievances as they feel deprived of good jobs and high wages. Ted Gurr’s 1971 book *Why Men Rebel* argues that a country’s inability to realize the benefits of modernization can lead to anger among those whose livelihoods have not changed, and therefore lead to

¹⁶ Amartya Sen. *Development as Freedom*. Anchor Books, 2000

¹⁷ Robert Putnam. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” *Journal of Democracy* 6:1, January 1995 (65-78)

violence¹⁸. This concept is carried forward by J.F. Bayart, who explains how “cadets sociaux,” young people without economic opportunities and not politically engaged, channel their relative deprivation into radical politics. This phenomenon is exacerbated by young people realizing they cannot sustain or improve upon their parents’ way of life, a concept that explains violence among Tuaregs in Mali and Niger in the 1980s as well as violence among Middle East and North African immigrants to Europe¹⁹. In fact, according to the World Bank, direct economic inequality was less of a driver of the Arab Spring as was dissatisfaction with the decline in the quality of life and inequality of wealth among middle class and wealthier groups²⁰.

However, this decline was in many ways a result of excluding certain groups of people from wealth and power. Repressive governments in the Middle East relied on a social contract, known as the “authoritarian bargain,” by giving their citizens free public services in exchange for support. However, as time went on political control of the economy hampered the creation of jobs in the private sector while restricting growth in the public sector, leading to a breakdown of this social contract. The breakdown particularly affected the middle class, who found themselves getting poorer and poorer, facing a shortage of jobs, and a decline in government services and effective governance. Both the lower and middle classes felt shut out of profits gained by the few, large Arab companies. These were the grievances that spurred the revolutions and violence of the Arab Spring and are often echoed by violent extremists as their motivation²¹.

Unlike in other Middle Eastern countries where divisions fell largely on religious, tribal, and ethnic lines, in Tunisia divisions became apparent regionally. Tunisia’s development has largely favored its coast – interior regions and the south have significantly higher rates of poverty and unemployment, and therefore crime and political violence. According to one study, the Arab Spring started in Tunisia by jumping from community to

¹⁸Ted Gurr. (1971) *Why Men Rebel?* Princeton: Princeton University Press

¹⁹Jean-François Bayart. *L’État en Afrique. La politique du ventre*. Paris, Fayard, 1989 (2e édition augmentée, Fayard, 2006)

²⁰*Inequality, Uprisings, and Conflict in the Arab World.* World Bank Group, MENA Economic Monitor, October 2015.

²¹*Inequality, Uprisings, and Conflict in the Arab World.* World Bank Group, MENA Economic Monitor, October 2015.

community where the socioeconomic conditions were similar: starting from interior, underdeveloped regions²². The World Bank assesses that youth not in education, employment, or training made up about 47% in these underdeveloped, rural areas. These youth were the most excluded, lacking access to many of the economic and educational opportunities afforded to residents of other areas of Tunisia, with women in these areas particularly excluded from the job market²³.

In the Tunisian context, a person is included when they have gainful employment or education, are religiously accepted, politically represented in the capital, civically engaged in their communities, and not socially isolated²⁴. The Maghreb Economic Forum has used this term instead of exclusion to better define exactly what approach programmatic and government actors should take. This research will endeavor to verify these theoretical findings with focus group discussions, before assessing their impact on disengagement from violent extremism.

Therefore, this study considers defining the perception of inclusion is based on 6 indicators:

- 1.** Education
- 2.** Employment
- 3.** Civic Engagement
- 4.** Political Participation
- 5.** Religion
- 6.** Social acceptance

²²Egel, Daniel and Garbouj, Malek. "Socioeconomic Drivers of the Spread of the Tunisian Revolution." RAND Corporation and the Graduate Institute, Geneva, February 27, 2016.

²³Breaking Barriers to Youth Inclusion: Tunisia." World Bank Group, 2014.

²⁴ See appendix 5 for an assessment tool of inclusion in the Tunisian context.




Figure 5: Aspects of inclusion indicators

2. Linking Motivations to join extremist groups to Inclusion

To a certain extent, studies and experiences such as the Aarhus model implemented by the Danish government, which is based on dissecting the root causes of radicalization and target them by specific inclusive interventions tried to prevent youth from joining violent groups also to reinforce exit programs.

Inclusion is an approach to remedy certain root causes of radicalization which can be used to prevent violent extremism or/and deradicalize extremists.

As presented in the figure bellow, each indicator can stanch one or multiple root causes of radicalization proving that inclusion is one of the major factors to prevent radicalization and reinforce youth de-radicalization even though, Experts, scholars and practitioners in several studies and key notes confirm that mapping the link between the motivations or root causes of radicalization and the indicators of inclusion is as complicated as any psychological change that an individual can face. A simple mind map of the interrelations between each indicator and its effect on one of the root causes of radicalization can showcase the complexity but also the extent "Feeling Included" can affect the process of radicalization.



Figure 6 The links between inclusion and the root causes of radicalization

Connecting Inclusion to root causes of radicalization is fundamentally based on the interrelations between youth personal perceptions on psychological and societal concepts and youth personal process of radicalization.

Linking inclusion and de-radicalization, or more specifically Disengagement, is a complex process and a multiplex exercise. The baseline of such a study is the comprehensive understanding of the feeling of inclusion among youth and the resonance of its components along with the root cause of radicalization. As many approaches try to tackle violent extremism through inclusion, the general understanding is missing a specific aspect which is the personal perception of inclusion and the personal experience of radicalization. Generalized strategies to prevent violent extremism and reinforce de-radicalization do not resonate with individualized concepts and perception.

3. Perception of inclusion

3.1. Education

3.1.1. Youth perception

Tunisian youth, participants of the research perceive education as an ineffective social ladder step toward economic stability. Youth consider education more as a social obligation while convinced that neither the educational system nor the education infrastructure in their community are inclusive. The stigma of being educated in an “excluded” region of Tunisia is already affecting employment rates but most importantly youth own feeling of inclusion. Education is perceived as a tool to a specific goal, the concept of being educated thus cultivated is no longer significant to youth’s personality or mindset, thus, to feel included, youth proclaim that education must lead to gainful employment.



A feeling of distrust in the educational system in Tunisia comes from youth’s own experience and observations of the local education institutions. Although in the three governorates of Tunis, Tataouine and Kasserine, participants have access to primary, secondary, and higher education, stigma has been affecting the integrity and the quality of education in a way that the stigma is repelling high-caliber and first-rate educators and manpower.

This generated a decline in the global educational system in marginalized regions, and most importantly, it generated a feeling of exclusion and a deep sentiment of injustice among citizens.

3.1.2. Radicalized individuals’ perception

Among radicalized individuals, education is perceived as a way of

enlightenment and a tool to gain power and influence the community. Education is not a path towards employment, it is defined more as a spiritual nurture and a comprehensive life teaching.

 *No more pain. So you can be content with yourself. That is the whole point of the learning. Our teaching is about learning to find peace within and find inner joy. One cannot found peace or joy until he has learned and understood the Quran* 

The in-depth interviews with the radicalized individuals shed the light on the importance of the greater role of education and how extremists used religious teaching as a holistic way of sharing knowledge and training people to survive while aspiring for an absolute enlightenment after life. Contrarily to the classical education system and even education in the Islamic state institutions, acquiring knowledge among violent extremist groups is very accessible since it does not rely on curriculums, it is mainly based on indoctrination and reading and examining a series of books and manifestos written by several trustworthy conservative Muslim teachers and ideological schools.

3.1.3. Disengaged individuals' perception

In the other hand, disengaged individuals considered education as more of a comprehensive process that is more open to science-based teaching and focus more on the day-to-day aspects of life experience.

In contrast with the perception among radicalized individuals, education is no more centered only around spiritual nurturing. Education is including tutoring, trainings, and coaching.

While the above is crucial, the most important thing is the source of information, the radicalization experience and the “doubt phase” of de-radicalization/disengagement process exposed how critical the trustworthiness of the source of information in building knowledge and forge convictions.

The interviewees insisted on the importance of any practical discipline along with the classical education because of the self-satisfaction they needed and felt upon leaving violent extremist groups.

“If I knew, I would have drop out from school and learn carpentry, nowadays we need to teach kids practical skills because a decent life is something you work hard for”




Figure 7: The perception of education among the research subjects

3.2. Employment



3.2.1. Youth perception

Young Tunisians identify employment as to have a gainful local job market and the opportunity to have local private investments.

They believe that being economically included depends on gainful employment (or to be gainfully employed) which refers to having a stable, full-time, steady job that pays enough to sustain a decent life without being a struggle, or where you are slipping behind despite working. It also refers to a profession that you find satisfactory, gratifying, and significant, and

that gives you self-respect as well as the respect of people who are important to you. This perception is valid only if the local job market and local investment is offering such opportunities. The ability to have a gainful employment in their community is as important.

Another understanding from the focus groups is that employment is strongly tied to the education of oneself, considering oneself employed depends on the fact that the job is a direct result on one's education. In some cases, individuals consider themselves unemployed even though they currently have a job, the difference is that the actual job is not related to their higher education. Tunisian youth, especially young graduates, are not attracted to informal jobs and often prefer to continue looking for formal employment that meets their expectations rather than settling into informal employment. And when they agree to work in the informal sector out of necessity, it is without satisfaction and considering that their transition to employment is not complete. Some, and there are many, give up and leave the labor market. They will never consider their selves in a position of gainful employment.

 *I have studied biology for 6 years and here I am teaching math to high schoolers.* 

3.2.2. Radicalized individuals' perception

For radicalized individuals, although denying any pursuit of a wealthy life, radicalized individuals believe that the religious based ideology is the only mean to live a decent life (gainful employment). However, their perception of decent life is defined as becoming as wealthy as possible and that comes as an automatic gratification from God.

The purpose of work is to provide for the group and support its needs. Working must be exclusively with comrades and/or conservative religious individuals except in case of deprivation and urgency, one is allowed to trade with non-believers.

3.2.3. Disengaged individuals' perception

Disengaged individuals understanding and convictions differ from the latter perception whereas, they believe in work ethics importance to reach a successfully economic stability and, probably coming from the trauma they are experiencing, they consider that working is the only occupation that can keep them focus and regain a sense of dignity and self-satisfaction. Two of the disengaged interviewees already started a practical training to gain technical skills to start new careers while the others are still actively looking for a job longing for a sense of stability and low-profile lifestyle.

I'm wokng 14 hours a day and I'm happy. I still have that voice in me guiding my action as pleasing to God

Female participants showed a shift in their perception on working, they turned from believers in the exclusive role of women to support their family and community to becoming desperate for self-accomplishment and independence regardless of parents or husbands' support.




Figure 8: The perception of employment among the research subjects

3.3. Civic engagement

3.3.1. Youth perception

Civic Engagement is providing a sense of belonging to the community of youth and helping them maintain personal and professional skills. Craving for change, civil society is considered as the ultimate space for youth to expand their knowledge, develop a sense of self accomplishment and politically engage in their community.

However, youth did express a deception in the Tunisian civil society due to how organizations are perceiving youth as a target population and not a participant in the decision-making process.

 *Our local civil society is trying but, you know, the system is always blocking.* 

3.3.2. Radicalized individuals' perception

Among radicalized individuals, civic engagement is perceived as social work led by the chosen. The word engagement is not appreciated since it includes an aspect of criticizing. The only acceptable participation/engagement is following the directions of the leaders.

Following leader's guidance, "brothers and sisters" perform social work with a strong sense of devotion and integrity. Interviewees admonish modern societies for neglecting such values in building a prosperous community.

3.3.3. Disengaged individual's perception

Disengaged individuals believe that civic engagement is preserving the social contract through focusing on individual actions. Possibly a

manifestation of trauma, interviewees repel organized action and groups to support communities, or undertake social work.




Figure 9: The perception of civic engagement among the research subjects

3.4. Political participation



3.4.1. Youth perception

Youth participants expressed a lack of interest in the conventional political activities. They have lost faith in the political institutions in the country and the system. They had high expectations after the revolution which the political elite failed to meet. New ways of channeling their political activities have strongly emerged such as joining student unions or participating in civic activities. Other issues have been raised, such as the legal discrepancies. Some of those who were willing to engage in political events faced problems such as registrations and logistics.

While the political situation is unstable and unpromising, youth almost repel any involvement in the actual classical political system. However, surprisingly, youth did have thorough reflections on the political situation in Tunisia and are well informed on legislations, governments, and public institutions.



3.4.2. Radicalized individuals' perception

For radicalized participants, politics are summed up in the pledge of allegiance to choose the Khalifate or, in smaller groups, their leader. No political activity is allowed since it is perceived as a tool to divide the Ummah (Nation). Despite the conviction that the only sovereign political system is Sharia, radicalized individuals strongly refute any political discussion unless discussing foreign policies or criticizing democracy or any other political ideology.

 *God asked humans to follow his law; the only politics that are valid everywhere and in all times.* 

3.4.3. Disengaged individual's perception

Disengaged from violent extremist groups means disengagement from any political activity; a conclusion proving that disengaged individuals became conscious about the political ambition and aspect of the extremist ideologies. However, the sense of apathy in the interviewees statement regarding their perception of politics and political participation may be a sign of confusion and a state of denial. However, participating in democratic manifestations such as elections is perceived as important in a way to prove citizenship and acquire a sense of belonging.

 *I'll be happy to vote, it is my obligation* 




Figure 10: The perception of political participation among the research subjects

3.5. Social acceptance

3.5.1. Youth perception

Social Acceptance is defined as having the support of the family, friends, and the community. This sought support includes most specifically respecting youth desire for change to overcome some limitation imposed by social norms and traditions.

“In high school, they even denied our request to create a music club”

On the national level, social acceptance is a more generalized perception, meaning community, as a whole, is socially accepted among other groups or populations. Stigma plays a key role in the process of Social Acceptance; The absence of stigma from other regions and media is important to reinforce integration and to fortify the sense of belonging to the national community.

Most of the participants expressed their pride to be part of their local communities as well as their regions. They had talked about the perks of belonging to these communities and the importance of developing their own regions. However, when they were asking about the difference between living inside and outside their communities, said that the only difference is people perception of them. They said that they feel excluded within other communities not because they have better life conditions but rather because the stigma they sense from people from other communities. Therefore, the research team has concluded that “stigmatization” is an important factor in deepening the feeling of exclusion.

3.5.2. Radicalized individuals’ perception

Radicalized youth are in total escapism from their social status and environment.

Their perception of social acceptance is inexistent (outwardly), denying any interference from their environment and considering any social circle as an impediment to once’s inner peace. Although in studying their trajectories, craving for a belonging to the group has been proved through their obedience to leaders in fear of rejection, reflecting on their experience before joining the violent extremist group.

When asked about social acceptance, interviewees explain their own position towards others in terms of accepting their environment and communities.

3.5.3. Disengaged individual’s perception

Disengaged youth are more conscious about whether their social circles (family, friends, community...) are accepting them. Like the importance of social acceptance among youth, returnees and disengaged individuals are more aware of the need to be accepted amid their communities.

The progressive isolation experienced during the process of radicalization was questioned during the de-radicalization/disengagement process of

violent extremists. Disengaged individuals are not craving acceptance as much as progressive reintegration to the community.

“I can see the uncomfortable looks of everyone here but I just wanna be next to my family, I'd do everything to take care of my parents.”






Figure 11: The perception of social acceptance among the research subjects

3.6. Religion

3.6.1. Youth perception

Testing the religious acceptance within the targeted communities, the research team has discovered that within these regions it is more about conservatism than religion. The participants had shared; those social norms and traditions are an important aspect within their communities. They claim that people tend to care more about social conservative norms and traditions. The participants claim that religion is important, but not as important as the cultural heritage and practices. One participant said that girls within her community are expected to “cover their hair” when they hit



puberty because of social norms and tradition. She had explained that people within her local community do not care whether you are practicing [Religion] or not, all that matters for them is that you should always abide by the social norms.

 *I try my best not to spend ramadan here with my family, you know, I have to fast here, everyone fast ramadan here* 

Religion might have influenced these social norms and traditions, however, within these targeted communities, social norms and traditions are vital for social inclusion.

3.6.2. Radicalized individuals' perception

On the other hand, radicalized individuals believe with sharp conviction that religion (Islam) is the savior and the only teaching of prosperous balanced life. Religion should be a way of living replacing any national, local, ethnic traditions or social contract.

 *God has giving us islam to follow, in our daily life, actions, relationships and morals. In hard times, I find my salvation in Quran* 

3.6.3. Disengaged individual's perception

After disengagement, the perception of religion became specific to personal experience. It is still a teaching of prosperous and balanced life; however, it can only affect one individual depending on his life experience and convictions. Disengaged agree on the importance to understand that

religion (Islam) is a personal spiritual relationship with God and that the social contract includes religion and should not be limited to it.




Figure 12: The perception of religion among the research subjects



Youth

Youth feel included when education leads automatically to gainful employment, communities and social circles separate religion from social norms and support youth desire for change and, politics implement non-stigmatizing reforms based on youth according to the youth led civil society work.



Radicalized Individuals

Radicalized Individuals perceive inclusion as when education is a way to enlighten inner peace, employment and social work has a purpose to elevate the community and support those in need and, religion defines the social contract and all life aspects thus Sharia reigns in the purpose to .safeguard and protect the group



Disengaged Individuals

Disengaged individuals perceive inclusion as when education provides theoretical and practical skills, occupy a gainful and ethical employment, their willingness to reintegrate the community is respected, allowed to participate in the democratic processes, social norms are protected and, .their religious convictions are kept private

Figure 13: The perception of inclusion among the research subjects

Chapter IV

PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND PROMOTING DE-RADICALIZATION IN TUNISIA, ALGERIA AND, MOROCCO.

1. Tunisia

Tunisia's armed forces have been engaged in a low-intensity war against violent terrorist groups operating especially in the Tunisia-Algerian borders. The Tunisian military has been continuously launching raids against terrorist cells hiding in Chaambi Mountains in the south of Tunisia. For instance, the Tunisian security forces along with the army launched a raid in February 2014 that ended up with killing seven militants belonging to Ansar al-Sharia, including the suspect of Chokri Belaid's murder. Two days later, the Tunisian security forces launched another raid that led to the arrest of four militants, including the suspect of Mohamed Brahmi's murder. In October 2014, the Tunisian forces killed six militants, including one woman, in the Northern suburbs of the capital Tunis. Since 2014, a significant number of Ansar al-Sharia fighters were killed, and hundreds were arrested. Such relative success is the corollary of various factors, including practical security reforms implemented by the different governments, new equipment for both the army and security forces and a public opinion that supported the security forces' operations and openly rejected any form of violence and extremism.

Counter violent extremism strategies have not been limited to military operations. Instead, the Tunisian authorities used an economic approach to counterterrorism, especially in the southern borders with Libya. Since the attacks on the town of Ben Guerdane in 2016, the Tunisian governments have continuously strived to increase employment opportunities by creating a free trade zone in Ben Guerdane. This free trade zone aims at reducing the illegal economic activities in the borders as well as increasing the economic opportunities for the youth of the region. Along similar lines, the governments also adopted a security approach in the region by increasing the number of security forces to fight terrorism and illegal smuggling.

Since 2016, fighting radicalization has also been adopted by the Tunisian

governments using preventive measures that target extreme violent political and religious ideologies to embrace more moderate views. In 2015, the Ministry of Religious Affairs launched a new campaign targeting the Tunisian youth on social media. “We are Islam” campaign aimed at sensitizing young people of the dramatic consequences of joining violent extremist groups and encouraging them to adopt moderate religious views that help them easily and smoothly integrate within their socio - cultural environment. Accordingly, the Ministry designed a campaign with a diverse content, including a website that records religious conferences and seminars along with government’s advertisements on social media and TV channels. The Ministry of Religious Affairs also decided to recruit new Imams and religious instructors in the mosques to spread an anti-violent discourse that discourages youth from joining extremist groups abroad and help them acquire an in-depth knowledge about Islam. The «Ministry of higher education and scientific research» has also contributed to the de-radicalization strategy. In fact, in 2017, the ministry allocated around \$1 million to study the roots of radicalization and violent extremism among young Tunisians. The funding was secured thanks to a partnership between several research centers in Tunisia and foreign institutions including the U.S Department of State. The The National Strategy to counter Extremism and Terrorism also involved the young Tunisians who are in prisons. The «Tunisian directorate general of prisons and rehabilitation» established new centers. The importance of these centers is two-fold: First, they help reintegrate those who are coming back home from Syria and Libya. Second, they help the Tunisian authorities closely examine these young Tunisians to design new policies that may effectively counter violent extremism.

As far as legislation is concerned, the Tunisian parliament signed and ratified a new anti-terrorist law, published on the 7th of August 2015 in the official journal of the Tunisian Republic. The prime aim of the law was to deal with the Tunisian militants who are coming back home from hot spots. According to this law, any Tunisian militant who has been involved in a violent extremist group will be arrested and judged. The law was initiated by Habib Essid’s government in an attempt to calm fears over the homecoming of thousands of Tunisian jihadists. Nevertheless, the law was harshly

²⁵<http://www.cnlct.tn/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/strategie-nationale-2016-FINALE-2-8-sept-2016-pdf.pdf>

criticized by the Tunisian civil society and a number of international non-governmental organizations, as it allows all kinds of abuses in the name of security reforms. In 2017, Amnesty International published a report in which it described the anti-terrorist law as an arbitrary, discriminatory, and repressive law that will allow security forces to rely on brutal tactics including torture, restrictions on the travel of suspects and harassment of militants' family members. Mr. Ben Emmerson, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, shared his concerns regarding prolonged periods of detention and the use of counter-terrorist laws against journalists. He also recommended further efforts to be implemented to accelerate the judicial proceedings including providing additional human resources to the Anti-Terrorist Judiciary Pole as well as simplifying the complexities of the Tunisian judiciary system.

The terrorist threats that Tunisia has witnessed might drastically affect its democratic transition. The nature of these attacks that targeted tourists not only endangered a vital source of national income but also unveiled the critical weaknesses of the Tunisian security system.

1.1. Legal framework in Tunisia

1.1.1. Anti-terrorism law

To find solutions to social phenomena, any legal system needs to follow a clear vision. Therefore, mitigating youth radicalization and countering terrorism are a legal priority, especially that violent extremist groups are known for their flexibility and adaptability to an ever-changing world. Therefore, Tunisia along with other countries that witnessed terrorist attacks, adapted severe deterrence strategies. These strategies have a vast popular support despite that at times it results on human right violations that mainly affect youth between the age of 18 and 35. The feebleness of the Tunisian legal system leads to human rights violations, especially that some unconstitutional laws give authorities [specifically Ministry of Interior] unconditional and unsupervised powers.

Anti-Terrorism Law The new anti-terrorism and money laundering law was criticized by human rights organizations for the lack of preventive measures that could mitigate youth radicalization. Additionally, Human rights activists noted that the adopted law does not protect children aged less than 18 years old and does not preserve the rights of youth aged between the age of 18 and 35. According to this law and unlike other crimes, people who are arrested for committing terrorist crimes would be detained for 15 days for interrogation. Furthermore, in accordance with Law N°5 of 2016, detainees cannot appoint an attorney during the first 48 hours of their arrest. The anti-terrorism and money laundering law and in accordance with article N°31, condemns praising and glorifying terrorism and charges those who commit this crime to five years in prison. Generally, most of the detainees are young people. The ambiguous legal definition of “glorify and praise” remains intact which represents a fundamental problem that would negatively affect the rights and freedoms of many young bloggers that tend to use social medias.

1.1.2. The State of emergency

The decree N°50 of 26th January 1978 concerning the regulations followed in the state of emergency is still in force. The first article of the decree mentions the cases in which the state of emergency can be declared. “The state of emergency may be declared in the entire Tunisian territory or partially in the case of an imminent threat to the public order or in the occurrence of events of grave calamity.” The decree, also, gives board powers to the Minister of Interior through the article N°5. “The Minister of Interior may place under house arrest in a certain territory or town any person who resides in one of the areas provided in article number two above, whose activity is considered to be dangerous to public order and security in those areas.” The decree specified as well the powers given to the governor to preserve public order and they are as follow: Prohibiting people and vehicle's movement. Preventing any strikes or attempts to disrupt work even if it is decided before the declaration of the state of emergency. Organizing people's housing. Putting under house arrest any person who tries in any way to obscure the activities of public authorities.

Harnessing people and resources if needed for the sake of public interests that were deemed as vital to the nation's prosperity.

Due to the beforementioned provisions, many young people remain under house arrest. According to the "Observatory of Rights and Freedoms of Tunis" association, 500 persons are placed under house arrest without any judicial supervision. However, the Ministry of Interior did not give any specific number of neither those who are placed under house arrest nor of those who are under surveillance.

Among other measures, the Tunisian authorities ban a certain group of young people from traveling to specific destinations [This measure called List S17, also, includes any young man or woman under the age of 35. They cannot travel without the permission of their guardian]. There is, also, the decision to not provide this group of young people with any official papers such as card N°3 (a card for criminal records), despite that this decision was revoked once and one of the young men was granted the card. These procedures apply to every person listed in the S17 list that was created by the Ministry of Interior. The list contains details about individuals who have been arrested or suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.

These procedures undermine the efforts to prevent young people from engaging in terrorist organizations. «Therefore, it showcases the weaknesses of the Tunisian legal system that adapted extreme measures instead of addressing the problem through less severe procedures; especially, when it comes to offenses related to freedom of expression» said Omar Oueslati - a Judge at the Court of First Instance in Manouba.

Despite these dreadful and horrific ideas and views, the Tunisian legal system still can address this issue within an educational, cultural, and psychological framework. Hence, Tunisian legislators shall review the current legal system for the sake of providing young people with a real second chance that will allow them to reintegrate into the society. Additionally, it would help them reject extremist rhetoric and renounce violent extremism.

1.2. Security challenges and international cooperation

The Tunisian government launched a program to restructure the security service through reinforcing the army's role in fighting terrorism by creating the Agency for Defense Intelligence and Security in 2015. Additionally, the Tunisian authorities launched the national Commission on Counterterrorism in 2015. In 2016, these two bodies started working together to establish the new comprehensive strategy on countering-terrorism and extremism. This strategy is inspired by European models, and it is based on the four pillars of prevention, protection, prosecution, and response to attacks. In early 2017, the Tunisian government established the National Intelligence Centre that would help the main agents of the security sector to minimize coordination and information-sharing problems that plagued the country's efforts to mitigate radicalization since the revolution.

The Tunisian authorities have worked on addressing the issue of under-resourcing of the Tunisian army through investing in equipment suited to these types of combats. It has, also, provided the police units with the same equipment. The Tunisian government has strengthened its borders with Libya and Algeria through enforcing a militarized buffer zone.

As part of reinforcing the security system abilities for countering-terrorism, the Tunisian government showed its readiness to work with international partners on reforming and enhancing the capability of its security sector. Therefore, Tunisia is part of the G7+6 grouping along with Spain, Belgium, Turkey, Switzerland and the UN office on Drugs and Crime. This coordination is an act of security assistance and a process dedicated to avoiding duplication of efforts. There is as well a French-Tunisian cooperation regarding sharing intelligence and providing the Tunisian security with equipment. Additionally, the Tunisian authorities received help from Germany and the United States regarding border security.

1.3. Legal mitigation

In 2015, Tunisia has adopted a new anti-terrorism law. This law was put together to counter not only terrorism but also money laundering. Throughout this law the Tunisian authorities will be able to mitigate violent extremism. This law consists of 143 articles that aim at creating a balance between countering-terrorism and preserving human rights.

Legislators are still debating the effectiveness of some of its provisions and its impact on the human rights and civil liberties. Therefore, the law might undergo a rectification in the near future.

1.4. Limitations

One of Tunisia's biggest challenges is the prevention of radicalization and the methods used to deal with radicalized individuals. Additionally, the Tunisian authorities appear to have no adequate policy for handling the return of the many Tunisians who left the country to fight with ISIS and other jihadist groups in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The government must as well find effective approaches to handle the individuals whom it has prevented from travelling to join extremist groups through the processes of rehabilitation and reintegration.

The Tunisian authorities did not show any sign of adopting systematic approaches to de-radicalization. Noting that the Tunisian prison system is already malfunctioning, the Tunisian government, efforts regarding rehabilitation remain insufficient.

Furthermore, individuals from Tunisia have been responsible for some fatal and major terrorist attacks in several European countries. Therefore, these attacks reflect the shortfalls of the Tunisian intelligence services that lacks a detailed knowledge of expatriate communities.

On the religious level, the Tunisian religious establishment remains poorly trained which hinders Imams' ability to provide convincing

counter-radicalization discourse. According to Tunisian researchers of Islamic Studies, only 7 percent of Tunisian Imams have received religious education, while just 30 percent have a university degree.

The economic instability remains a huge problem for the Tunisian government. This economic failure is negatively impacting the mitigation efforts, especially, that the feeling of frustration, injustice, and failure, along with the lack of equal economic opportunities are among the main drivers of youth radicalization.

2. Algeria

The Algerian strategy is based on two mechanisms: strengthening security and fighting money laundering.

2.1. Strengthening security

The authorities have upgraded the Ministry of Defense Budget to exceed 20 billion dollars annually and they worked on strengthening human resources through opening doors for recruitment in the military and law enforcement. Additionally, the Algerian government has provided the soldiers and police officers with intensive trainings in order to polish their skills as well as it has upgraded the armory of fighting terrorism through enhancing the wiretapping and intelligence system.

The Algerian security has created an updated database system to track foreign terrorists in cooperation with neighboring countries. They have adopted severe security measures in airports and sea ports in cooperation with Interpol to mitigate money laundering. Furthermore, the Algerian authorities tends to take serious measures to control money flow through abstaining from transferring money to terrorists in case of kidnapping and hijacking. «We are against the payment of ransoms by certain States for the release of their kidnapped compatriots», declared Rezag Barra, Advisor to the Presidency of the Republic in March 2004.

2.2. Legislative measures

The Algerian authorities have implemented the Amnesty and Peace Law of 2006 that reinforces the importance of integrating de-radicalized people into the society. The government has officially ended the state of emergency in 2011 and, in 2015 the State rectified legislative procedures, particularly the remand's procedure. To mitigate money laundering, the State has banned the banks from opening bank accounts with unknown identifications and asked the banks to report any suspicious activities. The government has adopted the United Nations Security Council's resolution number 2178 that abide countries to penalize supporters of foreign terrorist fighters.

2.3. Political measures

On the internal level:

The State has promoted National Amnesty as a political step to integrate disengaged and de-radicalized individuals. Additionally, they have integrated Islamists into the political life through allowing them to create parties. In 2012 the State allowed more freedoms related to political engagement; thus, around 63 political parties were created.

On the external level:

One of the main policies that the Algerian government has adopted is not intervening in other countries' internal affairs. However, the government has cooperated with neighboring countries to find solutions to the unrests that smear the region, and it has offered financial aids to the security and intelligence commission in the African Union.

Algeria has helped establish the Global Counterterrorism Forum in 2011 and has participated in the Sahel Intelligence meeting with Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Additionally, Algeria is an active member within the MENAFATF (The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force) in order to mitigate money laundering. The Algerian State has participated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program that aims at building a cooperative framework between North Africa and the Sahel region to fight terrorism.

2.4. Economic and social policies

The State has reinforced its investments within the country; in 2001 implementing three major projects and from 2011-2014 they started implementing a developing program to improve people's livelihood. The State has allowed Islamic oriented organizations to provide financial aid to those in needs specially in the underdeveloped areas of the country. The State has supported the social role of the mosques and therefore, allowed them to keep providing poor people with financial aids.

2.5. The media speech and the religious approach

There is a cooperation agreement between Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs that aims at fighting radical speech through providing religious lessons to whom interested through virtual channels as official websites dedicated to answer people's questions. The State allowed specific radical parties to be engaged in the political life, however, these parties are controlled by the State. The State has obliged these parties to help its efforts to denounce radical speech, for example condemning Jihad in Syria and those who support it.

The government is encouraging media outlets to adopt a moderated speech and to condemn radical approaches as well as to denounce hate and violent speech. Additionally, the State banned media outlets and social media users from sharing and posting videos and pictures linked to terrorist activities to fight the extremist propaganda.

2.6. Limitations

The most important drawback of this strategy is the lack of human rights consideration and there are limitations on civil liberties.

3. Morocco

Morocco, for instance, worked relentlessly on mitigating radicalism through establishing a mechanism that covers the religious and security aspects.

3.1. On the religious level

The government is focusing on promoting Sufism as a form of Islamic mysticism that emphasizes introspection and spiritual closeness with God; love is its manifestation, poetry, music and dance are the instruments of its worship and, attaining oneness with God is its ideal. Encouraging people to embrace Sufism is believed to mitigate the effects of radicalism. It, also, engaged women as a soft power to create a moderated speech through providing them with training sessions. Additionally, the Moroccan state established “House of Islam”; an institution that functions under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and it works on establishing a moderated islamic speech and reinforcing the spiritual aspect through Sufism. This institution is led by the King. The government is working on training and supervising imams in Morocco, as well as, sending supervisors to European countries as Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark and even to north America (Canada) in order supervise and teach the Moroccan expats about islam. Moreover, they launched TV channels and Radio stations dedicated to religious teachings in addition to answering people’s questions to prevent them from seeking information from suspicious sources.

3.2. On the security level

Morocco established a cooperative system between the Moroccan security sectors to minimize the terrorist threats, especially after the comeback of many Moroccan fighters from Syria, Iraq, and Sahel region. The government, also, worked on the reintegration of the detained terrorists into the Moroccan society through the launching of the Amnesty Initiative

led by the King Mohammed 6. This initiative would allow terrorists who expressed their readiness to abandon radical doctrines and embrace more moderated islamic one to be able to have a chance at being part of the Moroccan society. Furthermore, there is cooperation between the «Moroccan prison administration» and the League of Muhammadiyah Scholars at one hand and the UN development program in other hand, for the purpose of mitigating radical speech and help spread an islamic moderated speech. Additionally, Morocco established a cooperative system with other African countries. This system is based on exchanging personnel and intelligence information. Therefore, this cooperation is a success for it helped abort many terrorist plans.

3.3. Limitations

However, there are several drawbacks in this strategy, for its lack of legal and judicial aspects which open doors to illegal practices that impose restrictions on civil liberties. The level of inequality and unemployment is high in Morocco. However, the country is doing little to address these issues, especially that the concentration of radicalized individuals is generally in economically deprived urban areas. The only legal reform would be the introduction of longer prison sentences for public protest and online activities as well as restricting civic and political freedoms. These drawbacks might affect Moroccan efforts to mitigate the impacts of radicalization.

Chapter V

INCLUSION TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION AND TRIGGER DISENGAGEMENT

1. Preventing radicalization through Inclusion

In this research we separate preventing violent extremism from preventing or interrupting the process of radicalization. The latter is assessed by scrutinizing the similarities and differences between the perceptions of youth and that of radicalized individuals.

Indicator	Youth	Radicalized
Education	Automatically leads to employment	Enlighten inner peace
Employment	Gainful and a result of education	Has a purpose to elevate the community
Civic engagement	Leads to tangible change	Has the only goal to support those in need
Political participation	Subject to tangible change	Sharia reigns
Social acceptance	Desire for change is respected and supported by the community, friends, and family	Feeling of belonging to a group
Religion	Separate religion from social norms	Religion defines the social contract and all life aspects

Table 3: Youth versus radicalized individuals' perception of inclusion

Comparing the perception of indicators between tunisian youth and radicalized individuals conclude to a complete discrepancy leading researchers to estimate that working on youth feeling of inclusion must include radicalized individuals perception in any prevention programming. In other words, to prevent radicalization, strengthening youth feeling of inclusion must provide:

- An education that leads to a gainful employment and that enlighten youth life paths.
- A gainful employment that has a meaningful purpose
- Civil society that focusses on tangible change support those in immediate need
- Politics that implement non-stigmatizing reforms respecting ethics and social norms
- A community that supports youth desire for change accentuating on solidarity and sense of belonging
- Social norms that value Religion without confusing both.

In a second analysis, measuring the degree of importance of each indicator among radicalized individuals informs about the key shifters in the radicalization process.

The in-depth interviews discussions revealed that out of the 6 indicators, interviewees were more enthusiastic to express their thoughts about:

- 1.** Education
- 2.** Religion
- 3.** Employment

This entails the importance of these indicators respectively in radicalizing individuals thus crucial to interrupt the process.

2. Disengagement through Inclusion

As stated previously, this research focuses on the process of disengagement from violent extremist groups and not the de-radicalization as a whole mechanism. Understanding the perceptions of disengaged individuals and compare it to those of radicalized individuals inform on ways to support the disengagement process.

Indicator	Radicalized	Disengaged
Education	Enlighten inner peace	Provide theoretical and practical skills
Employment	Has a purpose to elevate the community	Gainful and ethical
Civic Engagement	Has the only goal to support those in need	Protect social norms
Political participation	Sharia reigns	Strict to basic participation and specific occasions - a matter to prove citizenship
Social acceptance	Feeling of belonging to a group	Accept their willingness to reintegrate
Religion	Religion defines the social contract and all life aspects	One's private relationship with God is not subject to others interpretation

Table 4: Radicalized versus disengaged individuals' perception of inclusion.

When researchers compared the perceptions of indicators among radicalized and disengaged individuals, they came to the conclusion that disengaged individuals still maintain certain notions from their experience with radical groups, prompting researchers to assert that any disengagement efforts focusing on inclusion must adjust to disengaged persons' perceptions and consistently break with radicalized individuals' perception.

To amplify the state of skepticism that radicalized individuals experience and support their detachment from violent extremist groups:

- Promote and provide an education that teaches practical skills.
- Promote and provide gainful employment that respects ethics and social norms.
- Promote the protection of social and cultural norms.
- Promote the efficiency of the democratic process.
- Promote the understanding of individual willingness to reintegrate the society.
- Promote the protection of freedom of thought, conscious and religion.

In a moment investigation, measuring the degree of significance of each indicator among disengaged individuals educates almost the key shifters within the disengagement process. The interviews discourses uncovered that out of the 6 indicators, interviewees were more eager to precise their contemplations on:

- 1.** Social acceptance
- 2.** Religion
- 3.** Employment

This involves the significance of these indicators respectively in disengagement hence pivotal to trigger the process.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Data collection protocol:

1. Define research objectives.

a) Research Statement:

Inclusive approaches reinforce Youth De-radicalization in post-revolutionary Tunisia.

Through this statement, the research team aims to establish the centrality of inclusion within de-radicalization and prevention programs that respond to violent extremism in post-revolutionary Tunisian context.

b) Research Questions:

To what extent inclusion affects Tunisian youth De-radicalization?

Through this question, the research team will assess to what extent inclusion affects Tunisian youth de-radicalization and, therefore, understand the real motives that lead Tunisian youth to de-radicalization. However, to reach the beforementioned conclusion, the research team aims to define and understand the root causes of radicalization.

Do the existing inclusive de-radicalization programs fit into post-revolutionary Tunisia?

This question addresses the adaptation of inclusive de-radicalization program through analyzing and assessing the effectiveness of the existing foreign and local de-radicalization and prevention approaches within post-revolutionary Tunisian context.

2. Data Tools Identification:

Objective 1.1.1:

- Root causes of radicalization (Tunisian Youth): **Literature Review and Interviews**
- Root causes of supporting Violent Extremism Groups (Tunisian Youth): **Literature Review and Interviews**
- Root causes of joining Violent Extremism Groups (Tunisian Youth): **Literature Review and Interviews**

Objective 1.1.2:

- Root causes of De-radicalization:

Trapped abroad: **Literature Review.**

Returnees: **Literature Review and Interviews.**

- Root causes of Disengagement
Trapped abroad: **Literature Review.**
Returnees: **Literature Review and Interviews.**

Objective 1.2.1:

- Defining inclusion: **Literature Review and Interviews.**
- Defining and assessing de-radicalization and disengagement to measure their efficiency: **Literature Review**
- Understanding the link between de-radicalization and inclusion: **Literature Review and Interviews**

Objective 1.2.2:

- Refining the definition of inclusion through modeling.
- Refining the definition of de-radicalization through modeling.

Objective 2.1.1:

De-radicalization/prevention programs in Tunisia: **Literature Review and Interviews**

Objective 2.1.2:

De-radicalization/prevention programs abroad: **Literature Review and Interviews**

Objective 2.1.3:

Defining the Tunisian context: **Literature Review, interviews, and Focus group**

3. Research methods

a) Who the data will be about?

The research team's target is Tunisian youth who went through radicalization process and, experienced the phase of both supporting and joining violent extremist groups. Furthermore, the data will cover the de-radicalization process through assessing the life cycle of radicalized Tunisian youth and their cognitive and behavioral profile.

b) How is the data going to be collected?

The primary data will be collected through reaching out to Tunisian youth, local stakeholders and official institutions, the secondary data will be collected through published studies, articles, and books.

During the data collection process, the research team will abide by the ethics and security protocols.

The language used during the data collection will be the “Tunisian Dialect”. The choice of language would be for the sake of preserving the data content. Moreover, it would help create a better understanding of the post-revolutionary Tunisian experience.

c) What is the format of the Data?

- **Qualitative:**

The qualitative data is based on literature review, interviews and focus groups.

Literature Review:

The purpose of a literature review is to establish the importance of the topic at hand and to provide a background information about it. Furthermore, it allows the researcher to effectively place themselves in a scholarly conversation.

With this literature review the research team aims at creating a comprehensive paper that works with books, academic and journalistic articles, research papers, policy briefs and accessible governmental data in order to establish a primary understanding of the topic.

The literature review covers:

- Defining Radicalization.
 - Root causes of supporting Violent Extremism Groups.
 - Root causes of joining Violent Extremism Groups.
- Defining De-radicalization.
 - Root causes of De-radicalization / Disengagement.
- Defining Inclusion.
 - Understanding the link between Prevention / De-radicalization and Inclusion.
- De-radicalization and prevention programs in Tunisia.
- De-radicalization and prevention programs abroad.
- Defining the Tunisian context.

Limitations:

- Creating a paper that lacks synthesis.

- Creating a paper that is not sufficiently critical.
- Creating a paper that does not discriminate between relevant and irrelevant materials.
- Creating a paper that lacks organizational structure.
- Creating a paper with an outdated materials and sources.

Interviews:

Interviews with the subjects:

Conducting interviews in a framework of a research is to put together a set of personalized questions that would help the research team gather information about the life cycle of a radicalized young person and their behavioral, psychological, and cognitive profile.

Interviews with stakeholders, NGO's representatives, and Decision-makers:

Conducting interviews with stakeholders and NGO's representatives would help the research team gather data about de-radicalization/disengagement and prevention programs in both Tunisia and abroad (Algeria and Morocco).

The Decision-makers would be discussing through the interviews the progress and efficiency of local de-radicalization/disengagement and prevention programs targeting local violent extremists and returnees.

The interviews cover:

- Root causes of radicalization.
- Root causes of supporting.
- Root causes of joining.
- Root causes of de-radicalization (returnees)
- Root causes of disengagement (returnees)
- Defining inclusion.
- Understanding the link between de-radicalization and inclusion.
- De-radicalization and prevention programs in Tunisia.
- De-radicalization and prevention programs abroad
- Defining the Tunisian context.

Limitations:

- Missing valuable information due to multitasking (interviewer).
- Failing to create a trustworthy atmosphere.
- Logistic and communication inconveniences.
- A challenging local environment (social instability, political crisis ...)

Focus groups:

A focus group is a limited gathering of people that are demographically grouped in order to assess a current social or political phenomenon. Through this group interview, the participants are asked about their perceptions regarding the issued matter. The focus group is an interactive process where the participants are free to express their point of views, in addition to interacting with other group members.

Through this research tool, the research team's goal is to collect data about the level of exclusion and inclusion within the youth community in different areas in Tunisia. This collected data would help the team understand the extent of exclusion and inclusion. The findings would be of an asset to the researchers to define youth perception on inclusion and exclusion.

The participants would be able to share their opinions in a trustworthy environment.

The number of participants and the targeted regions will be presented in detail through the Focus Group's Guideline. The latter would be developed and reviewed by experts.

The focus groups will cover:

- Defining the Tunisian context.

Limitation:

- Observer dependency and experimenter's bias (The data subjected to the influence of the personal judgment and assessment of the researcher who is conducting the focus group.)
 - Participants could hold back due to untrustworthy environment.
 - The lack of anonymity.
 - Logistics and communication inconveniences.
 - Cherry picked data to support forgone conclusion.
 - The participants not sharing their true perceptions and point of views.
- **Quantitative:**
A quantitative research is an empirical inquiry of existing phenomena through measured quantifiable indicators. It produces information based on specific case studies and public records.

Through this research tool, the research team's objective is to gather data about the extent of inclusion within youth community in order to understand and analyze its implication in the de-radicalization and prevention process. Additionally, the quantitative data will be used to frame and support the assessment of the Tunisian context.

The quantitative data will cover:

- Refining the definition of inclusion through modeling.
- Refining the definition of de-radicalization through modeling.

Limitation:

- It does not cover or reach the underrepresented population.
- Limited access to sources and official public records.
- Logistics and communication inconveniences.

4. Policies:

a) Data Collection Team:

Research leader: supervising and coordinating between team members.

Research Assistant: Preparing necessary paperwork and developing guidelines.

Research analyst: Transcribing, analyzing, and translating the data.

b) Focus groups/Interviews Strategy

The research team will develop a focus groups and interviews' guideline based on the literature review and the research objectives. Additionally, the research team will consult experts when drafting the focus groups and interviews' questionnaires.

c) Data Analyses:

This phase will cover the transcription, translation, and content analysis of the qualitative data. Additionally, it would cover the analysis of the quantitative data. This process is about sorting and verifying the compiled data. It would also, work on cleaning and validating the findings in accordance with "Data Quality Assurance".

The research team will analyze a person's level of exclusion and therefore, of inclusion. Through the findings extracted from the latter process, the team will assess the link between **"inclusion and exclusion"** on one hand and **"de-radicalization and prevention"** on the other hand.

The team will analyze the behavioral and cognitive profile of radical youth, through which they will assess and understand the process of supporting and joining a violent extremist group as well as the process of leaving.

- Analyze a person's level of inclusion before radicalization and prior de-radicalization.
- Analyze the behaviors and the beliefs concerning supporting and joining.
- Analyze the behaviors and the beliefs concerning disengagement and de-radicalization.

Appendix 2: Ethics and security protocol

Ethics and Security Protocol

The following guideline aims to protect the security, dignity and privacy of the researchers and every individual who, during this research, will be providing important information about themselves or others.

This guideline follows the Tunisian regulations (Article 24 of the Tunisian Constitution 2014, Organic Law 2004-63, and decree n° 2007-3004), and in accordance with commonly agreed standards of good practice such as the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report issued to protect the Human subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. These fundamental principles are categorized as:

- **Respect for Persons:** Respect for persons requires that subjects be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them.
- **Beneficence:** Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure their well-being.
- **Justice:** moral obligations require that there be fair procedures and outcomes in the selection of research subjects without taking advantage of their vulnerability.

The Protocol encompasses three sections that cover the moral requirements for the research.

Section A – Data Gathering Ethics

This section addresses the guidelines that the researchers shall follow when interviewing and gathering information.

1. Before an individual becomes a Subject of Research, they shall be notified of:
 - a) The aims, methods, anticipated benefits, and potential hazards of the research.
 - b) Their right to abstain from participating in the research and their right to terminate at any time their participation.
 - c) The confidential nature of their replies and any limits on such confidentiality.

2. No individual shall become a Subject of Research unless they are given the notice referred to in the preceding paragraph and provides a freely given consent that they agree to participate. No pressure or inducement of any kind shall be applied to pressure an individual to become a Subject of Research. Records of consent should be maintained.
3. No subject of research should be disrespected or treated with prejudice or racism.
4. The identity of the subject of the research shall be kept strictly confidential. After the research is concluded, any information revealing the identity of the subjects of the research shall be destroyed unless the individual concerned has consented otherwise in writing. No personal or sensitive information revealing the identity of the Subjects of the Research should be included in the research unless the individual has consented in writing, or such information is already in the public record.
5. When the potential research subject is under eighteen years old, parents or guardians should be counseled about the research and shall give their written consent to allow the participation of the potential underaged research subject.
6. Any Subject of the Research or their parents or guardians has the right to withdraw from the project at any time.
7. The research team shall remain neutral and shall not manipulate the Subject of the Research for any deliberate political or personal bias.
8. Any data sharing should be described. Encryption should be used for all electronic data outside a secure server.
9. Research should be preceded by careful assessment of predictable risks. Adequate facilities and procedures should be in place to deal with any potential hazards including emotional and mental distress. Activities should not be undertaken where the hazards are not believed to be predictable.
10. Researchers should be honest with respect to the conduct of their research. Conflict of interests are not unethical but should be declared beforehand.

Section B – Data Collection Assurance

This section helps assess the strengths and weaknesses of the data collected by applying data quality standards.

1. The data used in this research shall be rigorously verified and referenced to assess the quality of the data.
2. The data is collected, analyzed, and treated in the Tunisian Dialect to avoid translation errors. The report and findings will be written in English.

3. The research should be undertaken and/or supervised by appropriately qualified and experienced researchers and supervisors. The beforementioned parties should be held accountable for the research they undertake.
4. All reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that data is secure.
5. Data shall be assessed based on the following criteria to reduce the likelihood of errors occurring:
 - a) **Validity:**
The data should clearly and accurately represent the intended result. Errors in validity might be the outcome of a poor data collection process (e.g., recording or interview bias, transcription error) or from a wrong sampling of the population.
 - b) **Integrity:**
The risks from deliberate bias or data manipulation for political or personal reasons should be minimized. Supervisors should ensure the research integrity by listening to the interview tapes, examine data sets, ...
 - c) **Precision:**
Data shall be precise and specific enough to satisfy the intended data analysis.
 - d) **Reliability:**
Data should be collected in a stable and consistent manner over time. It shall be based on a protocol and procedures that do not change from one subject to another.
 - e) **Timeliness:**
Data should be available at a useful frequency as well as current. It should, also, be accessible for a reasonable period.

Section C – Security Protocol

The aim of the security protocol is to create a safe environment in which the research team members are comfortable in conducting their activities.

1. A supervisor should be appointed to coordinate and vet the proceeding of the activity.
2. A risk assessment should take place before the start of any event to take the necessary actions to mitigate the hazards.
3. The activities of the research team should always take place in a controlled environment in a safe emplacement with access to external communication.
4. The list of the participants and emplacement of the events should be communicated beforehand to the researchers.

5. The process and the timing of the event should be organized by the point of contact and communicated beforehand to the research team.
6. The research member should stop proceeding with the interview if they feel unsafe during the process.

Appendix 3: Consent forum

معلومات عامة

الغرض من البحث:

يهدف هذا البحث إلى إثبات أهمية "الإدماج" ومركزيته في إستراتيجيات درء التطرف العنيف ونبذ الفكر المتشدد في تونس ما بعد الثورة. الجزء الأول من البحث يهتم بمعالجة مدى تأثير إعادة ادماج الشباب التونسي في مختلف المجالات على نبذهم للفكر المتطرف مما سيساعد على مزيد فهم الأسباب التي تقود الشباب التونسي إلى نزع التطرف، ولكن قبل ذلك سيدرس فريق البحث الأسباب العميقة التي تدفع الشباب نحو التطرف من أجل فهم هذه الظاهرة.

ويعمل الباحثون في الجزء الثاني من البحث على وضع برنامج متكامل حول نزع التطرف ودرته في تونس ما بعد الثورة وذلك من خلال دراسة البرامج المعتمدة في تونس وفي الدول الأخرى.

كيفية اختيار المشاركين

الشريحة المستهدفة في هذا البحث هي الشباب التونسي الذي مر بتجربة التطرف وعاش مرطلي المساندة والانضمام الى الجماعات المتطرفة.

وستساهم البيانات التي سيتم تجميعها على دراسة الدورة الحياتية للشباب التونسي المتطرف من خلال التمحيص في الجانب الفكري والسلوكي للعينة المستهدفة.

الإجراءات

ستجمع البيانات والمعلومات من خلال الاحتكاك بالشباب التونسي والتواصل مع الشركاء المحليين والمؤسسات الرسمية.

كما سيلتزم الباحثون طيلة فترة البحث بالبروتكول الأخلاقي والأمني الخاص بالبحث. وستكون اللعة المستعملة خلال فترة تجميع البيانات "العامة التونسية" وذلك حفاظا على البيانات ووقايتها من أي تغيير قد يطرأ عليها إلى جانب أن هذا الاختيار سيساعد الباحثين على تكوين فهم معمق لهذه الظاهرة في إطارها التونسي.

مجموعات التركيز

السئلة المطروحة خلال النقاش ستكون بالضرورة مرتبطة بأسئلة البحث.

وخلال مجموعات التركيز سيتم الحديث حول المحيط الذي ينحدر منه المشاركون وذلك بهدف مساعدة الباحثين على مزيد فهم ظاهرة التطرف ونزع التطرف والادماج والتهميش في بيئتهم الاجتماعية.

كما بإمكان المشارك أو المشاركة عدم التصريح بأي معلومات قد تسبب له أو لها حرجا. سيجتمع المشاركون في هذا النقاش في مكان مشترك ولن يكون مسموح لأي شخص ما عدى المصريح لهم بالحضور بالتواجد خلال النقاش. وسيتم تسجيل كامل النقاش كما ستكون البيانات التي تم تجميعها سرية ولن يطلع عليها سوى فريق الباحثين.

المقابلات الفردية

سيكون مكان اجراء المقابلة من اختيار المشارك أو المشاركة.

بإمكان المشارك أو المشاركة عدم الإجابة على سؤال يعينه خلال المقابلة. ولا يمكن حضور أي شخص آخر للمقابلة إلا إذا أراد المشارك أو المشاركة أن يتواجد معهم مرافق.

المعلومات التي سيتم تسجيلها ستكون سرية ولن يطلع عليها سوى فريق الباحثين.

سرية البيانات

ستكون هوية المشارك أو المشاركة سرية وستتلف البيانات بعد نهاية البحث إلا إذا طالب المشارك أو المشاركة بغير ذلك من خلال مطلب خطي. ولن يتم ادراج البيانات الشخصية للمشارك أو المشاركة في البحث إلا إذا طالب المشارك أو المشاركة بغير ذلك من خلال مطلب خطي أو تكون البيانات موجودة في السجلات العمومية.

الحق في الانسحاب أو رفض المشاركة في البحث

من حق المشارك أو المشاركة عدم المشاركة أو الانسحاب في أي مرحلة من مراحل البحث.

الاتصال بنا

إن كان للمشارك أو المشاركة أي أسئلة حول البحث أو يريد (تريد) مشاركة معلومات قد تفيد مسار البحث فيإمكانه (ها) التواصل معنا من خلال الوسائل التالية:

نزار بن صالح: قائد فريق البحث

البريد الإلكتروني: n.bensalah@magef.org

الهاتف: (+216) 27249212

إيمان النيقاوي: باحثة ميدانية

البريد الإلكتروني: i.alnighaoui@magef.org

الهاتف: (+216) 27147251

استمارة الموافقة عل استعمال تسجيل صوتي أو صورة فوتوغرافية

(1) اسم وصفة الشخص الذي سيتم تسجيله أو تصويره

اسم.....
الصفة.....

(2) اسم وصفة الشخص الذي سيقوم بالتسجيل أو التصوير

اسم.....
الصفة.....

اسم.....
الصفة.....

اسم.....
الصفة.....

(3) أقر بأنني قرأت وفهمت جذاذة المعلومات العامة وبأنني طرحت الأسئلة اللازمة وتم الإجابة عليها.

(4) أنا مدرك بأنني شاركت طواعية في هذا اللقاء وبأن لي الحق في الانسحاب في أي وقت دون تقديم أي تفسيرات وبأن هذا الانسحاب لن يؤثر على حقوقي القانونية.

(5) أعراض استعمال التسجيل أو الصورة (أنظر الصفحة التالية)

(6) أنا مدرك (ة) تمام الإدراك بأن المعلومات التي سأدلي بها خلال المقابلة والتي ستكون ضمن البيانات المستعملة خلال البحث سيطلع عليها أعضاء المنتدى الاقتصادي المغربي وفريق البحث. وبهذا فإنني أصرح بإعطائي لهؤلاء الأفراد الإذن للاطلاع على تسجيلاتي.

7) أنا أقر بأن الشخص المذكور أعلاه بإمكانه (ها) القيام بالتسجيلات التالية وبأنه (ها) فسر (ت) لي مقتضيات استعمال هذه الوسائل.

أكثر ما يناسب	نعم	لا
<input type="checkbox"/> تسجيل <input type="checkbox"/>	الامضاء.....
<input type="checkbox"/> صورة <input type="checkbox"/>	بشهادة.....
<input type="checkbox"/> تسجيل <input type="checkbox"/>		

أو

أنتصرف بالنيابة عن..... وأنا موافق على القيام بالتسجيلات التالية وبأنه فسر لي مقتضيات استعمال هذه الوسائل.

أكثر ما يناسب	نعم	لا
<input type="checkbox"/> تسجيل <input type="checkbox"/>	الامضاء.....
<input type="checkbox"/> صورة <input type="checkbox"/>	بشهادة.....
<input type="checkbox"/> تسجيل <input type="checkbox"/>		

أغراض استعمال التسجيلات

- 1) هذه التسجيلات ستساعد الباحثين على تجميع المعلومات اللازمة التي ستساهم في تحقيق أهداف البحث.
- 2) أ. ستحول البيانات إلى نصوص مكتوبة ومن ثم ستترجم إلى الإنجليزية في مرحلة متقدمة من البحث.
ب. ستستعمل التسجيلات خلال مرحلة تحليل البيانات.
ج. ستكون التسجيلات تحت إشراف الباحثين الحاضرين أثناء التسجيل.
د. سيطلع كامل فريق البحث على التسجيلات عندما تكون جاهزة للتدقيق.

إمضاء الباحث.....

إمضاء المشارك.....

التاريخ.....

Appendix 4: Focus groups questions

السؤال الافتتاحي

اذكر ثلاثة حاجات إيجابية في حومتك/حيك وحاجة واحدة سلبية.

مقارنة

- حسب تجربتكم الشخصية هل تختلف المعاملات ما بين وقتلي تكونوا في الحي متاعكم و وقتلي تكونوا خارج الحي؟
- هل تحس عبارة "ولد بلاد" (أو براني) عندها تأثير على المعاملات كي تبدأ في الحي وخارج الحي؟

- حسب تجربتكم الشخصية كان فمة اختلاف علاش؟

توقعات/انتظار

- هل تشوفوا الي اختياراتكم في الدنيا هي بيدها الاختيارات الي قررها بوك وأمك في بلاصتك؟ (كان الإجابة بنعم، علاش؟)
- كان جات عندك عائلة وإنت المسؤول عليها كنت تفعد هنا وإلا تنقل الي بلاصة اخرى؟ وعلاش؟
- هل كانت اختياراتك في الدارسة مبنية على رغبة بوك وأمك وإلا انت اختارت الي روك؟ (كان الإجابة بنعم، علاش؟)

الانخراط في أنشطة مجتمعية وتطوعية

- الي ينطبق عليه ما يلي يهز يدو: قداش من واحد شارك في أنشطة في الصلب المجتمع المحلي (يعني المشاركة في الكشافة، جمعيات، جمعيات رياضية، أنشطة سياسية، اتحاد الشغل)
- أسئلة تكميلية للسؤال السابق:

- علاش انخرطت في حزب سياسي أو انظمت الي اتحاد الشغل؟
- هل حسيت بنوع من الانتماء الي المجتمع المحلي متاعك وقتلي انظمت للحزب السياسي أو اتحاد الشغل؟ وبالنسبة الي ما انخرطوش في جتي حزب أو في اتحاد شغل، علاش؟
- شنوا تعمل في أوقات فراغك؟

الدين

- . (رجال) هل كي تمارس شعائرك الدينية في مجموعة بخليك تحسي بالانتماء للمجتمع المحلي متاعك؟
- . (نساء) هل تعامل المحببة والغير المحببة بنفس الطريقة في مجتمعكم المحلي؟


قابلية

- . هل هناك حساسيات جهوية داخل الحي يعني هل تختلف المعاملات والمصالح داخل الحي حسب الجهة الي انت منها؟ كان الإجابة بنعم: هل عندها تأثير على الحياة اليومية سوى كان إيجابية أو سلبية.
- أسئلة تكميلية للسؤال السابق:
- . هل الانتماء الي جهة بعينها يساعدك في إيجاد عمل وهل يسهل قضاء بعض المصالح؟

السلامة

- . كان نهار توقفت شكون أول واحد تطلبو؟ وعلاش؟

Appendix 5: Assessment tool of inclusion in the Tunisian context



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